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Abstract
What explains the variation in implementation dynamics for cyber forces across militaries? In
other words, as cyber forces emerge in states across the international system, why do some
militaries undertake wide-ranging implementation efforts with few alterations to cyber force
structure, while implementation in other militaries is characterized by a drawn-out, incremental
process entailing several changes in cyber force structure?
Militaries have been building cyber capabilities since the late 1980s; however, formalized
military cyber organizations for these capabilities have only recently emerged. These cyber
forces—active-duty military organizations that possess the capability and authority to direct and
control computer network operations (CNOs) for strategic ends—have received little attention
from scholars. Despite the potential impacts cyber forces might hold for international security
dynamics, there exists no comprehensive overview of cyber forces and no analysis on the various
ways they have been implemented across militaries. Moreover, current explanations drawn from
the diffusion of military innovations remain incomplete in explaining the ways in which cyber
force structure change over the course of the implementation process.
In this dissertation, I examine the diffusion and implementation of cyber forces and
advance a theory of organizational size to account for the varying implementation dynamics
across militaries. My dissertation makes two important contributions to the growing literature on
cyber conflict. First, I offer a novel typology for categorizing cyber forces and the respective
force structures. By classifying cyber forces according to organizational model and scale of
command, I identify nine distinct cyber force structures: Subordinated Branch, Subordinated
Service, Subordinated Joint, Sub-Unified Branch, Sub-Unified Service, Sub-Unified Joint,
Unified Branch, Unified Service, and Unified Joint. The second contribution is empirical: I

create the first comprehensive database to catalogue the diffusion of cyber forces and evolution
of cyber force structures across state—the Dataset on Cyber Force Structures.
This dissertation also makes three broader contributions to the study of the diffusion of
military innovations. First, I show how organizational characteristics mitigate diffusion pressures
by constraining or enabling innovation and implementation. This dissertation moves past debates
that portray militaries as either change-resistant or innovation-seeking organizations by
providing a more nuanced claim: organizational characteristics—such as size—can predispose
militaries to pursue certain types of changes while creating resistance to others. As such, this
dissertation sheds important light on the ways in which the military organizational factors can
shape the agency and decisions of those implementing an innovation principle.
Second, I advance a stage-based conception of implementation for diffusion frameworks
comprised of five stages: pre-adoption, introduction, modification, expansion, and full
implementation. This framework can account for both partial and full adoption and provides a
way to assess intermediate changes to an innovation prior to its full institutionalization. As a
result, I use this framework to showcase the value of stage-based theorizing.
Third, this dissertation introduces new methodological tools for testing stage-based
hypotheses about adoption and implementation. In conjunction with qualitative analysis, this
dissertation utilizes multistate survival modeling to assess variable effects at each stage of the
implementation process. Traditional modeling techniques in the military diffusion literature—
such as logistic regressions and basic survival modeling—prove both cumbersome and
inadequate for assessing stage-based processes. In using multistate survival modeling, I
emphasize the importance of matching methods to conceptual and theoretical assumptions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

The Research Question
What explains the variation in implementation dynamics for cyber forces across militaries? In
other words, as cyber forces emerge in states across the international system, why do some
militaries undertake wide-ranging implementation efforts with few alterations to cyber force
structure, while implementation in other militaries is characterized by a drawn-out, incremental
process entailing several changes in cyber force structure?
The Need for an Organizational Focus in the Cyber Conflict Literature
Cyber forces1 are active-duty military organizations that possess the capability and authority to
direct and control strategic computer network operations (CNOs)2 in the cyber domain3 to

Several scholars have used the terms "military cyber organizations" or “cyber commands.” However, as is
explained in Chapter 2, I use "cyber forces" to facilitate a discussion of force structures, i.e., "cyber force structure"
is more concise than "military cyber organization force structure” and more precise than “cyber command
structure.” Thus, cyber forces, military cyber organizations, and cyber commands may be used interchangeably.
2
Computer network operations encompass three types of operations in the cyber domain. The first is computer
network defense (CND), which includes operations intended to the prevent compromises to the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability—through theft, infiltration, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction—of
information on computers or the computers or networks themselves. The second type of operation is computer
network exploitation (CNE), which encompasses intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance (ISR) operations to
collect information from an adversary’s computers and networks that fall short of disrupting or destroying
information. Finally, computer network attacks (CNA) are actions taken through a network of computers to disrupt,
deny, degrade, or destroy another computer’s information or the computers or networks themselves. Espionage and
theft only constitute CNAs when information or systems are destroyed in the process.
Jason Healey, ed., A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Arlington, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies
Association, 2013), 279–80; Piret Pernik, “Preparing for Cyber Conflict: Case Studies of Cyber Command”
(Tallinn, Estonia: International Centre for Defence and Security (RKK/ICDS), December 2018), 4.
3
The cyber domain is a hierarchical contingent system with four layers: (1) the physical layer of infrastructures that
enable the domain; (2) the syntactic layer of logical building blocks that support physical platforms and enable
services; (3) the semantic layer containing information content; and (4) the user layer of humans who interact with
the other three layers; see: Nazli Choucri, Cyberpolitics in International Relations (Cambridge and London: The
Massachusettes Institute of Technology Press, 2012), 8.
1

2
impact, change, or modify strategic diplomatic and military interactions between entities.4
Militaries have been building cyber capabilities since the late 1980s;5 however, formalized
military cyber organizations for these capabilities have only recently emerged.6 The creation of
United States Cyber Command in 2010 and its subsequent elevation to an independent unified
combatant command in 2017 stand as obvious examples of institutional innovation.7 A variety of
states have also established their own “cyber commands.” Examples include: South Korea in
2010;8 Colombia in 2011;9 the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Spain in 2013;10 and the

4

On the impact of computer network operations (i.e. cyber-attacks) on strategic interactions, see: Brandon Valeriano
and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
5
For a detailed account of the development of cyber capabilities in the United States, see: Craig J. Wiener,
“Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy: The Rise of Computer Network Operations as a Major Military Innovation”
(Doctoral Dissertation, Fairfax, VA, George Mason University, 2016).
6
Chris C. Demchak and Peter Dombroski, “Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age 2.0,” in Understanding Cyber
Security: Emerging Governance & Strategy, ed. Gary Schaub, Jr. (London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2018), 77–101; Healey, A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012.
7
Robert Knake, “Obama’s Cyberdoctrine,” Foreign Affairs, May 6, 2016,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-05-06/obamas-cyberdoctrine; Elias Groll, “Trump
Elevates Cyber Command,” Foreign Policy, August 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/18/trump-elevatescyber-command/.
8
Zachary Keck, “South Korea Seeks Offensive Cyber Capabilities,” The Diplomat, October 11, 2014,
https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/south-korea-seeks-offensive-cyber-capabilites/.
9
“Colombia Rises to the Cyber Challenge,” Dialogo, April 1, 2013, https://dialogoamericas.com/en/articles/colombia-rises-cyber-challenge.
10
Osula, Anna-Maria, “National Cyber Security Organisation: United Kingdom,” National Cyber Security
Organisation (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2015),
https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/national-cyber-security-organisation-united-kingdom/; Esnar Seker and Ihsan
Burak Tolga, “National Cyber Security Organisation: Turkey,” National Cyber Security Organisation (Tallinn,
Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2018),
https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/national-cyber-security-organisation-turkey/; Alexander Cendoya, “National
Cyber Security Organisation: Spain,” National Cyber Security Organisation (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2016), https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/national-cyber-securityorganisation-spain/.

3
Netherlands and Ecuador both in 2014.11 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
also announced its own plans to stand up a cyber command by 2023.12
Despite these developments, cyber forces have received little explicit attention from
international security scholars. Instead, researchers have placed an overwhelming focus on
coercive logics of cyber-attacks,13 escalatory dynamics,14 debates over offense-dominance,15 and
the transformation of warfare.16 Other works have centered on military organizations as
stakeholders in national cyber-ecosystems17 and in emerging civil-military issues related to

Kadri Kaska, “National Cyber Security Organisation: The Netherlands,” National Cyber Security Organisation
(Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2015),
https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/national-cyber-security-organisation-the-netherlandskadri-kaskaactivepassive-cyber-defence-law-national-frameworks-policy-strategy-the-netherlands/; Directorate of Social
Communication of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces of Ecuador, “Fuerzas Armadas realiza taller para defini
Infraestructura critica [Armed Forces conducts workshop to define Critical Infrastructure],” Nota Periodistica No.
2015-04-20-01-DIR-C.S., April 20, 2015, https://www.ccffaa.mil.ec/2015/04/20/fuerzas-armadas-realiza-taller-paradefinir-infraestructura-critica/.
12
Robin Emmott, “NATO Cyber Command to Be Fully Operational in 2023,” Reuters, October 16, 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023idUSKCN1MQ1Z9.
13
Ryan C. Maness and Brandon Valeriano, “The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Interactions,” Armed
Forces & Society 42, no. 2 (2016): 301–23; Valeriano and Maness, Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber
Conflict in the International System; E. D. Borghard and S. W. Lonergan, “The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace,”
Security Studies 26, no. 3 (2017): 452–81; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,”
International Security 41, no. 3 (Winter /2017 2016): 44–71; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C.
Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2018).
14
D. Gompert and Martin Libicki, “Cyber Warfare and Sino-American Crisis Instability,” Survival 56, no. 4 (2014):
7–22; Sean T. Lawson et al., “The Cyber-Doom Effect: The Impact of Fear Appeals in the US Cyber Security
Debate” (2016 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, 2016), 65–80; Mischa Hansel, “CyberAttacks and Psychological IR Perspectives: Explaining Misperceptions and Escalation Risks,” Journal of
International Relations and Development, 2016, 1–29; Jacquelyn Schneider, “The Information Revolution and
International Stability: A Multi-Article Exploration of Computing, Cyber, and Incentives for Conflict”
(Dissertation, Washington, D.C., George Washington University, 2017); Benjamin Buchanan, The Cybersecurity
Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear between Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
15
I. Saltzman, “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance,” Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1 (2013):
40–63; Rebecca Slayton, “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?: Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment,”
International Security 41, no. 3 (Winter /2017 2016): 72–109.
16
J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is Coming!,” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (1993): 141–65; Richard
Clarke and Robert Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security (New York: Harper Collins, 2010);
Lucas Kello, “The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft,” International Security 38,
no. 2 (2013): 7–40; Timothy J. Junio, “How Probable Is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back in to the Cyber
Conflict Debate,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 1 (2013): 125–33; John Lindsay, “The Impact of China on
Cyber Security: Fiction and Friction,” International Security 39, no. 3 (2015): 7–47.
17
For overviews, see: Eviatar Matania, Lior Yoffe, and Tal Goldstein, “Structuring the National Cyber Defence: In
Evolution towards a Central Cyber Authority,” Journal of Cyber Policy 2, no. 1 (2017): 16–25; Moritz Weiss and
11

4
cyberspace.18 As one recent review of the literature has highlighted, the lack of analysis of cyber
forces—and, in particular, different organizational structures—hinders a greater understanding
of cyber conflict.19 Given the implications that cyber forces might hold for security dynamics,
this shortage of substantial analysis is problematic. The development and growth of cyber forces
provide evidences of states’ interest in conducting offensive cyber operations.20 As a result, these
organizations and their activities can potentially impact escalatory dynamics in cyberspace,21
cyber-arms racing,22 and the effectiveness of coercive campaigns in the cyber domain.23 More
broadly, understanding the diffusion and evolution of cyber forces is also a necessary step in

Vytautas Jankauskas, “Securing Cyberspace: How States Design Governance Arrangements,” Governance, 2018, 1–
17.
18
Sergei Boeke, Matthijs A. Veenendaal, and Caitriona H. Heinl, “Civil-Military Relations and International
Military Cooperation in Cyber Security: Common Challenges and State Practices across Asia and Europe,” in 7th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict (Architectures in Cyberspace, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE
Publications, 2015), 1–13; Sergei Boeke, “National Cyber Crisis Management: Different European Approaches,”
Governance 31 (2018): 449–64.
19
Emphasis added. Robert Gorwa and Max Smeets, “Cyber Conflict in Political Science: A Review of Methods and
Literature” (2019 International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, Canada, 2019), 1–24.
20
Max Smeets, “NATO Members’ Organizational Path Towards Conducting Offensive Cyber Operations: A
Framework for Analysis,” in 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, ed. T. Minarik et al.
(Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2019), 163–78. On the integrations of offensive cyber operations
ito organizational missions, see: Max Smeets and Herbert S. Lin, “Offensive Cyber Capabilities: To What Ends?,”
in 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon X: Maximising Effects, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD
COE Publications, 2018), 55–72; Max Smeets, “Organisational Integration of Offensive Cyber Capabilities: A
Primer on the Benefits and Risks,” in 9th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (Defending the Core, Tallinn,
Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2017), 1–18.
21
On cyber-escalation, see: Schneider, “The Information Revolution and International Stability: A Multi-Article
Exploration of Computing, Cyber, and Incentives for Conflict”; Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking,
Trust, and Fear between Nations.
22
Anthony Craig and Brandon Valeriano, “Conceptualising Cyber Arms Races” (2016 8th International Conference
on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), Tallinn, Estonia, 2016), 141–58; Anthony Craig and Brandon Valeriano, “Reacting to
Cyber Threats: Protection and Security in the Digital Age,” Global Security and Intelligence Strudies 1, no. 2
(2016): 21–41.
23
These organizations can also provide insight into how states and conceptualize the co-deployment of computer
network operations with kinetic force in battlefield settings to coerce adversaries; see: Nadiya Kostyuk and Yuri M.
Zhukov, “Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,
2017, 1–31, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002717737138. For overviews of cyber coercion, see:
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” International Security 41, no. 3 (Winter /2017
2016): 44–71; Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character
of Power and Coercion (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018).

5
theorizing how technology shapes and reshapes the nature of interactions, conflict, and warfare
between states over time.24
To date, scholars investigating cyber forces have focused more on the varying maturity of
forces rather than the structural variation. For example, both Gomez (2016) and Robinson et al.
(2013) analyze military cyber organizations as one component of a state’s national cyber
capabilities. While Gomez (2016) only relies on the presence or absence of these organizations
in his index, Robinson et al. (2013) assess the maturity of cyber organizations within European
Union member states’ militaries.25 Similarly, Smeets (2019) catalogues the maturity of military
cyber organizations across NATO-member states, finding that most organizations are still in the
nascent stages of development.26 Although these studies provide valuable insights, a focus on
organizational maturity inadvertently homogenizes institutions in terms of mandates, scope of
authority, and missions. Even when organizations are at the same stage of development or
maturity, there may exist crucial structural differences between cyber forces.
While the United States’ cyber force structure has been debated extensively,27 analysis in
a comparative context has been rare. Saltzman (2013) provides an important bridge by
categorizing offensive and defensive cyber force postures for China, Russia, the United States,
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and NATO.28 Although highlighting variation in militaries, Saltzman’s study emphasizes
strategic dynamics over the variation in organisational dimensions. To this end, Pernik (2018)
investigates different cyber force command structures. In the first publicly available comparison
of cyber forces, Pernik identifies three distinct command types: cyber divisions, which are
subordinate to larger logistical entities in the military; cyber services, which are standalone
functional combat services; and cyber commands, which are standalone combatant commands or
branches with the capability and authority to direct and computer network operations.29 Although
an important foundation, this conceptualization only capture a small amount of the possible
institutional variation in cyber forces.
This review reveals three major shortcomings in existing works on cyber forces. The first
is definitional: scholars have utilized a variety of definitions to identify cyber forces. As such,
“[t]here is no common understanding of what constitutes a cyber command.”30 Second, and
relatedly, no consistent terminology has emerged for classifying and assessing the military
institutions tasked with developing and deploying cyber capabilities. The lack of a common
definition—and the blanket usage of the term “cyber command”—has masked important
variation in the roles, responsibilities, and scope of institutional arrangements of cyber forces.
Finally, as a result, there exists no comprehensive overview of existing cyber forces and no
explanation of how cyber force structures change across and within militaries over time.
Considering this discussion, my dissertation makes two important contributions to
the growing literature on cyber conflict. First, I offer a novel typology for categorizing cyber
forces and the respective force structures. By classifying cyber forces according to organizational
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model and scale of command, I identify nine distinct cyber force structures: Subordinated
Branch, Subordinated Service, Subordinated Joint, Sub-Unified Branch, Sub-Unified
Service, Sub-Unified Joint, Unified Branch, Unified Service, and Unified Joint. The second
contribution is empirical: I create the first comprehensive database to catalogue the
diffusion of cyber forces and evolution of cyber force structures across state.
The Argument
Drawing on insights from the diffusion of military innovations and organizational theory, the
central argument of this dissertation is that organizational size—specifically, the size of a
state’s military organization—is an ever-present but oft-overlooked variable that shapes
the implementation of cyber forces and thus the changes in cyber force structure over time.
Implementation is a dynamic process consisting of five interconnected stages: pre-adoption,
introduction, modification, expansion, and full implementation. Some implementation efforts
may move through each stage, while others may bypass certain stages altogether. Substantively,
creating and implementing cyber forces requires both building a mission-oriented, operationally
effective organization and integrating that organization into the existing defense bureaucracy.
Although these goals pull implementation resources in opposing directions, implementers must
achieve both to fully implement a cyber force.
In short, implementers in larger military organizations are more predisposed to initially
prioritize bureaucratic integration of cyber forces over operational imperatives, while those in
smaller militaries are more likely to prioritize building cyber capabilities. Despite a greater risk
tolerance and the availability (relative to smaller organizations) of human and financial capital to
build out the cyber mission, larger militaries entail a greater number of competing interests that
can threaten the autonomy of cyber forces or lay claim to the cyber mission. As such,
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implementers in larger militaries are more likely to ensure the bureaucratic integration and
organizational survival of cyber forces before prioritizing mission-building. Conversely, smaller
militaries are more likely to focus directly on mission-building. Implementers in smaller
militaries face a smaller pool of bureaucratic competitors; however, smaller militaries possess a
smaller resource base and lack the risk tolerance of larger militaries. Accordingly, implementers
are more inclined to vigorously build out the cyber mission to justify an additional strain on
financial and human capital. Subsequently, implementers in smaller militaries are likely to pivot
to the bureaucratic imperative in attempts to secure future resources.
Size is an obvious factor that matters in contingent and unobvious ways. Organizational
size—in conjunction with other factors—helps shape implementation priorities that influence
implementation pathways and changes in cyber force structure. While organizational size does
not fully explain implementation dynamics, this dissertation asserts that the effects of size on the
implementation process cannot be ignored.
Diffusion of Military Innovations: A Necessary but Underspecified Foundation
To examine the spread and implementation of cyber forces worldwide, this dissertation builds on
frameworks advanced in the literature on the diffusion of military innovations. While this
dissertation does not explicitly examine processes of diffusion, it does ask: “what comes next”?
Diffusion provides a necessary precursor and foundation for examining the implementation of an
international innovation. As such, exploring the assumptions and shortcomings inherent in the
diffusion literature represent a crucial starting point for examining what “comes next”—
implementation.
Broadly, diffusion represents a pattern of “[a]n S-shaped rate of adoption over
time…[and] different sources/channels at different stages in the innovation-decision process for
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an individual [unit].”31 Diffusion can be viewed as a consequence of interdependence between
units of analysis.32 Authors across a range of subfields—most prominently, the international
security and public policy subfields—generally agree that diffusion is defined as (1) a process
occurring (2) among the members of a social system whereby (3) an innovation is communicated
(5) through certain channels (6) over time and where (7) the probability of adopting the
innovation is systematically conditioned by the prior choices of others in the social system.33
Diffusion studies must thus account for five factors: the transfer object (innovation), the
transfer agent, the transfer recipient, the transfer media/medium, and the demand
environment/social system.34 In studies of military diffusion, states and their militaries are
naturally the primary transfer agents and recipients of innovations spreading across the
international system. Authors have focused broadly on the competitive, normative, and cultural
transmission mediums through which innovations diffuse.35 The innovation at the center of
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diffusion is generally a policy that is new to the government (or unit of analysis) that is adopting
it.36 Studies of domestic public policy in the United States have focused on the spread of
innovations such as welfare and civil rights policies,37 education policies and reforms,38 tort
laws,39 state lottery policies,40 the Children’s Health Insurance Program,41 and anti-smoking
policies.42 Diffusion studies in international relations (outside of military innovation) have
tended to focus on phenomena such as capital account liberalization,43 bilateral investment
treaties,44 regime changes,45 and militarized conflict and war.46
In the context of military diffusion,47 innovations represent “changes in the conduct of
warfare designed to increase the ability of a military organization to convert the components of
potential military power into actual military power.”48 Additionally, military innovations can be
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further defined along two dimensions.49 First, innovations can occur at strategic, operational,
and/or tactical levels.50 Second, innovations can be defined in terms of technological, doctrinal,
and/or organizational components. Although an innovation can encompass one, two, or all three
components;51 of the three, technological dimensions have usually received the most attention
from scholars.52 Importantly, innovations may only have limited success improving the ability of
militaries to generate greater power; wide-ranging impacts are not a pre-requisite for defining
innovations.53
Shortcomings in the Military Diffusion Literature
The preceding discussion provides an important conceptual foundation for explaining the
implementation of cyber forces and the development of cyber force structures over time.
Nevertheless, I argue that, on two accounts, existing military diffusion frameworks remain
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underspecified for addressing the variety of ways in which militaries can implement cyber forces
post-adoption. First, studies rarely acknowledge the degree of agency and innovation modulation
that is available to potential adopters. Specifically, studies must specify whether the innovation
under investigation is a concrete model—i.e. it entails specific policy instruments and a blueprint
for implementation—or a broader principle or framework. Second, and relatedly, existing
diffusion frameworks tend to treat implementation as part of adoption: successful adoption
assumes successful implementation.
Problem 1: Innovation Model or Innovation Principle? Innovative policies and
technologies exist on a spectrum from concrete models with specific policy instruments and a
blueprint for adoption to broader principles or frameworks.54 At one extreme, potential adopters
are presented with a distinct innovation model. This model prescribes the adoption of certain
policy instruments—tools and techniques that link the adoption of an innovation to its
implementation55—and entails information on how the innovation should be implemented. At the
other extreme, an innovation appears as general principle to be adopted, i.e. broad maxims of
innovation that provide a general direction for policymakers but do not prescribe specific policy
instruments or courses of action regarding implementation.56 Military diffusion studies rarely
explicitly acknowledge which phenomenon—model diffusion or principle diffusion—is under
investigation. Two examples, the analysis of new “military models” and carrier warfare, serve to
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show that that same types of innovations have been portrayed as both concrete models and
general principles.
New “military models” in the literature have been examined as both innovation principles
and concrete innovation models. Studies of information technology-based (IT) military models,
network-centric military models, and the revolution in military affairs (RMA) fall into the former
category—broad principles of innovation. For instance, Demchak’s (2003) assessment of the
spread of IT-based militaries advances five broad maxims related to innovation: doctrinal
flexibility, strategic mobility, tailorability and modularity, joint and international connectivity,
and the versatility to function in both war and operations other than war. As the author notes, the
IT-based “model” is an incredibly broad vision that has been pursued in a variety of ways.57
Similarly, Junio (2012) defines network-centric military forces as those incorporating “a group
of operational concepts that, together, are intended to enable a military to conduct missions
quicker and more effectively.”58 Key concepts include: self-synchronization; the organization of
the military itself into a network to absorb and disseminate information; increased speed of
decision making; enhanced battlespace awareness; and the decentralization of decision making.59
As with Demchak’s study on IT-based militaries, Junio’s net-centric “model” is based on broad
principles for innovation that can be implemented in different ways. Works on military
transformation and RMA offer even broader examples of innovation principles. For example, the
edited volume by Terriff et al. (2010) examines the spread of the United States’ transformation
model to its European NATO allies. This U.S.-based “model” rests on three broad innovation
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principles: network-enabled capability, similar to Junio’s (2012) network-centric warfare;
effects-based operations; and a shift from territorial defense to expeditionary warfare. As the
introductory chapter of the volume notes, these are inherently broad concepts for innovation.60
At the same time, scholars have assessed the diffusion of more concrete, specific military
models. Resende-Santos’ (2007) work offers such an example: his study centers on the attempts
of Latin American militaries to emulate the Prussian/German military model. He identifies four
distinguishing features of the Prussian/German model. The first was a conscription system
consisting of short-term service in the first line that built a pool of trained reserves. Conscription
was decentralized so that service was done primarily at the local district of enlistment. The
second feature of the Prussian model was its system of officer recruitment and instruction; this
included a reorganization of military education and changes to curriculum that separated officer
training from general military education. Third, the Prussian model organized the general staff
according to mission-orientation: it was subdivided into functional departmental groupings so
that it could manage all aspects of mass warfare. The general staff was also given extensive
autonomy and command authority vis-à-vis civilian.61 This model is contrasted with the French
model. The French model hinged on: a conscription system focused on longer-term service
(seven-plus years) for the first line; little distinct education training for general staff officers; and
a weak, decentralized general staff that was heavily subordinated to civilians.62
Eisenstadt and Pollack (2003) examine another case of model diffusion: the spread of the
Soviet model to the Middle East. The authors identify twelve doctrinal and organizational
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features of the Soviet model: (1) the linkage of force to diplomacy—war served political
objectives, and strategy and operations were subordinate to political planning; (2) achieving
rapid victory and enemy annihilation through surprise, offense, and continuous operations; (3)
echeloned attacks with multiple breakthrough points; (4) the use of air and missile operations and
operational maneuver groups to attack through the enemy’s depth; (5) an emphasis on
preemptive strikes on the enemy’s tactical nuclear forces; (6) fast-paced operations with advance
rates of roughly 50-70 kilometers per day; (7) maximized freedom of operational commanders
and restricted freedom for tactical commanders; (8) detailed operational planning with an
assumption that set-piece planning will change; (9) highly mechanized forces; (10) placing the
taking as a centerpiece of force structure; (11) and emphasis on combined arms; and (12) the use
of air superiority as a key tool for success.63 Even more so than Resende-Santos’ description of
the Prussian/German model, Eisenstadt and Pollack provide multiple innovation characteristics
and instruments with which to assess diffusion.
Carrier warfare offers an even clearer example of how researchers can define the same
innovation as both a model and principle. Goldman (2003) identifies two distinct institutional
models of carrier warfare from the end of World War I to the end of World War II: the offensive
model and the defensive model of carrier warfare. Goldman elaborates:
The Americans and Japanese adopted the offensive carrier air paradigm. They
made air power the centerpiece of their navies, transition to air-centered naval
organizations and operations, and concentrated and operated carriers
independently in carrier battle groups. The British grafted air power onto existing
doctrine, keeping the carrier in a defensive role, subordinate to part of the battle
line. They used carriers to hunt down enemy raiders and supply ships, escort
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convoys, attack special land targets, conduct ocean sweeps and patrols, and ferry
land-based aircraft to fighting zones.64
Goldman differentiates these two models along four dimensions: the prevailing air power-battle
fleet paradigm; carrier-specific doctrine; the organizational structure within which aircraft
carriers were embedded; and the carrier design and the design of the aircraft complement.65 In
contrast, Horowitz (2010) assesses the non-adoption (i.e. failed diffusion) of carrier warfare. He
does not define a distinct model of carrier warfare; instead, carrier warfare is defined more as a
general principle that entails
the combined use of fleet aircraft carriers and an array of logistical ships for the
purpose of conducting strikes against enemy naval assets and establishing sea
control. It uses carriers as mobile airfields, abandoning reliance on naval gunfire
as the core of the naval fleet by substituting air-launched weapons for the power
of the big gun.66
These examples show that military diffusion studies can and do conceptualize
innovations as both concrete models and broader principles. However, researchers rarely
acknowledge whether they are examining model diffusion or principle diffusion; instead,
authors’ definitions of innovations act as an implicit signal. For two reasons, this becomes
problematic, particularly as studies engage with and build on previous research.
First, the specification of an innovation—whether in the form of a principle or a model
with instruments—can affect findings regarding both the degree and rate of diffusion.67 Scholars
that study the same innovation but define it differently (as a model or principle) can reach
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different theoretical conclusions about the dynamics of diffusion. Second, conceptualizing an
innovation as a principle or model carries important implications for assessing the degree to
which adopters have room for agency and modulation. Model diffusion leaves little room for
agency and empirical variation. Because innovations are defined with specific policy instruments
and implementation plans, agency and empirical variation remains limited as militaries may
choose to fully adopt the model, adopt select components/instruments of the model, or reject the
model through either non-adoption or wholesale reinvention of the innovation.68 Under principal
diffusion, however, there exists much more room for agency and empirical variation. There is no
standard innovation model from which to deviate; instead, the general innovation principle is
adopted. As such, potential adopters are faced with a broader range of adoption and
implementation choices and decisions. There is no source of empirical variation in the adoption
stage: the broad principle is either adopted or it is not. Changes and variation thus occur during
implementation and are relative to how each individual military initially implemented the
innovation principle. As a result, model diffusion presents limited agency and variation at the
adoption stage for potential adopters; in contrast, principle diffusion allows for greater agency
and empirical variation which manifest during implementation.69 This analytical shift highlights
a second, related problem in the military diffusion literature.
Problem #2: Conflating Implementation with Adoption. The second conceptual
shortcoming in the military diffusion literature is the conflation of implementation an adoption.
Implementation has traditionally received little attention from the military diffusion literature.
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Similarly, military innovation studies tend to focus on explanations for innovation outcomes—
specifically the invention and incubation of new technologies and practices—instead of
implementation dynamics. Most accounts across both literatures “black box” implementation: it
is combined into a single “adoption” stage, where civilian or military leaders decide to adopt an
innovation, then provide implementation orders to the relevant military community that faithfully
implements the innovation.70
In effect, the probability of implementation success is equated with the probability of
adoption. As such, these studies can account for the initial introduction of an innovation into a
military organization but not the subsequent institutionalization of that innovation.71 Researchers
risk overlooking instances of successful adoption but failed implementation by classifying these
cases as failed adoption. Moreover, military innovation studies focus on this dynamic mainly in
relation to the “prime movers” of an international innovation; diffusion studies generally focus
on the decision calculus of a wider range of potential adopters.
By collapsing implementation into adoption, studies neglect the dynamic and contested
nature of implementation and the forms of political and organizational resistance that can emerge
in response to implementation. There are a few exceptions; as several have noted, there is a clear
distinction between attempting to implement and innovation and actually doing so.72 In the
military innovation literature, Mahnken (2011) and Rosen (1991) conceptualized implementation
as a distinct stage that occurs after the speculation and experimentation associated with
innovation. In this sense, implementation activities occur after adoption to support the integration
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and routinization of an innovation.73 In a rare example in the diffusion literature, Grauer (2015)
integrates the dynamics of bureaucratic politics into diffusion logics by focusing on the adoption
and implementation German military doctrine in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. His analysis
shows that opposing bureaucratic factions can actively stall or sabotage implementation—as the
size of the opposing faction grows, the chances of fully implementing German doctrine
significantly decrease. Stulberg et al. (2007) deal with similar implementation issues related to
the spread of military transformation initiatives: military organizations are much more likely to
vigilantly implement transformation when procedural oversight mechanisms are clearly specified
and existing managerial norms are utilized.74
However, these exceptions only focus on the degree to which an innovation is
implementation. As such, accounts of change in military diffusion generally tend to be subsumed
under adoption decisions.75 The challenge, then, is to conceptualize a broader diffusion
framework that (1) applies to both model and principle diffusion, (2) applies to all potential
adopters of an innovation (prime movers and later adopters), (3) considers adoption decisions,
and (4) accounts for a dynamic implementation process in terms of the scope and character of an
innovation over time.
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This Dissertation’s Contributions to Military Diffusion Studies
When taken together, the shortcomings discussed above suggest that military diffusion
frameworks need important clarifications and extensions, particularly for cases of principle
diffusion. To these ends, this dissertation makes three contributions to the literature on the
diffusion of military innovations. First, I highlight how organizational characteristics
mitigate diffusion pressures by constraining or enabling innovation and implementation.
Organizational factors—such as organizational size—filter the international stimuli associated
with diffusion76 by facilitating certain types of innovation and change while constraining
others.77 In doing so, this dissertation moves past claims that portray military organizations as
either resistant to change (and thus an obstacle to diffusion) or proactive in seeking out
innovation.78 Instead, I provide a more nuanced claim: organizational characteristics such as size
can predispose militaries to pursue certain types of innovation while creating resistance to others.
As such, this dissertation sheds important light on the ways in which the characteristics of
military organizations can shape the agency and decisions of those implementing an innovation
principle.
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Second, I advance a stage-based conception of implementation for diffusion
frameworks and showcase the value of stage-based theorizing. I assert that the
implementation dynamic process is comprised of five stages: pre-adoption, introduction,
modification, expansion, and full implementation. This framework can account for both partial
adoption (introduction) as well as more comprehensive adoption efforts that include
institutionalization (full implementation). This also provides as way to assess changes to an
innovation during implementation (modification) as well as the degrees to which an innovation is
implemented over time (expansion). This framework is particularly important for understanding
how innovation principles are implemented across the diffusion process.
Third, this dissertation introduces new methodological tools for testing stage-based
hypotheses about adoption and implementation. Specifically, this dissertation utilizes
multistate survival modeling to assess variable effects at each stage of the implementation
process. The methods used for testing hypotheses must mesh with the assumptions behind
different frameworks. In the case of the stage-based framework advanced by this dissertation,
traditional modeling techniques—such as logistic regressions (logit and probit) and basic
survival modeling—prove both cumbersome and inadequate for assessing stage-based processes.
Moreover, the stage-based framework highlights the importance of qualitative case studies, and
particularly negative cases to explore why some countries are more likely to move through some
implementation stages but less likely to experience others.79
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Research Design
This dissertation is an exercise in theory development to highlight the importance of
organizational size in understanding implementation dynamics. As such, the dissertation has
three analytical goals: (1) establish that cyber forces are spreading across the globe and that
considerable variation exists in cyber force structure both across and within states; (2) illuminate
the overall and stage-specific effects of military size on implementation; and (3) construct causal
narratives to probe, identify, and differentiate theorized mechanisms.
To these ends, this dissertation employs an integrated multi-method design.80 The first
stage consists of quantitative analysis. More specifically, it uses both a stratified Cox
proportional-hazards model and a multistate survival model to assess the overall and stagespecific effects of organizational size, respectively. Although used extensively in epidemiology
and biomedical studies,81 multistate modeling remains rare in political science.82 As an extension
of Cox models,83 multistate models can model a duration process comprised of multiple stages
with a variety of process structures. Stages are defined based on failure events that a subject is at
the risk of experiencing; these failure events represent transitions between stages.84 Like
stratified Cox models, multistate models allow transitions to have different underlying rates of
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occurrence by permitting baseline hazards to vary across transitions. Unlike stratified Cox
models, multistate models allow for transition-specific covariates and can thus capture the
theoretically differential impact of independent variables at different stages.85 For quantitative
modeling, I introduce a custom-created database of cyber forces worldwide: the Dataset on
Cyber Force Structures (DCFS).
The second stage consists of qualitative analysis. This stage hinges on a series of withincase analyses across two militaries—the United States and Estonia—with a preliminary
extension to a third, Germany, in the concluding chapter. Both the United States and Estonia
represent extreme-on-the-X case selections based on the survival regressions: the U.S. military as
an extremely large organization and the Estonian military as an extremely small organization.
Because both the U.S. and Estonia represent extreme values of organizational size, they present
useful cases for investigating and differentiating causal pathways as well as for assessing
measurement error and potential omitted variable bias in my regressions.86 Moreover, examining
the implementation of cyber forces in these countries offers leverage over several key aspects of
the project—namely, organizational size and implementation pathways—while theoretically
controlling for common effects from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Allies can
be a source of information about threats87 and a source of pressures toward conformity.88 NATO
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has also been an international leader in defining the strategic cyber-environment89 and its
members have been at the forefront of developing cyber capabilities.90
The evolution of U.S. cyber force structure presents three episodes for analysis: (1) the
failed modification of U.S. cyber force structure with the rise and fall of U.S. Air Force Cyber
Command (Provisional) from 2006 to 2008; (2) the expansion of the joint force approach into
U.S. Cyber Command from 2008-2010; and (3) the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a fully
unified combatant command (2010-2018). Two episodes are drawn from Estonia: (1) the
delegation of cyber responsibilities to the Staff and Signals Battalion in the wake of the 2007
distributed denial of service incident (2007-2009); and (2) the creation of Cyber Command
(2010-2018). The preliminary extension to Germany in Chapter 7 analyzes the establishment of
the Cyber and Information Domain Service (2013-2017).
In each case study, my goal is to show how organizational size matters contingently with
other likely explanations for cyber force implementation.91 Accordingly, I sketch out two
alternative explanations that have the potential to explain implementation dynamics within
militaries: adoption-capacity and organizational culture. Along with organizational size, these
alternative explanations are compatible with competitive diffusion and limit the scope-conditions
of this dissertation to examine the internal implementation dynamics of military organizations.
Although broader governmental dynamics and relationships, such as civil-military dynamics, are
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described to some degree in each of the case studies, a full analysis of theoretical explanations
related to these issues remain outside the scope of this dissertation.
To evaluate how my argument performs and meshes with alternative explanations in each
case, I employ the method of process tracing. This method allows researchers to examine causal
process observations within a case to disconfirm or provide support for hypotheses derived from
different theoretical explanations.92 Process tracing links these alternative explanations to
specific political, social, and psychological mechanisms, allowing the researcher to differentiate
and evaluate causal mechanisms for a specific outcome of interest.93 By connecting independent
to dependent variables through an uninterrupted chain of events, process tracing establishes
causal paths that directly link cause to effect.94 Process tracing also ameliorates concerns over
endogeneity by examining the timing and sequencing of causal forces95 This method is ideal for
this project for two main reasons. First, process tracing is a necessary step for detecting omitted
variable bias and assessing measurement error in my survival regressions.96 Second, because a
limited number of case studies are proposed, and controlling for all individual case differences
for comparisons is nearly impossible,97 within-case process tracing is needed to increase the
number of comparable observable implications for assessing the relative strengths and
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weaknesses of each alternative explanation. For each case, I evaluate the theory of organizational
size, adoption-capacity theory, and organizational cultural logics with a combination of historical
data, original interview data, and data generated from recently declassified government
documents.
Plan of the Dissertation
The remaining chapters of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides an
empirical overview of the diffusion of cyber forces and cyber force structures. Specifically, this
chapter provides a conceptual foundation for assessing cyber force structures and establishes that
the empirical variation in cyber force structures constitutes as process of principle diffusion.
Chapter 3 develops my theoretical framework. This chapter advances a novel conceptualization
of implementation, describes the major implementation tension surrounding cyber forces, and
details the logic of organizational size that underpins my theoretical framework and offers
several hypotheses. This chapter also outlines two major competing explanations. Chapters 4
through 6 offer empirical analysis. Chapter 4 presents statistical analysis; the results from both a
stratified Cox model and a multistate survival model provide support for my theoretical claims;
importantly, this chapter details how the implementation process relates to changes in cyber
force structures. Chapters 5 and 6 provide case-based analysis of the evolution of cyber forces in
the United States (Chapter 5) and Estonia (Chapter 6). For each case, I provide a brief overview
of each military’s implementation pathway and trace the changes in cyber force structure to
evaluate the empirical validity of my theory and consider the relative explanatory power of the
alternative explanations. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the findings from
Chapters 4 through 6 and assessing my theory against the competing explanations. This chapter
also extends the framework to initially assess the development of Germany’ cyber force
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structure, looks to future avenues of research opened by this dissertation, and closes by
considering the broader academic and policy implications of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
Cyber Force Structures:
Conceptualization and Evidence of Principle Diffusion

Introduction
This chapter makes three claims. First, contends that the global spread of cyber forces represents
a process of diffusion. Second, this diffusion process is characterized by the lack of a dominant
organizational model to guide the implementation of cyber forces. Third, because cyber forces
have spread without a distinct model for implementation, this chapter makes the case that
scholars must account for implementation dynamics to explain the structural variations in cyber
forces.
To these ends, this chapter proceeds in four major sections. The first section defines
cyber forces, while the second provides a conceptual foundation for assessing force structures.
Third, this chapter advances a novel typology for classifying cyber force structures. The fourth
section discusses the diffusion of cyber forces and provides an empirical overview of the growth
of cyber forces across states over time. This overview shows that there is no distinct cyber force
“blueprint” for states to follow. Instead, as evidenced by the variation in cyber force structures,
cyber forces represent a common innovation principle that can be enacted in various ways. The
chapter concludes by summarizing and looking to the theory chapter.
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What Are Cyber Forces?
While existing definitions of cyber forces1 provide an important foundation for this study, they
nevertheless suffer from vague conceptual boundaries. Pernik (2018), for example, states that a
cyber force “generally denotes a standalone structure, branch, or service of the armed forces that
directs and controls the three main categories of cyberspace operations [defensive cyber space
operations; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance cyberspace operations; and offensive
operations].”2 Similarly, Smeets (2019) asserts that “[a] military cyber organization is defined as
a command, service, branch, or unit within a government’s armed forces which has the authority
and mission to conduct offensive cyber operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, and/or destroy (d4
effects).”3 Both definitions indicate that cyber forces are (1) a kind of organization within the
armed forces that (2) maintains some sort of authority over cyber operations (although Smeets’
only applies to offensive operations).
A key problem with these and similar definitions is which organizations are excluded.
Authority over cyber operations is a crucial delineator. Yet, not all cyber forces will have the
mandate over the full spectrum of cyberspace operations (as advanced by Pernik). Additionally,
not all cyber forces will have the full capability to undertake offensive operations as laid out by
Smeets. Moreover, it is not clear what organizational structures count as cyber forces: both
Pernik and Smeets are generally agnostic as to the strategic, operational, or tactical ends pursued
by organizations. As such, existing definitions have amorphous conceptual boundaries that are
problematic for distinguishing force structures.
Several studies have used the terms "military cyber organizations" or “cyber commands.” However, I use "cyber
forces" to better facilitate the subsequent discussion of force structures, i.e., "cyber force structure" is more concise
than "military cyber organization force structure” and more precise than “cyber command structure.” Thus, cyber
forces, military cyber organizations, and cyber commands may be used interchangeably.
2
Pernik, “Preparing for Cyber Conflict: Case Studies of Cyber Command,” 2–3.
3
Smeets, “NATO Members’ Organizational Path Towards Conducting Offensive Cyber Operations: A Framework
for Analysis,” 165.
1
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To remedy these shortcomings, I assert that cyber forces are active-duty military
organizations that possess the capability and authority to direct and control strategic computer
network operations (CNOs) to impact, change, or modify strategic diplomatic and military
interactions between entities.4 Computer network operations encompass three types of
operations in the cyber domain:
(1) Computer network defense (CND), which includes operations intended to the prevent
compromises to the integrity, confidentiality, or availability—through theft,
infiltration, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction—of information on
computers or the computers or networks themselves;
(2) Computer network exploitation (CNE), encompassing intelligence, surveillance, or
reconnaissance (ISR) operations to collect information from an adversary’s
computers and networks that fall short of disrupting or destroying information; and
(3) Computer network attack (CNA), or actions taken through a network of computers to
disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy another computer’s information or the computers or
networks themselves. Espionage and theft only constitute CNAs when information or
systems are destroyed in the process.5
Importantly, this definition of cyber forces excludes three types of organizations with similar
missions.
The first exclusion is civilian defense intelligence agencies such as the United States’
National Security Agency (NSA). While there may be significant overlap in cyberspace
operations between civilian intelligence agencies and military cyber forces, the primary purposes
of these organizations are fundamentally different. Aside from falling outside military chains of
command, civilian intelligence agencies are largely focused on information collection. Although
cyber forces (such as military intelligence units) can and do collect information, they prioritize
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strategic advantage over intelligence-gathering so that intelligence-gathering is in service of and
subordinated to gaining strategic advantages.
Second, this definition excludes military cyber-defense organizations comprised purely of
reservists.6 It is true that the integration of reservist and active-duty components is an important
component of constructing an effective cyber force,7 and the use of reservists can entail several
benefits. Because the cyber mission is non-traditional, reserve personnel may perform official
mission tasks in their capacity as reserves during peacetime like their active-duty counterparts.8
Additionally, reservists offer a ready pool of personnel with advanced training that is usually
obtained in the private sector. They also have ties to communities that can be leveraged to assist
state and local agencies.9
Although reservist components can (and do) fulfill many of the same duties as activeduty components, their operation is conditional on legal activation, and they do not maintain fulltime authority over CNOs. The scope of reservists is further complicated by the ambiguity of
cyber conflict and the subsequent formulation of criteria for activating reserves.10 Despite being
a formal component of the military, reservists are volunteers who primarily work in the private
or civilian government sectors and hence only serve for limited periods of time.11 As such,
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reservist organizations are far more fluid than active-duty units. This fluidity can compromise the
up-to-date knowledge of operations, scalability, and interoperability required of active-duty
organizations.12 For reservists to function like active-duty components, there must be substantial
volunteering past minimum service requirements, an assumption that is unlikely to hold across
militaries. Many governments also maintain legal restrictions on the use of reserve funds for
operational missions.13 Therefore, while states may use reservist units in lieu of forming activeduty cyber organizations, reservists do not meet the criteria for cyber forces. Excluded
organizations include: Bulgaria’s Cyber Defense Unit under the Armed Forces Reserve,
Estonia’s Cyber Defense Unit of the Estonian Defense League, and Latvia’s Cyber Defense Unit
of the National Armed Forces.14
Finally, military computer emergency readiness teams (MilCERTs), computer incident
response teams (MilCIRTs), and computer incident response centers (MilCIRCs) are excluded.
These organizations—such as the Jordanian Armed Forces’ MilCERT and Moldovan Armed
Forces’ MAFCIRC15—are purely incident response teams that look for and patch military and/or
defense network vulnerabilities, develop plans to deal with network outages and malicious
attacks, and coordinate appropriate responses 16. MilCERTs and MilCIRTs work at the tactical
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level to ensure network operability but they do not seek to integrate capabilities on larger
operational or strategic scales. While they can be under the control of or report to cyber forces,
MilCERTs and MilCIRTs themselves do not constitute cyber forces.
Conceptualizing Cyber Force Structure
Traditional military force structures generally refer to the number and types of combat units that
a military can generate and sustain. The central components of force structure have been defined
in a number of ways: the composition and structure of organizations; unit functions; capabilities;
the costs of operation; or some combination of these factors.17 However, many of these aspects
of force structure become ambiguous when applied to cyber forces. Table 2.1 highlights the
problematic nature of mapping traditional force structure categories onto cyber forces.
Unlike the individual unit functions of traditional combat forces in the land, sea, and air
domains, the operational functions of cyber forces—CNE, CND, and CNA—are nearly
indistinguishable. Both attacks on an adversary’s network (CNA) and the defense of one’s own
network (CND) rest on intrusions into an adversary’s networks for intelligence collection (CNE).
Moreover, network exploitation, defense, and attack use similar tools and techniques. Thus, at an
operational level, unit functions necessarily overlap and are operationally indistinguishable.18
Cyber force capabilities are also difficult to quantify. Although human capital can be
quantified to some degree—in terms of total personnel and their respective qualifications—the
technological dimensions of capabilities remain nearly impossible to assess quantitatively.
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Table 2.1. Mapping Traditional Force Structure Components onto the Cyber Mission

Land
Forces*

Maritime
Forces*

Air
Forces*

Cyber
Forces

Function

Capabilities

Structure/Composition
of Units
Assessed according to the
number of units and the
direct and indirect military
personnel per unit.

Costs of Operation

Clearly differentiated.

Quantifiable.

Distinct functions include:
armored combat, armored
personnel carrier, infantry,
aviation, special operations.
Clearly differentiated.

Example: the number
of armored tanks.

Assessed according to the
number of units and the
direct and indirect military
personnel per unit.

Total of the direct, indirect,
and administrative/overhead
personnel and O&S costs.

Distinct functions include:
Aircraft carrier, surface
combat, attack submarines,
amphibious ships,
amphibious infantry,
special operations.
Clearly differentiated.

Example: the number
of aircraft carriers.

Assessed according to the
number of units and the
direct and indirect military
personnel per unit.

Total of the direct, indirect,
and administrative/overhead
personnel and O&S costs.

Distinct functions include:
Tactical aviation, bombers,
airlift, refueling, unmanned
air systems, special
operations.
Unable to differentiate.

Example: the number
of long-range bomber
planes.

Difficult to Quantify.

Difficult to Assess.

Largely Unknown.

CND, CNE, CNA are
rarely operationally
distinct functions.

Capabilities rest on
“weapons” that are
largely transitory.

Possible to count units, but
nature of direct and
indirect personnel remains
unclear.

Direct personnel costs
provide only concrete
insight but remain
unreliable.

Quantifiable.

Quantifiable.

Total of the direct, indirect,
and administrative/overhead
personnel and O&S costs.

*Information on land, maritime, and aviation force structures taken from Congressional Budget Office, “The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer”
(Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, July 2016).
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Instead of tangible weapons systems (missiles, tanks, submarines, etc.) that have multiple-use
ability and can be counted, cyberweapons are comprised of largely digital, transitory elements
that have only a temporary ability to access and attack computer networks and systems.19 An
adversary can detect and patch vulnerabilities after a cyberweapon has been used; the attacker’s
capability also rapidly diffuses to other actors, where it can be modified and redeployed against
the original attacker.20
The nature of cyber force personnel further complicates force structure assessments: there
is no clear distinction between direct “combat” personnel and indirect “support” personnel.
Traditional roles played by indirect personnel—such as signals intelligence—are at the heart of
network operations for cyber forces’ direct personnel. More problematically, data regarding
personnel costs, operating costs, and capability acquisitions tend to be inconsistent across
countries, with much information remaining classified and unavailable.21
Accordingly, I use two criteria for categorizing cyber force structures: (1) the
organizational model for command structures and (2) the scale of command over computer
network operations. These are two broad, visible dimensions of military organizations that help
to define the membership, responsibilities, capacity, and interactions of subsystems in
organizations.22 They provide initial (if imperfect) proxies for assessing the structure of cyber
forces and their potential operating costs (i.e., all things equal, larger scales of command should
entail higher resource requirements).

Max Smeets, “A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41,
no. 1–2 (2018): 6–32.
20
Benjamin Buchanan, “The Life Cycles of Cyber Threats,” Survival 58, no. 1 (2016): 39–58.
21
On the problematic nature of cyber conflict data, see: Christopher Whyte et al., “Rethinking the Data Wheel:
Automating Open-Access, Public Data on Cyber Conflict,” in CyCon X: Maximising Effects (2018 10th
International Conference on Cyber Conflict, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2018), 9–30.
22
W. Richard Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, Fourth Edition (New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1998), 89–92, 153–94.
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First, cyber forces can be organized according to one of three models: a branch model, a
service model, or a joint model. As open-system organizations bound together by institutional
rules and collective beliefs, militaries are comprised of multiple, interdependent subsystems.23
These three models provide different arrangements to locate cyber forces within military
subsystems (combat or combat support24) and define the number of combat services to be
included in the cyber force structure.
Under a branch model, authority for computer network operations rests primarily in
logistical branches, military intelligence agencies, or signals corps that provide specialized,
operational assistance to combat subsystems.25 As part of the combat support subsystem, they are
independent from the control of the combat services.26 Although the combat services can provide
personnel to staff cyber forces in the combat support subsystem, forces in this subsystem fall
outside the chain of command of service departments. As such, the branch model has a nonservice command structure.
Under both the service and joint models, cyber forces are part of the combat subsystem
and are subordinate to existing service structures or appear as an independent service or
combatant commands. In the combat subsystem, entities are traditionally tasked with the
application of kinetic force through the employment of weapons systems against adversaries.

Goldman, “Introduction: Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 16; Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural,
and Open Systems, 82–100; Theo Farrell, “Figuring Out Fighting Organisations: The New Organisational Analysis
in Strategic Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 1 (1996): 122–35.
24
Combat, combat support, and combat services support are the primary subsystems within military organization.
Here, I exclude the combat services support subsystem as combat services support generally refers to administrative
roles that support readiness such as acquisitions, transportation, and medical services. Congressional Budget Office,
“The U.S. Military’s Force Structure,” 8–9. For consistency, I employ the combat/combat support/combat services
support terminology utilized by the U.S. Army. For an example of this practice, see: Stephen Biddle, Military
Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).
25
Congressional Budget Office, “The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer,” 9–10.
26
While combat support elements are necessarily present within combat subsystems, combat represents the
dominant, overarching functional role for that subsystem.
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This subsystem is generally comprised of distinct departments (or commands) for domain-based
services (Army, Navy, or Air Force) or other functional combat service branches (such as Rocket
Forces or Marines).27 Cyber forces are organized according to a service model when a single
combat service retains primary authority for computer network operations. A joint model entails
the shared distribution of authority over computer network operations across two or more combat
services.
The second way to classify cyber force structures is according to the scale of command,
which can be categorized as subordinated, sub-unified, or unified.28 Subordinated cyber force
structures represent the smallest scale of command: computer network operations are
incorporated into existing combat or non-combat commands with only limited alterations.
Subordinated force structures support existing missions, technologies, and operating
procedures29 to enhance effectiveness without disrupting the status quo.30 Sub-unified cyber force
structures consist of new, specialized cyber sub-organizations that treat computer network
operations as an independent mission set. These force structures are usually the product of major
reconfigurations of personnel and capabilities within the combat or non-combat subsystems to
exploit new technologies or implement novel operational concepts.31 However, they do not
impact the values, beliefs, and power relationships across the entire military. Unified cyber force

27

Although the combat services themselves could constitute a smaller subsystem within the combat subsystem, this
level of analysis is below the focus of this typology.
28
The scale of command also provides insight into the potential resources available and operational capacity of
cyber forces.
29
On the integration of novel practices into existing structures,, see: Farrell, “Improving in War: Military Adaptation
and the British in Helman Province, Afghanistan, 2006-2009.”
30
This categorization maps roughly onto discussions of first-, second-, and third-order changes in organizations.
See: Kamalesh Kumar and Mary S. Thibodeaux, “Organizational Politics and Planned Organization Change: A
Pragmatic Approach,” Group & Organization Studies 15, no. 4 (1990): 357–65; Karl E. Weick and Robert E. Quinn,
“Organizational Change and Development,” Annual Review of Psychology 50 (1999): 361–86.
31
Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and Military Innovation,” 30.
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structures institutionalize “new ways of war”32 through the creation of a new branch, combat
service, or combatant command to coordinate or integrate efforts in the cyber domain. These
force structures generally emerge from a process of sustained innovation and military-wide
reorganization that disrupts existing command arrangements by altering the values, beliefs, and
interdependencies across multiple subsystems.33
A Typology of Cyber Force Structures
These two criteria—organizational model and scale of command—produce nine distinct cyber
force structures: (1) Subordinated Branch; (2) Subordinated Service; (3) Subordinated Joint; (4)
Sub-Unified Branch; (5) Sub-Unified Service; (6) Sub-Unified Joint; (7) Unified Branch; (8)
Unified Service; and (9) Unified Joint. Table 2.2 summarizes this typology.
Subordinated Branch cyber force structures fulfil logistical and/or intelligence functions
by integrating computer network operations into the existing command structures of independent
communications divisions, signals intelligence units, or larger military intelligence agencies.
Examples include: Israel’s Unit 8200, an electronics intelligence unit established in the 1950s
(subordinate to the Israeli Intelligence Corps in the Israeli Defense Forces Directorate of Military
Intelligence) that has been tasked with conducting CNOs; and Estonia’s Strategic
Communications Center, a unit formerly subordinated to the independent Staff and Signals
Battalion that was tasked with carrying out network operations.34

32

The lessons, beliefs, and practices regarding new technological and mission environments. Rosen, Winning the
Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military.
33
On military transformation, see: Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions”;
Stulberg, Long, and Salomone, Managing Defense Transformation: Agency, Culture and Service Change, 16; Terry
Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell, eds., A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military
Change (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010).
34
James Andrew Lewis and Gotz Neuneck, “The Cyber Index: International Security Trends and Realities” (New
York and Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2013); Osula, “National Cyber Security
Organisation: Estonia.”
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Subordinated Service force structures emerge when a single combat service co-opts the
CNO mission into existing electronic warfare, signals, or communications units and no other
combat services have the capability or mandate to conduct CNOs. The Danish Army’s 3rd
Electronic Warfare Company from 2009 to 2012 and the Armed Forces of the Philippines’
Signals Corps subordinate to the Filipino Army from 2016 to the present provides examples of
single-service units with primary responsibilities for cyber operations.35
Subordinated Joint structures coordinate the CNO mission when responsibilities are
distributed across multiple (more than two) combat services. They are not new suborganizations; instead, they primarily take on the form of a temporary, issue- or mission-driven
joint task force. States with these force structures include the United States from 2001 to 201036
and France (Cyber Defense Cell) from 2011 to 2015.37
Sub-Unified Branch cyber force structures result from the creation of new divisions or
directorates under military intelligence agencies, communications or information systems
agencies, or joint staff support directorates. Examples include the Finnish Cyber Defense
Division (2015-present) and the Cyber Security Operations Center under the Belgian Military
Intelligence Service (2017-present).38

“Chapter Four: Europe,” The Military Balance, 2013; Gilbert P. Felongco, “Philippine Armed Forces Build Up
Capability to Fight in Cyberspace,” Gulf News, November 23, 2016,
https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/philippines/philippine-armed-forces-build-up-capability-to-fight-in-cyberspace1.1934044.
36
As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Joint Structures for the U.S. include the Joint Task Force – Computer Network
Operations (JTF-CNO) from 2001-2004, the Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) in 2004,
and the Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) from 2005-2010. U.S. Cyber
Command, “U.S. Cyber Command History,” n.d., https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/;
37
Pascal Brangetto, “National Cyber Security Organisation: France,” National Cyber Security Organisation (Tallinn,
Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2015).
38
Pernik, “Preparing for Cyber Conflict"; Kenneth L. Lasoen, “Belgian Intelligence SIGINT Operations,”
International Journal of Intelligence and CounteriIntelligence 32, no. 1 (2019): 1–29.
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Table 2.2. A Typology of Cyber Force Structures

Subordinated

Scale of Command
Sub-Unified

Unified

(1) Subordinated Branch

(4) Sub-Unified Branch

(7) Unified Branch

Israel (1950s-present)
Estonia (2009-2018)

Finland (2015-Present)
Belgium (2017-Present)

Estonia (2018-Present)
Norway (2012-Present)

(2) Subordinated Service

(5) Sub-Unified Service

(8) Unified Service

Denmark (2009-2012)
Philippines (2016-Present)

Brazil (2017-Present)
Nigeria (2018-Present)

Germany (2017-Present)
China (2016-Present)

(3) Subordinated Joint

(6) Sub-Unified Joint

(9) Unified Joint

France (2011-2015)
U.S. (2001-2010)

U.S. (2010-2017)
Italy (2017-Present)

U.S. (2017-Present)
Netherlands (2018-Present)

Organizational
Model
Branch Model

Service Model

Joint Model
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Sub-Unified Service force structures manifest as new major commands within a single
combat service specifically for conducting cyber operations. By reorganizing service personnel
and capabilities, this force structure places CNOs at the same hierarchical level as existing
service commands and their missions. Although it can be staffed with personnel from other
combat services, a Sub-Unified Service structure is under the command of and subordinated to
only one combat service. Brazil’s Cyber Defense Command (2017-Present) and Nigeria’s Cyber
Warfare Command (2018-Present) are commands subordinated to the respective armies.
Nigeria’s command consolidates previous efforts within the Army into a new service command;
Brazil’s Cyber Defense Command incorporates personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force
under the sole authority of the Army.39
Sub-Unified Joint cyber force structures report to an existing joint unified combatant
command but significantly expand the scope of operations for that parent command. Unlike
Subordinated Joint structures, Sub-Unified Joint force structures are necessarily comprised of
service-level component commands (i.e., at least two services have developed service-level
major commands). Both the United States’ Cyber Command from 2010-2017 (subordinate to
United States Strategic Command) and Italy’s Joint Command for Cyberspace Operations (2017present, subordinate to the Joint C4 Defense Command) fall in this category.40
There are three unified cyber force structures: Unified Branch, Unified Service, and
Unified Joint. A Unified Branch force structure is an independent non-combat military branch

Taciana Moury, “Brazilian Army Invests in Cyber Defense,” Dialogo, May 12, 2017, https://dialogoamericas.com/en/articles/brazilian-army-invests-cyber-defense; Kingsley Omonobi-Abuja, “Nigerian Army’s Cyber
Warfare Command Begins Operation,” Vanguard, August 29, 2018,
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/08/nigerian-armys-cyber-warfare-command-begins-operation/.
40
U.S. Cyber Command, “U.S. Cyber Command History”; Italian Ministry of Defence, “Il Sottosegratario Tofalo
visita il Comando C4 Difesa e il CIOC [Undersecretary Tofalo visits the C4 Defense Command and the CIOC],”
August 1, 2018, https://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/Il-Sottosegretario-Tofalo-visita-il-Comando-C4-Difesae-il-CIOC.aspx.
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that holds special armament or battle equipment to conduct missions in the cyber domain.
Examples include Estonia’s Cyber Command (2018-present) and Norway’s Cyber Defence
Force (2012-present).41 Unified Service structures hinge on the creation of a new, domainspecific combat service (with a new military department) that receives the same hierarchical
standing as other domain-based services (armies, navies, and air forces). Only China’s Strategic
Support Force (established in 2016) and Germany’s Cyber and Information Domain Service
(established in 2017) have attained this force structure.42 Unified Joint cyber force structures
coincide with the formation of an independent, unified combatant command for the cyber
domain that is comprised of at least two service-level component commands. These structures
are not subordinated to another combatant command, but instead report directly to the top
civilian defense official (via the combatant commander). Examples include United States Cyber
Command from 2017 to the present and the Defense Cyber Command in the Netherlands from
2018-present.43
The Diffusion of Cyber Forces in Principle
Cyber forces have emerged in every region of the world. However, no clear pattern has emerged
among states in terms of creating actual force structures. As discussed in the previous chapter,
few military diffusion studies specify whether the innovation under examination entails specific
policy instruments and a blueprint for implementation or represents a broader principle. In the
case of the former—i.e. “model diffusion”—innovators export a specific incarnation of a new

Estonian Defence Forces, “Cyber Command,” n.d., http://www.mil.ee/en/landforces/Cyber-Command; Ministry
of Defense of Norway, “Cyberforsvaret offisielt etablert i dag [Cyber Defence Force officially established today],”
September 18, 2012, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumentarkiv/stoltenberg-ii/fd/Nyheter-ogpressemeldinger/Nyheter/2012/cyber/id699271/.
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“Chapter Six: Asia,” The Military Balance, 2019; Pernik,“Preparing for Cyber Conflict Command.”
43
U.S. Cyber Command, “U.S. Cyber Command History”; Kaska, “National Cyber Security Organisation: The
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technological application, policy paradigm, or an institutional design. By and large, adopters
replicate the original innovation model.
Yet, many issue areas—such as the cyber mission and computer network operations—are
complex, and do not lend themselves to a single, comprehensive innovation model. In these
cases, general principles of innovation emerge that can encompass a multitude of permutations.
As such, “principle diffusion” provides broad maxims of innovation that give direction to
decisionmakers but do not prescribe specific courses of action for innovation.44 Therefore,
diffusion patterns of cyber forces should indicate that: (1) cyber forces have spread across a large
number of states; (2) there is variation in the institutional characteristics of cyber forces, i.e.
variation in the cyber force structures; and (3) no dominant cyber force model has emerged over
time.
Cyber Forces in the World, 2000-2018
To assess the principle diffusion of cyber forces, I use evidence from a custom-created
database: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures (DCFS). The Dataset on Cyber Force
Structures catalogues the evolution of cyber forces and force structures for all United Nations
(UN) members with an active military force from 2000 to 2018. An active military force is a
necessary precondition for inclusion into the dataset: there can be no cyber force without an
active military. As such, the DCFS surveys 172 UN-member states and excludes the 21 member
states that do not maintain an active military force.45 The dataset utilizes five types of sources to
code a country’s cyber force structure over time: official government publications; reports
produced by think tanks or international organizations; peer-reviewed academic works; news
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Weyland, Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America, 17–18.
These are: Andorra, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
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articles from international and regional media outlets; and primary interviews conducted with
former policymakers, military officials, industry members, and subject matter experts. For those
states with a cyber force, the DCFS captures both the organizational model utilized and the scale
of command. The changes in cyber force structure captured by the dataset will be discussed in
more depth in Chapter 4. More detail about dataset sources and coding procedures is provided in
Appendix 1 of this dissertation.
Figure 2.1 charts the spread of cyber forces according to politico-geographic region.46
From 2000-2004, only seven countries (4.1% of all eligible countries) maintained cyber forces.
These seven countries—the United States, Russia, China, Israel, North Korea, Greece, and
Thailand—each had cyber forces prior to 2000.47 By 2018, the number of states with a cyber
force increased to 61 (35.5%). Western Europe and North America has experienced the most
growth in the number of states with a cyber force—from two in 2000 to 20 states by 2018. Since
2000, Asia (South, South-East, and East Asia combined) has seen a total of 14 states create a
cyber force.
Many of the developments outside these two regions have occurred post-2007. Both the
Eastern Europe/Central Asia and Latin America regions have had consistent growth in cyber
forces since 2007. With Russia as the only state with a cyber force from 2000-2008, by 2018
Eastern Europe/Central Asia was home to 13 militaries possessing a cyber force.

Politico-geographic region coding is drawn from: Jan Teorell et al., “Measuring Polyarchy Across the Globe,
1900-2017,” Studies in Comparative International Development 54 (2019): 71–95.
47
As such, there are observations for these countries that the dataset does not capture since they occur prior to the
start of the dataset (making the dataset left-truncated).
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Figure 2.1. The Growth of Cyber Forces by Region, 2000-2018

Source: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures

46

Three countries created a cyber force in Latin America in 2008 (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru),
and the region reached nine by 2018. The Middle East/North Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan
Africa have seen the least amount of cyber force growth. In addition to Israel, Iran and Turkey
have created formal cyber forces in the MENA region. South Africa and Nigeria are the only
Sub-Saharan African countries to develop cyber forces.
Figure 2.2 provides insight into the growth of the Branch, Service, and Joint
organizational models over time. Worth noting is the post-2007 surge in all three cyber force
models. As mentioned in the description of Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 portrays accelerated growth in
the share of states developing cyber forces. In 2007, only 5.8 percent of states (10 total) had
cyber forces. This increased to 35.5 percent of all states (61 states) by 2018 with an average
growth rate of 2.7% per year (between four and five states each year) since 2007. Significantly,
Figure 2.2 portrays increasing variation over time in the distribution of models. In other words,
as the number of cyber forces has increased, so has the variation in organizational model.
Figure 2.3 shows this trend more clearly. The Branch model accounted for roughly 75
percent of the variation in cyber forces until roughly 2008; this share decreased to approximately
55 percent by 2018. This 20 percent drop in the prevalence of the Branch model, coupled with
fluctuations in the number of states utilizing the Service and Joint models, provides support for
the diffusion of cyber forces in principle. Although the utilization of the Joint model has
noticeable grown over time, the Joint model accounts for just over 25% over the variation in
cyber forces and is by no means the dominant paradigm.
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Figure 2.2. The Growth of Cyber Forces by Organizational Model, 2000-2018

Source: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures

Figure 2.3. The Distribution of Organizational Models across Cyber Forces, 2000-2018

Source: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures
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Figure 2.4. Distribution of Model by Region
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Geographic clustering has been a key feature in diffusion studies.48 Figure 2.4 surveys the
distribution of organizational model selection by region in country-months. Eastern Europe and
Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are the only two areas where the regional prevalence of the
Branch model exceeds the international prevalence charted in Figure 2.3 above. The Branch
model has accounted for roughly 90 percent of the country-months in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia and slightly less than 90 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. There does appear to be a
dominant model emerging in these two regions; however, significant variation occurs in other
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For overviews of geographic dynamics and diffusion, see: Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., The
Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003); Berry and
Berry, “Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research.”
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regions. This is particularly the case for Latin America, where the Branch model accounts for
approximately 25 percent of the cyber force country-months and the Service and Joint models
account for roughly 30 percent and 45 percent of country-months, respectively.
Finally, even across states using a similar organizational model, states have given cyber
forces different scales of command. Table 2.3 and Figure 2.5 indicate that, while Subordinated
command structures have been the most prevalent across all three organizational models over
time, the variation in command scale increases significantly after 2009. The first Sub-Unified
commands emerge in 2010, with one Sub-Unified Branch (South Korea’s Cyber Command) and
two Sub-Unified Joint (U.S. Cyber Command and Iran’s Cyber Defense Command) force
structures. The Netherlands’ Cyber Defense Command represents the first Sub-Unified Service
force structure in 2014. Across all three organizational models, Unified command structures only
appear after 2012. In terms of command variation, both the Branch and Service models have
experienced similar patterns. The Joint model has seen the most volatility in command over time.

Table 2.3. Number of Countries by Cyber Force Structure
2000
Model
Branch

Command
Subordinated
Sub-Unified
Unified
Service
Subordinated
Sub-Unified
Unified
Joint
Subordinated
Sub-Unified
Unified
Countries with Cyber Force
Countries with No Cyber Force
Total Countries

6
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
7
162
169

Year
2005 2010
6
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
8
162
170

17
1
0
5
0
0
0
2
0
25
146
171

2015 2018
20
9
1
4
1
0
2
5
6
48
124
172

16
12
5
6
3
2
1
6
10
61
111
172
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Figure 2.5. Distribution of Command Scale by Organizational Model, 2000-2018

51
Conclusion
States across the globe have increasingly adopted cyber forces since 2000. However, no clear
model for creating a cyber force has been at the center of diffusion; instead, states have adopted
the general principle of a cyber force. As a result, many structural permutations—captured by the
typology advanced in this chapter—have emerged across cyber forces over time. Yet, a crucial
question remains: why have militaries implemented cyber forces in such different ways? The
lack of a clear model for adoption provides an important precondition but cannot fully explain
why militaries exhibit varying implementation dynamics. To address the question of
implementation dynamics, the next chapter lays out a theory of organizational size that helps
explain implementation priorities and pathways.
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CHAPTER 3
Theorizing Implementation Dynamics:
The Effects of Organizational Size

Introduction
In this chapter, I advance both a novel conceptual framework for understanding implementation
dynamics and a theoretical explanation for why the implementation of cyber forces unfolds
differently under different organizational conditions. The central claim is that the size of a
military organization drives implementation efforts: implementers in larger military
organizations are driven to initially prioritize bureaucratic integration of cyber forces over
operational imperatives, while those in smaller militaries initially prioritize building capabilities
over bureaucratic concerns. In this way, organizational size drives implementation priorities that
alter implementation pathways.
This chapter proceeds in six major sections. The first discusses the importance of
theorizing implementation as an extension of the diffusion process, particularly when
innovations do not entail specific policy instruments or an implementation blueprint. The second
section offers a framework for understanding implementation as a process comprised of multiple,
discreet stages. I suggest that implementation has five stages: Pre-Adoption, Introduction,
Modification, Reinvention, and Full Implementation. The third section pivots to explain the
substantive challenges of implementing cyber forces. Specifically, I discuss the tension between
implementing a new mission area and integrating cyber forces into the broader bureaucratic
environment. Fourth, I lay out my key theoretical claims on the role of military size; this section
presents several hypotheses. The fifth section sketches out two alternative explanations:
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adoption-capacity and organizational culture. The chapter concludes by summarizing and
looking forward to the ensuing empirical chapters.
Principle Diffusion and the Importance of Implementation
As detailed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, few military diffusion studies specify
whether the innovation under examination entails specific policy instruments and a blueprint for
implementation or represents a broader principle. In the first instance, potential adopters are
presented with a distinct innovation model; this model prescribes the adoption of certain policy
instruments and entails information on how the innovation should be implemented. In the latter
case, an innovation appears as general principle to be adopted, i.e. broad maxims of innovation
that provide a general direction for policymakers but do not prescribe specific policy instruments
or courses of action regarding implementation.1
As shown in Chapter 2, the diffusion of cyber forces is characterized by both spatial and
temporal variation in cyber force structures: force structures vary both across states and within
states as cyber forces evolve. More importantly, this variation shows that cyber forces have
diffused as a general innovation principle. With no dominant force structure to be adopted, there
is no clear cyber force “model” to be replicated. As such, and as will be detailed in Chapter 4,
militaries have adopted a cyber force but have implemented force structures in a variety of ways.
Although adoption decisions remain pertinent, the variation in cyber force structures speaks to an
additional question: why have militaries differed in how they implement cyber forces? A first
step is to consider the ways in which implementation can unfold.

1

Kurt Weyland, Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 17–18. The issue of "loose bundle" innovations is also addressed by: V.
Koontz, “Determinants of Individuals’ Knowledge, Attitudes and Decisions Regarding a Health Innovation in
Maine” (Dissertation, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, 1976).
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Under the diffusion of an innovation in principle, potential adopters are faced with a
greater degree of decision flexibility vis-à-vis the innovation—they can pick and choose which
aspects or components to adopt. In this regard, complex, process-based innovations are
particularly malleable.2 As a result, the traditional scholarly focus on adoption becomes
problematic: potential adopters are faced with not only the decision to adopt or reject an
innovation in principle but also post-adoption decisions to modify or reject certain dimensions of
an innovation.3 As such, typical diffusion frameworks will struggle to explain the empirical
variation that occurs as adopters adapt innovations during implementation to fit local political
and institutional contexts.4
Implementation dynamics offer more nuanced insight into the ways in which adopters
shape and reshape innovations across the diffusion process. While adoption encompasses the
decision to adopt or reject an innovation principle, implementation is the actual integration of the
innovation into the community of interest.5 The implementation process involves putting to use
new technologies or integrating new practices within an organizational setting and requires
creating new or changing existing organizational routines and relationships.6

Ronald E. Rice and Everett M. Rogers, “Reinvention in the Innovation Process,” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion,
Utilization 1, no. 4 (June 1980): 502; Jane Fedorowicz and Janis L. Gogan, “Reinvention of Interorganizational
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(2010): 81.
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4
Sanya Carley, Sean Nicholson-Crotty, and Chris J. Miller, “Adoption, Reinvention and Amendment of Renewable
Portfolio Standards in the American States,” Journal of Public Policy 37, no. 4 (2017): 431–58; J. Clark, “Policy
Diffusion and Program Scope: Research Directions,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 15 (1985): 61–70; H.R.
Glick and S.P. Hays, “Innovation and Reinvention in State Policymaking: Theory and the Evolution of Living
Wills,” Journal of Politics 53 (1991): 835–50; Scott P. Hays, “Patterns of Reinvention: The Nature of Evolution
during Policy Diffusion,” Policy Studies Journal 24, no. 4 (1996): 551–66.
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A Framework for Implementation Dynamics
As a process, implementation unfolds across a series of multiple, discreet, and interconnected
stages.7 Organization studies have acknowledged that implementing an innovation consists of at
least two stages. In the first stage, organizations introduce the innovation. The organization’s
leaders enable introduction by generating perceptions of the problem being addressed, gathering
information, and fostering an attitude toward innovation and evaluation. The second stage
concerns the use of the innovation until it becomes a routine.8
Although the introduction and routinization of an innovation are both critical stages, they
represent only the beginning and end of the implementation process. The implementation process
offers the opportunity for adopters to reinvent an innovation.9 Reinvention refers to the ways in
which adopters change or modify innovations through the processes of adoption and
implementation.10 These changes can be to the components of an innovation and/or how an
innovation is used. Reinvention becomes particularly important when actors face broadly defined
problems, 11 innovations that are too generalized12 or overly complex,13 or adopters lack detailed
knowledge about an innovation.14 Reinvention can be idiosyncratic or systematic, where later
adopters learn from the experiences of early adopters.15 Reinvention thus portrays a more
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complex and dynamic diffusion process, where innovations change and evolve across systems as
adopters purposely alter them during implementation.16
Many scholars analyzing reinvention, however, note an additional dimension: expansion,
whereby an innovation becomes more comprehensive than its initial incarnation throughout the
implementation process.17 After introducing an innovation, many adopters amend initiatives to
expand or increase the scope of innovation. Problematically, the post-adoption expansion of an
innovation has received little attention from diffusion scholars. Instead of treating
amendment/expansion as a distinct decision stage, most studies treat it as another instance of
reinvention.18 However, a multi-staged conception of implementation requires differentiating
between the qualitative changes an innovation and the increase in the scope of an innovation.
Defining Implementation Stages
Few studies—whether of diffusion or of organizational innovation—incorporate these
dynamics into staged conceptions of implementation. Eveland et al. (1977) stands as an early
exception in studies of diffusion. The authors advance a framework of five stages, including:
agenda-setting, where organizations identify and define problems; matching, where a potential
solution is discussed; redefinition, where the attributes of an innovation are defined according to
organizational members and goals; structuring, where members introduce the innovation into
organizational structures; and interconnecting, where those tasked with implementation redefine

16

Hays, “Patterns of Reinvention: The Nature of Evolution during Policy Diffusion,” 551–52; S.P. Hays,
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their relationships with the rest of the organization and the external environment.19 While
advancing a multi-stage approach, Eveland et al. place overwhelming emphasis on the dynamics
of adoption decisions (agenda-setting, matching, and redefinition). As such, changes can only
occur during adoption—for Eveland et al., structuring and interconnection assume a linear and
straightforward implementation process.
In surveying subsequent works in public policy, Carley et al. (2017) find that reinvention
and amendment can certainly apply to post-adoption implementation efforts. Carley et al. note
that previous studies have seen adoption, reinvention, and amendment as mutually exclusive
diffusion processes and not discrete stages within a single framework. However, the authors
suggest that this is misguided:
…these are in fact distinct sequential decisions, as lawmakers first
decide that they want a general class of policy, then decide what
the specific characteristics of that policy should be and, finally,
make adjustments to the policy after adoption. Without
acknowledging this sequence, there is little theoretical foundation
for explaining the evolution of policies as they diffuse over time.20
These insights echo the frameworks and findings of organizational scholars studying
implementation processes. Recently, Chung and Choi (2018) have advocated for a stage-based
conception of implementation in organizational studies. The authors propose that implementation
unfolds across four stages, and the power balance between the initiators of an innovation and
resistors drive implementation dynamics at each stage. Implementation begins with initiation,
where an innovation is introduced into an organization. Subsequently, at the power evaluation
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stage, unaligned members of the organization assess the power differential between the initiators
and resistors; at the tactics evaluations stage, the initiators and resistors try to respectively
facilitate and inhibit implementation, and their effectiveness is judged by unaligned members.
The outcome stage is thus the culmination of power struggles across other implementation
stages; innovations can be implemented without change, minimally implemented, modified, or
implementation can fail.21 Although this framework is important for understanding the
differential impacts of a variable (in this case, the power balance between initiators and resistors)
across the implementation process, Chung and Choi (2018) provide little insight into how the
innovation itself changes in the course of implementation.
What is needed, then, is an implementation framework that incorporates changes to the
nature or scope of an innovation and the potential for variables to have differential impacts
across the implementation process.22 To these ends, I propose a framework for implementation
comprised of five discrete stages: pre-adoption, introduction, modification, expansion, and full
implementation.
Stage 1: Pre-Adoption. A fully specified implementation process starts at the preadoption stage. This stage is the quintessential starting point for many innovation and diffusion
studies. At pre-adoption, actors are faced with the decision to adopt or reject the innovation
principle. At this stage, potential adopters define the problems to be addressed by innovation.
Additionally, potential adopters identify and target specific models to implement innovation
principles in concrete ways.
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Stage 2: Introduction. Introduction is the second stage of the implementation process.
Although some actors may be able to adopt and implement an innovation to its fullest extent, it is
far more likely that limited aspects of an innovation are adopted and implemented in a piecemeal
fashion over time. Accordingly, select elements of an innovation principle are adopted and
matched to the adopter’s specific needs, resources, and abilities. In doing so, introduction marks
the initial installation and use of an innovation.23 At the introduction stage, the innovation usually
supports existing organizational goals and status quos.24 Importantly, the initiators behind the
adoption supply information to the communities implementing the innovation. Groups of
resistors can emerge in response to the introduction of an innovation that threatens traditional
power relations.
Stage 3: Modification. The third stage of implementation is modification, i.e. whether
and what qualitative changes have been made to the innovation. After the initial introduction of
an innovation, issues may arise that require the redefinition, redesign, or restructuring of the
innovation’s components. Such reinvention can be driven by: the failure to address problems as
originally perceived; difficulties with operational implementation; or resistance from influential
competing interests.25 Competing interests and ideologies are particularly strong influences on
the modification of an innovation. Those resisting an innovation may reject or advocate altering
parts of an innovation that threaten their resources and traditional power relations. Thus,
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modification can emerge as an accommodation to resisting forces seeking to influence over the
implementation process by threatening the viability of the innovation.26
Stage 4: Expansion. After a degree of consensus has been reached regarding the design
of the innovation, implementation can proceed with a fourth stage—expansion. Expansion
occurs after Introduction and prior to the full implementation of an innovation. Expansion is thus
an intermediate step where initiatives increase in scope or comprehensiveness but have not yet
been fully implemented. Expansion differs from modification:27 while modification emphasizes
changes in the composition or structure of an innovation, expansion involves an additional influx
of resources (such as personnel and spending). Through expansion, organizations develop new
operational concepts and goals.28
Stage 5: Full Implementation. The final stage in the implementation process is full
implementation. At this stage, the innovation has been adopted to its fullest extent and has
become routinized within the adopting entity.29 The full implementation of an innovation can
disrupt and alter organizational dynamics, leading to new organizational structures to support
new areas of organizational operation. Within militaries, the full implementation of an
innovation can institutionalize new paradigms of warfare.30 Where military innovation involves
organizational changes, full implementation entails the creation of an independent, unified
military command.31
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Figure 3.1. A Simplified View of the Implementation Process

Figure 3.2. A Dynamic View of the Implementation Process

Figure 3.1 summarizes a simplified view of the implementation process described above. This
view implies that innovations can and do change over the course of implementation. Importantly,
and as will be explored further in Chapter 4, implementation often proceeds in dynamic,
nonlinear patterns. Figure 3.2 presents a dynamic view of implementation with multiple
pathways.32 This multi-staged, dynamic framework can capture a variety of changes in cyber
force structures within militaries. Moreover, this framework enables the conceptualization and
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theorization of the key tensions and drivers at each implementation stage as well as across the
entire implementation process.
The Challenge of Implementing Cyber Forces
The primary tension underlying the creation and implementation of cyber forces—and new
military organizations more broadly—is the pursuit of two competing goals that pull
implementation resources in opposing directions: building out a new mission and integrating the
organization into the existing defense bureaucracy. Reaching the Full Implementation stage
requires achieving both goals by creating an “ambidextrous” organization: cyber forces must be
efficient in daily administrative and interagency processes while adapting to rapid changes in the
operational environment.33 Implementation is thus characterized by a tension between competing
operational and bureaucratic imperatives:34 organizational autonomy facilitates operational
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control but conflicts with the interdependent nature of the broader military and defense
bureaucracy. Implementers must thus pursue autonomy and dedicate resources towards
operational effectiveness in the cyber domain while retaining enough political capital to
successfully navigate the bureaucratic ecosystem.35
Military organizations (and respective suborganizations) are “mission oriented”: they
have formally designated missions36 and are predisposed to aggressively pursue the successful
execution of those missions.37 Because of this mission orientation, military organizations pursue
autonomy over organizational resources and full operational control.38 For those implementing a
new mission—particularly when that mission is tied to a new organizational structure—
autonomy and control over resources help to streamline mission-building. The development of a
new mission area entails several observable actions. For newly created organizations,
implementing a new mission involves the creation of new career paths and the reorganization of
existing and recruitment of new personnel.39 Developing mission-specific expertise within the
organization can require subsequent changes to the curriculum of professional military
educational institutions. Strategic and doctrinal changes also support mission development;40 at
the operational level, novel concepts of operation and measures of effectiveness help to refine
how the organization executes the mission.41 Finally, as the mission grows and is refined, the
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organization should push for additional resources to expand. This can even include the
establishment of new arms or sub-organizations within the cyber force organizational construct.42
However, mission-building does not occur in a vacuum. Pre-existing bureaucracy will
typically oppose the creation of a new organization. Some parts of the military may even lay
claim to the cyber mission, defining it as part of their own mission.43 For a new organization to
survive, implementers must build out the ability to operate within the broader bureaucratic
environment. Successful bureaucracy-building allows cyber forces to assimilate into interagency
processes and compete for funding, influence, and legitimacy with the rest of the military
establishment.44 For these reasons, bureaucratization helps insulate the cyber mission from the
resistance and opposition of other military organizations. However, existing bureaucracies will
possess resource and influence advantages over a nascent cyber force. Accordingly, the primary
bureaucracy-building challenge for implementers is grappling with power-asymmetries.45
Implementers can employ several strategies to build bureaucratic power. They can
engage in coalition-building with civilian actors or with other military actors by appealing to
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common interests.46 Implementers can also seek to embed cyber forces within another military
organization, sacrificing autonomy for mission insulation.47 Relatedly, cyber forces can gain
bureaucratic power through inclusion, i.e. explicitly including bureaucratic competitors in the
organizational command structures. Finally, implementers can attempt to quell opposition by
narrowing the definition of the cyber mission.48 However, strategies for bureaucracy-building
necessarily compromise autonomy and/or mission definition to preserve organizational
existence.49
Both mission-building and bureaucracy-building are necessary. The question at the crux
of implementation is: how do cyber force implementers prioritize mission- and bureaucracybuilding? Initially prioritizing mission-building at the expense of bureaucratic integration can
undermine the ability of cyber forces to compete for funding, legitimacy, and bureaucratic
influence, all of which can hamper cyber forces’ ability to achieve operational effectiveness over
the long term. Conversely, by prioritizing assimilation into the defense bureaucracy, cyber forces
sacrifice resources for mission-building in a rapidly changing environment, undermining the
primary purpose and justification for the organization’s existence. As discussed in the next
section, overall military size is the key factor driving implementers to prioritize one aspect of
organization-building over the other.
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How Organizational Size Shapes Implementation Dynamics
I assert that organizational size—specifically, the overall size of a state’s military—is a crucial
variable shaping implementation dynamics. Whereas organizational attributes such as
specialization, formalization, and centralization determine the nature of tasks performed within
an organization, size concerns the grouping and resources of units within an organization.
Organizational size varies along four theoretically important dimensions: the number of
functionally differentiated sub-units (horizontal complexity), the levels of hierarchy (vertical
complexity), the number of members (human capital), and the amount of financial capital.50 For
militaries, size is relative: measurements along these four dimensions must be compared to the
measurements of other militaries to determine whether the military organization is “small” or
“large.” For theoretical purposes, I assume that, ceteris paribus, larger organizations exhibit a
greater number of sub-units, more levels of hierarchy, more members, and greater amounts of
financial capital.51
I argue that organizational size helps mitigate the operational-bureaucratic tension
underlying cyber force implementation. In short, larger militaries are more predisposed to
initially prioritize the bureaucratic goal over the mission goal, while smaller militaries are more
likely to focus on mission-building before pivoting to bureaucracy-building. Despite a greater
risk tolerance and the availability (relative to smaller organizations) of human and financial
capital to build out the cyber mission, larger militaries entail a greater number of competing
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interests that can threaten the autonomy of cyber forces or lay claim to the cyber mission.
implementers in larger militaries are more likely to ensure the bureaucratic integration and
organizational survival of cyber forces before prioritizing mission-building.
Conversely, smaller militaries are more likely to focus directly on mission-building.
Implementers face a smaller pool of bureaucratic competitors in smaller militaries, meaning that
there are fewer interests to lay claim to the cyber mission and threaten the autonomy of cyber
forces. However, smaller militaries possess a smaller resource base and lack the risk tolerance of
larger militaries. Accordingly, implementers are more inclined to vigorously build out the cyber
mission to justify an additional strain on financial and human capital. Subsequently,
implementers in smaller militaries are likely to pivot to the bureaucratic imperative in attempts to
secure future resources. Personal ties can become crucial at this phase of implementation: despite
few available resources, implementers in a small organization can leverage personal ties to
advance implementation progress. The rest of this section unpacks the effect of organizational
size on the implementation process as a whole as well as its impact across each stage of the
implementation process. In doing so, I offer a framework that reconciles conflicting accounts of
the role of organizational size.
The Overall Effect of Size
Organizational size can exert both direct and indirect effects on innovation and
implementation processes.52 Existing studies on size and its effect on innovation and
implementation outcomes53 exhibit contradictory findings. In fact, a comprehensive review of the
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relationship between size and innovation across organizational theory notes “a single common
conclusion, which is that the most consistent result found in the organizational innovation
literature is that its research results have been inconsistent.”54
On one hand, many studies have asserted that large organizations are more likely to
undertake and implement radical, wide-ranging innovations than smaller organizations. Large
organizations maintain economies of scale for research and development and can more
effectively distribute the risks of failure than smaller organizations. With greater financial
resources, larger organizations are better positioned to implement innovations than smaller
organizations.55 The greater complexity exhibited by larger organizations also facilitates
innovation and implementation:56 complexity produces a broad knowledge base through a variety
of issue specialists and the exchange of ideas57 across differentiated units.58 For these reasons,
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authors conclude that large organizations are more likely to radically adopt and implement
innovations while smaller organizations adopt and implement innovations in an incremental
manner.
On the other hand, scholars have suggested that, despite resource advantages, larger
organizations face many hurdles that stifle innovation. Larger organizations usually entail higher
cooperation costs59 that slow the connection of capabilities, resources, knowledge, and strategies
across different parts of the organization.60 As such, innovation and implementation proceed
more slowly. Moreover, large organizations develop distinct bureaucratic subcultures and
entrenched interests that can decrease the efficiency of and even discourage innovation and
implementation.61 Large bureaucracies are slower to react to changes in the strategic
environment.62 Accordingly, smaller organizations are better equipped to adjust to external
changes and embrace innovations in a more cost-effective manner than larger organizations.
Smaller organizations are thus more predisposed to undertake and implement radical
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innovations.63 Large organizations lend themselves to more incremental innovation and
implementation.64
To reconcile these competing claims, some researchers have postulated that the
relationship between organizational size large-scale innovation is curvilinear.65 This suggests that
increases in organizational size facilitates radical innovation; however, after a certain point,
larger organizations experience diminishing returns. The larger an organization becomes, the
more resources that are required to produce and implement innovations.66 Drawing on this logic,
my first hypothesis is:
H1: The relationship between military size and the risk of completing the
implementation process is curvilinear.
While increases in organizational size—particularly increases in human and financial capital—
can enable the faster adoption and implementation of a cyber force, the additional bureaucratic
hurdles in larger organizations should negatively impact implementation processes, leading to
slower adoption and implementation rates than smaller organizations.
Stage-Specific Effects
A more nuanced way to understand the impact of organizational size on implementation
is to assess the effects of size across individual implementation stages. I make four key claims
about the role of organizational size. First, larger militaries should be more likely to create and
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introduce a cyber force than smaller militaries due to a higher risk tolerance. Larger
organizations tend to have a higher tolerance for risk than smaller organizations, i.e. larger
militaries are better able to absorb the risks of innovation failures. This greater risk tolerance
stems from two characteristics of large organizations. The greater resource levels of large
organizations compared to smaller ones—specifically, greater amounts of human and financial
capital—facilitate investments in innovative initiatives.67 A greater number of organizational
members increases the potential pool of issue-expertise and technical know-how needed to
introduce an innovation; greater spending levels allow for new ideas to be actualized.68 At the
same time, larger organizations are better able to distribute risks of failure than smaller
organizations. As organizations grow in the number of sub-units, failed innovation in one subunit is less costly to the overall performance of the organization. Larger organizations have a
greater number of sub-units than smaller organizations over which to distribute the effort to
compensate for failure.69
Accordingly, larger militaries (such as those owned by great powers) possess more
material, scientific, and technical capacity and are better able to absorb the risks of innovation
than smaller militaries.70 Moreover, larger militaries face greater systemic incentives to be the
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prime movers of international innovation than smaller militaries.71 Smaller militaries are
therefore more likely to have limited freedom and institutional capacity as well as fewer systemic
incentives to introduce new ideas about the use of military forces. In these cases, cyber forces are
more likely to be adopted out of strategic necessity.72 As such, Hypothesis 2 states:
H2: Larger militaries are more likely to transition into Introduction than
smaller militaries.
Second, once a cyber force has been introduced, the organizational model (branch,
service, and joint constructs) of a cyber force is more likely to be modified in larger militaries
than in smaller militaries. As organizational size increases, so does the number of interests,
whether it be an increase in the number of sub-units, levels of hierarchy, or an increase in
membership.73 An increase in the number of competing interests decreases the likelihood that
consensus can be reached over cyber force structure: as organizations grow, so do the number of
potential veto players.74 Bureaucratic pressures to veto or assert control over the implementation
can emanate from horizontal and/or vertical resistors.75
Moreover, as organizations become larger, sub-groups are more likely to develop their
own norms, cultures, values, and social dynamics for their operations.76 As such, the dynamics of
bureaucratic politics are likely to be more intense in larger organizations, particularly when
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innovations threaten traditional power relations.77 Implementation efforts can become embedded
in and reinforce existing routines, procedures, and structures.78 As a result, the pursuit of an
autonomous cyber force in large militaries is likely to require extensive coalition-building; the
increases the probability that the organizational model of the cyber force is modified.79
Implementers in larger militaries are therefore more likely to initially prioritize bureaucratic
assimilation over mission development after introducing a cyber force.
Conversely, cyber forces in smaller organizations should be less likely to undergo
modification than those in larger organizations. Implementers face relatively fewer competing
interests, meaning that implementers are less likely to undertake extensive political bargaining
than their counterparts in larger organizations.80 Moreover, because of the higher costs of
introduction, most of the bureaucratic negotiation in smaller militaries are likely to occur prior to
introduction. Thus, smaller organizations are more likely to bypass the Modification stage,
allowing implementers to focus more building out the cyber mission and expanding cyber forces.
Hypothesis 3 therefore states:
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H3: Cyber forces in larger militaries are more likely to transition into
Modification than those in smaller militaries.
Third, although smaller militaries can focus implementation efforts on expansion,
expansion is more likely to occur in larger organizations. With greater resources and capabilities,
larger organizations are better able to extend existing knowledge bases than smaller
organizations.81 Smaller militaries are more likely to be handicapped by resource constraints that
limit the potential for cyber force expansion.82 As such, Hypothesis 4 states:
H4: Cyber forces in larger militaries are more likely to transition into
Expansion than those in smaller militaries.
Finally, I assert that the transition into full implementation is greatly influenced by
providing “proof of concept” to political leaders and other military organizations by linking the
operational effects of computer network operations to broader strategic priorities. Successful
operational experiences provide crucial feedback to military leaders and political decisionmakers
that reduces uncertainty regarding the strategic implications of the cyber domain. Because larger
organizations generally have a greater number of interests to which implementers can link
operational success, they are likely to present a more opportunities for proof of concept than
smaller organizations. This leads to Hypothesis 5:
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H5: Cyber forces in larger militaries are more likely to transition into Full
Implementation than those in smaller militaries.
Alternative Explanations: Capacity and Culture
Two alternative explanations for the implementation of cyber forces—adoption-capacity and
organizational culture—help to shed light on the contingent importance of organizational size. In
the brief discussion that follows, I sketch out adoption-capacity theory as well as an explanation
resting on organizational cultural logics. I differentiate each explanation from the theory of
organizational size by highlighting several shortcomings that indicate the need for additional
theorization.
Adoption-Capacity
According to the first alternative explanation, adoption-capacity, competitive pressures
drive states to respond to the demonstration of military innovations in one of two ways:
internally, by adopting or countering the innovation; or externally, by balancing with an adopter,
bandwagoning with the demonstrator, or becoming neutral. Adoption decisions hinge on two
factors. The first is the information on adoption requirements transmitted by the demonstration
event: the greater certainty states have surrounding the substance of the innovation, the more
likely a state is to adopt the innovation. The second factor is the state’s ability to meet the
financial and organizational requirements for adoption given its current capabilities.83
The required financial intensity and required organizational capital for adoption differ by
innovation. Financial intensity refers to the required mobilization of resources specific to the
innovation. The financial intensity of adopting an innovation is driven by (1) whether the
underlying basis of the innovation technology is civilian or military and (2) the cost per unit of
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technology. States are more likely to adopt innovations with a lower financial intensity (civilian
basis and low cost per unit) than those with a higher financial intensity (military basis and high
cost per unit).84 Organizational capital refers to a military’s ability—in terms of critical task
focus, experimentation, and its bureaucratic entrenchment—to undertake the necessary
organizational changes (in scope and degree) to implement a given innovation. All else equal,
innovations requiring less organizational capital are more likely to be adopted than those
requiring a greater amount of organizational capital.85 Ultimately, states that cannot muster the
required financial and/or organizational capital must resort to alternative strategies to
innovation.86
What then, would adoption-capacity predict for the implementation of cyber forces? In
his concluding chapter, Horowitz (2010) extends the adoption-capacity argument to consider
cyberwarfare. Horowitz posits that “the construction of cyberwarfare units could require a fairly
low level of financial intensity to adopt due to their heavy linkages to commercial enterprises.”87
However, for cyberspace to become a domain for military warfare, innovation “will also
probably require large levels of organizational transformation.”88 This indicates that the adoption
of cyber forces should require relatively little financial intensity but large amounts of
organizational capital to adopt and implement. Moreover, the relative availability of financial
and organizational capital should dictate whether a military prioritizes the operational or
bureaucratic goal during initial implementation efforts.

84

Horowitz, 31–33.
Horowitz, 32–39.
86
Horowitz, 27.
87
Horowitz, 219.
88
Horowitz, 220.
85

77
Unfortunately, adoption-capacity does not treat implementation as a distinct stage:
considerations of implementation costs and the likelihood of success are part of adoption
decisions. However, the logic of adoption-capacity suggests that, ceteris paribus, most states
should easily transition into Introduction: low financial intensity enables adoption, but high
organizational capital requirements prevent greater implementation progress. Increases in
organizational capital should thus facilitate transitions between the Introduction, Expansion, and
Full Implementation stages of the implementation process. This explanation, however, provides
little insight into the dynamics of reinvention that take place during the Modification stage.
Competing interests in adoption-capacity are only examined in the context of organizational age
and bureaucratic entrenchment over time: the older the organization, the more likely that existing
bureaucratic players resist any type of change that threatens business as usual. This discussion
only implies that a greater number of bureaucratic interests prevents further implementation.89
Adoption-capacity differs from the theory of organizational size in another important
way: Horowitz’s organizational capital is relatively agnostic to the absolute size of an
organization. Instead, his framework is more focused on bureaucratic bloating. However, he does
note that the two factors may be related, and the issue of organizational size may take on more
significance depending on the specific military innovation under examination.90
Organizational Culture
The second alternative explanation for cyber force implementation rests on organizational
culture. In militaries, organizational culture refers to “those identities, norms, and values that
have been internalized by a military organization, and that frame the way the organization views
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the world, and its role and functions in it.”91 Culture can shape decisions over which innovations
to pursue92 as well as the scope, pace, and extent of diffusion.93 According to cultural accounts,
competitive pressures—via external threats or strategic setbacks—can provide the impetus for
innovation but cannot explain the extent to which the adoption of an innovation occurs.94
A key factor pointed to by cultural explanations is the degree of cultural tolerance for
innovation, i.e. whether military organizations and their leadership tolerate deviations from
orthodox practices and structures.95 Higher degrees of cultural tolerance increase a military’s
openness to new ideas and facilitate the flow and absorption of information about an innovation.
In this way, militaries are more responsive to strategic setbacks, and adoption is likely to occur
faster and more extensively. Conversely, when militaries and their leaders work to enforce a
cultural orthodoxy—and thus exhibit lower levels of cultural tolerance—the adoption of an
innovation is expected to be limited, partial, or non-existent. Lower levels of cultural tolerance
close off militaries to new information and practices and restrict responsiveness to strategic
setbacks.96 In these cases, an orthodox culture curtails the adoption of practices and technologies
that are seen as incompatible.97
Yet, when innovations diffusion in principle, militaries with low levels of cultural
tolerance may still be likely to adopt and adapt the broad innovation principle. In these
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circumstances, culturally intolerant militaries can pursue an incarnation of the innovation
principle that represents the best “cultural fit” with the organization’s existing orthodoxy.98 For
example, an important orthodoxy in many militaries is operational jointness: a culture of
jointness promotes and prescribes operational coordination, cooperation, and integration across
military services.99 Those militaries with a high degree of cultural jointness should be biased
towards the selection of a joint force cyber force structure, while those who have not or have
weakly internalized jointness (and thus have a culture of service-dominance) are more likely to
pursue a service-based force structure.
Together, cultural tolerance and fit can help explain both the selection of organizational
model for cyber forces and the extent to which it is implemented. Cultural fit provides a logic for
assessing the selection of an organizational model for cyber forces;100 culturally tolerant
militaries are expected to implement the chosen model to a greater extent (i.e. at higher levels of
command) than culturally intolerant militaries. Importantly, cultural tolerance can change over
time and is thus not a static variable.101 This logic suggests that increases in cultural tolerance
should facilitate transitions between the Introduction, Expansion, and Full Implementation
stages. Additionally, while cultural “fit” can explain initial organizational model selection,
increases in cultural tolerance should also increase the likelihood of Modification. As military
organizations become more tolerant of deviations from orthodoxies, there is an increased
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likelihood that the military opts to change the organizational model of cyber forces to achieve
more unorthodox and innovative force structure.
In contrast to organizational size and adoption-capacity, cultural logics do not routinely
account for a military’s pool of potential resources. Although culturally open militaries may
desire to expand and fully implement a cyber force, they may lack the resources to do so.
Cultural openness and organizational size may also, to a certain extent, overlap: larger militaries
are more conducive to the development of distinct, service-level subcultures that can compete
with one another to produce diverse approaches to an innovation.102
Conclusion
This chapter has advanced three core claims. The first is that implementing an innovation
constitutes a process; as such, diffusion studies require a more nuanced framework for
understanding how innovations change over the course of implementation. To these ends, I have
proposed a novel framework for implementation based on five discrete stages: Pre-Adoption,
Introduction, Modification, Expansion, and Full Implementation. Second, I have asserted that the
implementation of cyber forces is characterized by a tension between developing the capacity to
carry out the cyber mission and integrating into the defense bureaucracy to develop interagency
power and influence. Both are crucial to implementing cyber forces. The issue at the heart of
implementation efforts is how to prioritize these objectives.
Finally, I argue that organizational size is an important factor that helps shape
implementation dynamics and predisposes implementers to initially prioritize mission-building
or bureaucracy-building. In short, larger organizations possess a greater tolerance for risk and a
greater pool of resources; however, larger organizations also possess a greater number of
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competing interests. As such, cyber forces can more easily be introduced into the military
ecosystem and subsequently expanded. Yet, implementers are likely to prioritize bureaucratic
integration to position a nascent cyber force to compete for autonomy and influence. Conversely,
smaller organizations have less tolerance for risk and smaller resource bases but fewer
bureaucratic competitors. Accordingly, implementers in small organizations are likely to focus
on building the cyber mission and pushing for additional resources for expansion without
extensive bureaucratic negotiation. In both large and small organizations, providing “proof of
concept” by linking operational effects to broader strategic interests is likely to influence the full
implementation of cyber forces. Because larger organizations have a broader portfolio of
strategic interests than smaller organizations, implementers in large militaries are likely to have
more opportunities to prove the worth of cyber forces.
As laid out in the research design section of the introductory chapter, the next three
chapters of this dissertation evaluate the explanatory power of my theory to highlight the
importance of organizational size. Chapter 4 presents my quantitative analysis. Through a
combination of survival models—a stratified Cox model and a multistate survival model—this
chapter tests the hypotheses derived from my theory and establishes broad trends in
implementation. Chapters 5 and 6 offer within-case qualitative analyses. Using process tracing, I
examine the evolution of two cyber forces: the United States’ U.S. Cyber Command (Chapter 5);
Estonia’s Cyber Command (Chapter 6). Importantly, the U.S. case study examines
implementation in a large military organization; Chapter 6 on Estonia assesses implementation
patterns in a small military. In each case, I interrogate my theorized causal mechanisms and
differentiate the them from the mechanisms associated with adoption-capacity and organizational
culture. In doing so, I investigate the utility of my theory—in conjunction with the alternative
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explanations—with a combination of historical and original interview data. Ultimately, the
incomplete accounts provided by the alternative explanations highlight the importance of
theorizing organizational size. The concluding chapter provides a preliminary extension of the
theory to Germany’s Cyber and Information Domain Service (Chapter 7).
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CHAPTER 4
Modeling Cyber Force Implementation Dynamics

Introduction
This chapter provides a quantitative test of the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3. The first section
of this chapter summarizes the main arguments of the previous theory chapter: that implementing
an innovation is best conceptualized as a process consisting of stages that includes adoption
decisions; and that size is the primary factor shaping implementation pathways. The second
section discusses the measurement of key variables. Much of this section is devoted to
operationalizing the dependent variable—specifically, probability of experiencing a transition
event between implementation stages at a given point in time. Accordingly, this section
elaborates how implementation stages relate to changes in cyber force structure and identifies the
range of possible transitions. The third section details the modeling strategy as well as issues
with the data that require attention. The fourth section presents and discusses the results of two
statistical models: a stratified Cox model addressing the entire implementation process; and a
multistate survival model that assesses transitions between specific implementation stages.
Subsequently, the chapter concludes by summarizing and looking forward to the two case study
chapters that follow.
Recap: Theory and Hypotheses
The previous chapter has argued that the implementation of cyber forces is a process that unfolds
across a series of five interconnected stages: pre-adoption, introduction, modification, expansion,
and full implementation. Implementation can proceed in nonlinear patterns, and implementers
may not pass through each stage (i.e. they may skip certain stages altogether).
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Substantively, the implementation of cyber forces is characterized by a tension between
two competing goals that pull implementation resources in opposing directions: building an
organization that operates effectively in the cyber domain and integrating that organization into
the existing defense bureaucracy. Fully implementing cyber forces requires achieving both goals
by creating an “ambidextrous” organization: cyber forces must be efficient in daily
administrative and interagency processes while adapting to rapid changes in the operational
environment. Implementers must therefore dedicate resources towards operational effectiveness
in the cyber domain while retaining enough political capital to successfully navigate the broader
bureaucratic ecosystem.
Because militaries can deal with this challenge in different ways, a variety of pathways to
full implementation are possible. This is particularly true under the conditions of principle
diffusion, where states and their militaries lack a dominant blueprint or roadmap for
implementation. Without clear direction for implementation, what explains the variation in
implementation dynamics for cyber forces across militaries? In other words, what causes
the implementation of cyber forces to unfold differently across militaries?
I assert that organizational size—specifically, the size of a state’s military
organizations—is a crucial variable shaping implementation dynamics.
In short, larger militaries are more predisposed to initially prioritize the bureaucratic goal
over the mission goal, while smaller militaries are more likely to focus on mission-building
before pivoting to bureaucracy-building. Despite a greater risk tolerance and the availability
(relative to smaller organizations) of human and financial capital to build out the cyber mission,
larger militaries entail a greater number of competing interests that can threaten the autonomy of
cyber forces or lay claim to the cyber mission. As such, implementers in larger militaries are
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more likely to address the bureaucratic integration and organizational survival of cyber forces
before prioritizing mission-building. Conversely, smaller militaries are more likely to focus
directly on mission-building. Implementers face a smaller pool of bureaucratic competitors in
smaller militaries; however, smaller militaries possess a smaller resource base and lack the risk
tolerance of larger militaries. Accordingly, implementers are more inclined to vigorously build
out the cyber mission to justify an additional strain on financial and human capital.
Subsequently, implementers in smaller militaries are likely to pivot to the bureaucratic
imperative to increase the likelihood of securing resources in the future.
The argument advanced in Chapter 3 provided five hypotheses. These hypotheses span
both the overall (H1) and stage-specific effects (H2-H5) of organizational size over time:
H1: The relationship between military size and the risk of completing the
implementation process is curvilinear.

H2: Larger militaries are more likely to transition into Introduction than
smaller militaries.

H3: Cyber forces in larger militaries are more likely to transition into
Modification than those in smaller militaries.

H4: Cyber forces in larger militaries are more likely to transition into
Expansion than those in smaller militaries.

H5: Cyber forces in larger militaries are more likely to transition into Full
Implementation than those in smaller militaries.

Figure 4.1 summarizes a dynamic view of the implementation process with the corresponding
stage-specific hypotheses.
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Figure 4.1. A Dynamic Model of the Implementation Process with Corresponding Hypotheses.

Measurement
Dependent Variable: Probability of Transition Event over Time
To model the probability of experiencing a transition event over time, this section operationalizes
the transitions between implementation stages. Moving between implementation stages rests on
changes in cyber force structure. As such, operationalizing transitions between stages requires
three important steps: (1) cataloguing the types of changes in cyber force structures; (2)
explicating how these changes in force structure underlie changes in the implementation process;
and (3) identifying the range of potential implementation transitions.
Changes in Cyber Force Structure. As conveyed in Chapter 2, The Dataset on Cyber
Force Structures captures the changes in cyber force structure. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 provide
an overview of the changes in force structures over time. Table 4.1 summarizes the raw data on
transitions between cyber forces structures, while Tables 4.2 and 4.3. shed light on changes in
organizational models and scales of command, respectively. A total of 90 cyber force structure
transitions have occurred from 2000-2018. Immediately worth noting is that, once a cyber force
has been created, there have been no transitions back to No Cyber Force.
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Table 4.1. Number of Observed Transitions between Force Structures, 2000-2018

Subord.

Branch
Sub-Uni.

Unified

Next Force Structure
Service
Subord. Sub-Uni. Unified

Subord.

Joint
Sub-Uni.

Unified
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27

8

1
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Sub-Uni. Branch
Unified Branch

--0
0

7
--0

3
1
---

0
0
0

1
0
0

2
0
0

3
1
0

0
0
0

1
2
0

17
4
0

Subord. Service
Sub-Uni. Service
Unified Service

0
0
0

1
0
0

0
0
0

--0
0

2
--0

0
0
---

1
0
0

1
0
0

1
1
0

6
1
0

Subord. Joint
Sub-Uni. Joint
Unified Joint

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

--0
0

5
--0

0
3
--

5
3
0
90

Note: --- indicates same stage transition
Source: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures
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The creation of an initial force structure (i.e. any transition from No Cyber Force)
accounts for the bulk of transitions that have occurred (54 of the 90 total transitions: 60%). By
far, the most common transition has been from No Cyber Force to a Subordinated Branch force
structure. This has accounted for 30% of all transitions that have occurred in Table 4.2 (27 out of
90 transitions). Transitions from No Cyber Force into Subordinate Service (11 out of 90, 12.2%)
and Subordinated Joint (1 out of 90, 0.01%) have occurred much less frequently.
More broadly, Table 4.1 indicates that most initial cyber force structures result in
Subordinated commands—which includes transitions from No Cyber Force into Subordinated
Branch, Subordinated Service, or Subordinated Joint force structures—and represent 39 out of 90
total command transitions (43.3%). The Branch model is also the most common selection for
initial force structures, with transitions from No Cyber Force into a Branch model numbering 39
out of the 54 total model selection decisions (72.2%).
As noted in Chapter 2 the variation in organization models increases over time. Table 4.2
also details “model switching”, i.e. the change from one organizational model to another. Model
switching has only occurred 15 times; despite the small sample, changes generally tend to
favor the selection of a Joint model. Militaries utilizing the Branch model have changed to a
Joint model seven times (compared to three transitions from a Branch to Service model). Those
employing a cyber force structure based on a Service model have transitioned into a Joint model
four times as opposed to one transition into the Branch model. Notably, once a Joint model has
been selected, there has been no further model change. Table 4.3 indicates that changes to
command levels are more frequent than model switching in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2. Organizational Model Selection Dynamics, 2000-2018
Current
Organizational Model
No Cyber Force
Branch
Service
Joint
Total

Next Organizational Model
Branch
Service
Joint
36
12
6
--3
7
1
--4
0
0
--37
15
17

Total
54
10
5
0
69

Source: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures

Table 4.3. Command Change Dynamics, 2000-2018
Current
Command Level
No Cyber Force
Subordinated
Sub-Unified
Unified
Total

Subordinated
39
4*
1
0
44

Next Command Level
Sub-Unified
12
17
0*
0
29

Unified
3
7
7
0*
17

Total
54
28
8
0
90

*Transitions into the same command level are included in this table only when a model change has occurred.
Source: The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures

Although the initial creation of a cyber force accounts for over half of the command
selection dynamics (54 out of 90 total, 60%), 40 percent of cyber force structures have
experienced some sort of change. This table does include four transitions into the same force
structure as the current; this is documented to capture de facto changes to the nature of the
command due to a change in organizational model. Overwhelmingly, changes in force structure
tend to lead to greater levels of command. Subordinated commands have transition into SubUnified commands 17 times and into Unified commands three times. Sub-Unified commands
generally transition into Unified commands (seven out of eight transitions), with one transition
into a Subordinated command. Table 4.1 shows that this transition was from a Sub-Unified
Branch into a Subordinated Joint cyber force structure. Finally, the data indicates that Unified

90
commands do not change: there have been no transitions into any other command level, and
there have been no model switching from Unified commands (as evidenced by no transitions
from a Unified to another Unified command). As of 2018, only 17 states have reached a Unified
command level.
Several insights emerge from this brief overview. First, most initial cyber force structures
tend to take on Subordinated commands. Second, subsequent changes in force structures
generally entail an increase in the level of command. Third, while model switching is relatively
infrequent (representing 15 of the 90 total transitions, 16.7%), cyber forces (with one exception)
tend to move into the combat subsystem by adopting either a Service or Joint model. Fourth, the
Joint model appears to be a terminal model—once the military moves to a Joint model, it will not
transition into any other organizational model. Finally, once a Unified command is reached, there
are no subsequent changes in the cyber force’s organizational model or command level.
How Changes in Cyber Force Structure Define Implementation Stages. Table 4.4
below summarizes the operationalized definitions for each implementation stage; Figure 4.2
gives additional detail by providing the coding schema used to define implementation stages
according to changes in cyber force structures. Militaries with no cyber force occupy the PreAdoption stage. The creation of an initial (non-Unified) cyber force moves militaries from
Pre-Adoption into Introduction. Militaries enter Modification after changing the
organizational model underpinning cyber force structure; these changes result in a nonUnified command. Expansion entails an increase to the cyber force’s scale of command.
Expansion hinges on the organizational model matching the previously occupied stage and
excludes increases to Unified commands. Finally, Full Implementation coincides with the
creation of Unified command for cyber forces.

91

Table 4.4. Operationalizing Implementation Stages
Stage

Operational Definition

1.

Pre-Adoption

No cyber force.

2.

Introduction

The initial (non-unified) cyber force structure adopted by
the military. Can include any organizational model and
Subordinated or Sub-Unified command structures.

3.

Modification

Any change in organizational model from the force
structure in the Introduction stage. This can include (but
does not require) changes in the command level. Excludes
any changes that result in Unified commands.

4.

Expansion

An increase in the scale of command; organizational model
must match organizational model from the previous stage
(otherwise, it is defined under the Modification stage).
Expansion occurs only when the previous force structure
maintains a Subordinated command.

5.

Full Implementation

The creation of a unified cyber force structure, regardless
of the previous stage’s organizational model or command
structure.
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Figure 4.2. Coding Schema for Mapping Changes in Cyber Force Structure onto Implementation Stages
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A brief look at the development of the United States’ force structure provides an example
of this operationalization. Before 1998, the U.S. maintained no cyber force, and was thus in the
Pre-Adoption Stage. The first cyber force was the Joint Task Force – Computer Network
Defense (JTF-CND), established in late 1998 under the Defense Information Systems Agency, a
logistical agency. The creation of JTF-CND as a subordinated branch moved the U.S. into the
Introduction stage. In 2001, JTF-CND was reassigned to a combatant command (U.S. Space
Command); this move modified the organizational model of JTF-CND from a branch to a joint
model. Subsequent iterations of JTF-CND (Joint Task Force – Computer Network Operations
[JTF-CNO], Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations [JTF-GNO], and Joint Functional
Component Command – Network Warfare [JFCC-NW]) reported to U.S. Strategic Command
and retained a subordinated joint force structure. The U.S. entered the Expansion stage with the
creation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as a sub-unified combatant command in
2010. The U.S. reached Full Implementation with the elevation of USCYBERCOM to a fully
unified joint combatant command in August 2017. Figure 4.3 visualizes these changes.

Figure 4.3. The Implementation of U.S. Cyber Force Structure over Time
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Identifying Potential Transitions. The potential transitions between stages provides a
more dynamic and realistic portrayal of the implementation process. All militaries begin in PreAdoption. Full Implementation represents the absorbing state—once reached, militaries cannot
transition to any other stages. Introduction, Modification, and Expansion are intermediate stages.
There are two logical transitions out of the Pre-Adoption stage: Full Implementation with the
adoption of a Unified cyber force structure (Transition #1); or Introduction through the creation
of a Subordinated or Sub-Unified cyber force (Transition #2). There are three potential
transitions out of Introduction: the modification of the cyber force’s original organizational
model (Transition #3), an expansion of the scale of command (Transition #4), or a move to Full
Implementation via creating a Unified force structure (Transition #5). After reaching
Modification, militaries can move into Expansion (Transition #6) or Full Implementation
(Transition #7) depending on how the command has been elevated. Finally, militaries can leave
the Expansion stage by restructuring cyber forces into a Unified force structure (Transition #8).1
Table 4.5 summarizes these transitions and Figure 4.4 portrays potential pathways.

Table 4.5. Potential Transitions according to Current and Next Implementation Stages

1

Transition #

Current Stage

Next Stage

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Pre-Adoption
Pre-Adoption
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Modification
Modification
Expansion

Full Implementation
Introduction
Modification
Expansion
Full Implementation
Expansion
Full Implementation
Full Implementation

Although it may be possible to transition from Expansion to Modification, the more likely scenario is that changes
to the organizational model occur in the transition from Expansion to Full Implementation. Expansion implies an
increase in cyber forces’ bureaucratic turf; as such, changes in the organizational model are only likely to be
accepted if it is accompanied by the greater resources associated with reaching Full Implementation.
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Figure 4.4. A Dynamic Model of the Implementation Process by Transition Number

Independent variable: Organizational Size
Two predominant measures of organizational size are the total number of personnel and
the financial resources at the disposal of the organization. As personnel represents the more
direct and most frequently used measure in organizational studies,2 I use the total number of
active-duty military personnel as my primary measure of size.
At the same time, models must account for spending in some manner to avoid omitted
variable bias. However, I avoid using total military spending, as this would include a highly
correlated second measure of organizational size and could wash out the actual statistical effects
of size. To these ends, I focus on military spending per soldier—specifically, military spending
(in USD million) per 1,000 soldiers.3 Using this measure captures the possibility that militaries
can increase (or decrease) spending levels without changing overall size (in terms of personnel).
Total military spending (in USD million) is used as an alternative measure in the robustness
checks in Appendix 1.

Camison-Zornoza et al., “A Meta-Analysis of Innovation and Organizational Size,” 337.
Former Commander of U.S. Cyber Command General Keith Alexander has suggested that effectively developing
an initial cyber force requires about 1,000 soldiers. .James A. Lewis, “Managing New Style Warfare: An Interview
with Keith Alexander,” Cyber From the Start, accessed May 10, 2019, https://www.csis.org/podcasts/cyber-start.
2
3
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Because each of these measures exhibit positive skewness, I log-transform each measure
to normalize them and facilitate subsequent modeling. Logging personnel and spending measures
is a common practice in organizational studies.4 To test Hypothesis 1 in the full implementation
process model, I include a squared term for the logged personnel measure (the same method is
used for spending in the robustness checks. Due to the narrowing of subjects throughout the
implementation process, the squared term is dropped in the transition-specific model.
Control Variables
Although organizational size should primarily influence the adoption and implementation
of cyber forces, statistical models must account for other factors that facilitate or inhibit adoption
and implementation efforts.5 Accordingly, I include several control variables.
Latent Cyber Capabilities. A state’s cyber capabilities should play a critical role in the
ability to implement cyber forces. In testing the effect of cyber capabilities on coercive
concessions, Valeriano et al. (2018) construct a latent cyber capacity index as a proxy for a
state’s cyber capabilities. This index captures the infrastructure and knowledge capital from
which cyber power is built. The index normalizes six measures before averaging them into a
single score. For each country, these measures include: the number of broadband subscriptions
per 1,000 people; the number of secure Internet servers per 1 million people; the percentage of
high technology exports out of total manufacturing exports; the number of Internet users per
1,000 people; the total number of scientific and technical journal articles published; and the
number of residents who have applied for patent applications per year.6 To account for the
Damanpour, “Organizational Size and Innovation,” 386; Camison-Zornoza et al., “A Meta-Analysis of Innovation
and Organizational Size,” 336.
5
Camison-Zornoza et al., “A Meta-Analysis of Innovation and Organizational Size,” 338.
6
Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power
and Coercion (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 59–60; n.10, 152. Data for each measure is taken
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The World Bank, “World Development Indicators”
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2018).
4
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possibility that there may be a threshold effect for cyber capabilities and implementation, the full
implementation model includes a squared measure of the latent cyber capacity index. The
squared measure is dropped for the transition-specific model.
Government Cybersecurity Expertise. While states may have the latent cyber capabilities
to implement cyber forces, governments may lack sufficient cybersecurity expertise. As with
latent cyber capabilities, there may be a threshold effect with expertise. Moreover, expertise can
influence implementation decisions: as epistemic communities7 exchange ideas, they can
influence the design and redesign of cyber force structures. To capture the government’s degree
of cybersecurity expertise, I use an interval measure derived from Mechkova et al. (2019).8 In the
full implementation model, I include a squared measure of cybersecurity expertise. The squared
measure is dropped for the transition-specific model.
Regime. Domestic political institutions can affect the adoption and implementation of
cyber forces. Gartzke (2001) and Caverly (2014) have noted that democracies tend to have more
capital-intensive militaries; this may predispose them to invest in cyber forces.9 At the same
time, centralized institutions in autocracies can facilitate wide-ranging implementation;10
similarly, Dyson (2008) suggests that, even within democratic regimes, different levels of

“An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” P. M. Haas,
“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46, no. 1
(1992): 3.
8
Valeriya Mechkova et al., “Measuring Internet Politics: Introducing the Digital Society Project (DSP),” Working
Paper #1 (Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, May 2019). The ordinal measure from Mechkova et al. (2019)
is converted by the V-Dem team into an interval measure. See: Daniel Pemstein et al., “The V-Dem Measurement
Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data,” V-Dem Working
Paper (University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute, 2020).
9
Erik Gartzke, “Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Tyupe Affect States’ Anticipation of
Casualties?,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 3 (2001): 467–84; Jonathan D. Caverley, Democratic
Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Fuhrmann and Horowitz
(2017) find that the relationship between regime and acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is curvilinear.
Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz, “Droning On: Explaining the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles,” International Organization 71 (2017): 397–418.
10
Goldman, “Introduction: Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 8–9.
7
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executive constraints shape how innovations are implemented.11 To capture regime type, I utilize
the Electoral Democracy Index from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem). In the
robustness check models, I utilize the Regimes of the World Measure from the V-Dem Project.12
Strategic Environment. The strategic and competitive environment can incentivize or
deter the adoption and implementation of innovations.13 In particular, the external environment
can shape the timing of, strategies for, and extent to which militaries pursue innovation and
implementation.14 To account for the effect of the external environment, I deploy two measures:
one that captures the total number of engagements in military conflicts and one that captures the
overall intensity of the conflicts in which the military is engaged. For both measures, I use data
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.15
Diffusion. To capture the effects of systemic diffusion, I create a variable that
measures the geometric distance of each state’s cyber force structure from the overall
cyber force composition of the international system.16 In essence, this measures a state’s
distance from the “global standard” for cyber force structure at a given point in time. For
individual states, force structures are coded to capture the extent to which an organizational
model is implemented. States are sorted by organizational model using binary variables; (0 if the

T. Dyson, “Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms:
Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy,” Security Studies 17, no. 4 (2008): 725–74.
12
Michael Coppedge et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year] Dataset V10” (University of Gothenburg: Varieties of
Democracy Institute: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, 2020).
13
Damanpour, “Organizational Size and Innovation,” 393–94.
14
Resende-Santos, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army; Joao Resende-Santos, “Anarchy and the
Emulation of Military Systems,” Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 193–260; Elman, “The Logic of Emulation: The
Diffusion of Military Practices in the International System”; Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes
and Consequences for International Politics.
15
Specifically, I use the UCDP Dyadic Dataset to determine state actors participating in conflict. Lotta Harbom,
Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen, “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007,” Journal of Peace
Research 45, no. 5 (2008): 697–710; Therese Pettersson, Stina Hogbladh, and Magnus Oberg, “Organized Violence,
1989-2018 and Peace Agreements,” Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 4 (2019)..
16
The dyadic approach outlined below follows the guidance of Gilardi (2014); for more detail, see: F. Gilardi,
“Methods for the Analysis of Policy Interdependence,” in Comparative Policy STudies, ed. Isabelle Engeli and
Christine Rothmayr Allison (Springer, 2014), 185–204.
11
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organizational model is not used, 1 if the model is used); force structures are subsequently
weighted by scale of command (0.33 for subordinated, 0.66 for sub-unified, and 1 for unified).
For example, a state with a Subordinated Branch force structure would have a score of 0 for the
service model variable, a score of 0 for the joint model variable, and a score of 0.33 for the
branch model variable.
The force structure score of the international system aggregates all state-level scores by
(1) summing all state scores by month and (2) dividing the sum by the total number of states with
a cyber force structure. This systemic measure captures both the distribution of models across the
international system and the degree to which they are implemented via command levels. For
example, in a scenario where three states have a Unified Branch, the system score would be 1 for
the branch model measure and 0 for the service and joint model measures. This implies stronger
systemic pressures to adopt a specific model compared to a scenario where different models
populate the system score. In contrast, where three states have cyber forces but have Unified
Branch, Unified Service, and Unified Joint force structures, the systemic score would be 0.33 for
the Branch Model, 0.33 for the Service Model, and 0.33 for the Joint Model. In this case,
systemic pressures to adopt a specific model are much weaker.
The geometric distance between a state’s cyber force structure and the systemic
distribution of cyber force structures are subsequently calculated by (1) subtracting the system
score from the individual state score for each of the three weighted model measures, (2) squaring
the results, and (3) taking the square root of the summed results. The formula below summarizes
this final step:
(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 2 ) +
𝐸𝑢𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = √ (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2 +
(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐽𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)2
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The result is a single score that measures the geometric distance of the state’s force structure
from the systemic distribution. The higher the score, the greater the difference between the
state’s force structure and the systemic composition of force structures. The lower the score, the
closer the state is to the systemic distribution.
Additional variables are discussed and included in the robustness checks in Appendix 2
of this dissertation.
Methods: Multistate Modeling and Data Issues
This chapter employs two main survival modeling strategies to test the hypotheses listed above.
First, I utilize a stratified Cox model to assess the overall effect of size on the risk of
transitioning through the entire implementation process, thus testing Hypothesis 1. By stratifying
according to specific transitions, the stratified Cox model aggregates all transition events but
allows the baseline hazard to vary across transitions while assuming common covariate effects
over time for each transition. Additionally, stratification is useful for risks where the occurrence
of an event does not necessarily entail exiting the sample.17 This strategy thus provides initial
insight into the variables driving implementation dynamics.
The second strategy involves multistate survival modelling to test Hypotheses 2-5.
Although used extensively in epidemiology and biomedical studies,18 multistate modeling
remains rare in political science.19As an extension of Cox models,20 multistate models are

17

Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists, 176.
For a comprehensive overview of applying multistate models to these fields, see: Cook and Lawless, Multistate
Models for the Analysis of Life History Data.
19
Several recent exceptions include: Jones and Metzger, “Evaluating Conflict Dynamics: A Novel Empirical
Approach to Stage Conceptions”; Webster, “Rethinking Civil War”; Barrie, “The Process of Revolutionary Protest:
Development and Democracy in the Tunisian Revolution of 2010-2011”; Ari, “Uncrossing the Rubicon: Transitions
from Violent Civil Conflict to Peace”; Min, “Cheaper Talk: The Changing Nature of Wartime Negotiation in the
Post-1945 Order.”
20
For a basic overview of the logic behind Cox models, see: Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, Event History
Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists, 8.
18
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flexible enough to model a duration process comprised of multiple stages with a variety of
process structures. Stages are defined based on failure events that a subject is at the risk of
experiencing; these failure events represent transitions between stages.21 In the context of
implementation, multistate models can encompass not only the initial transitions within
implementation processes (i.e. adoption), but also the intervening transitions and the termination
of the process. Like stratified Cox models, multistate models allow transitions to have different
underlying rates of occurrence by permitting baseline hazards to vary across transitions.
However, multistate models offer two additional advantages. Unlike stratified Cox models,
multistate models allow for transition-specific covariates. By allowing the effects of covariates to
vary according to transition, multistate models can capture the theoretically differential impact of
independent variables at different stages of implementation. Additionally, using a multistate
model enables the calculation of unique transition probabilities based on specific covariate
profiles.22
Data
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 provide some descriptive information about the data.23 Although 172
countries are included in the dataset, 17 countries have been dropped as insignificant outliers
leaving 155 countries for statistical analysis.24 Table 4.6 contains information about the number

On how this approach differs from competing risks models, see: Metzger and Jones, “Surviving Phases:
Introducing Multistate Survival Models.”
22
Metzger and Jones; Jones and Metzger, “Evaluating Conflict Dynamics: A Novel Empirical Approach to Stage
Conceptions.” My approach follows Metzger and Jones (2016) and Jones and Metzger (2016) to satisfy the Markov
assumption, i.e. all relationships and probabilities rest on the current stage of occupation and not the entire life
history up to a given point.
23
On the structure of multistate data, see: Liesbeth C. de Wreede, Marta Fiocco, and Hein Putter, “The Mstate
Package for Estimation and Prediction in Non- and Semi-Parametric Multi-State and Competing Risks Models,”
Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine 99, no. 3 (2010): 261–74.
24
Countries with fewer than 1,500 total active military personnel and countries without any data on military
spending, personnel, or a host of control variables have been excluded. These include: Antigua and Barbuda,
Bahamas, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, St. Kitts and Nevis, Maldives San Marino, Tonga, Bhutan, Comoros, Sao
Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Barbados, Gambia, Cabo Verde, Timor-Leste, and Equatorial Guinea.
21
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of militaries to occupy each stage and the average length of time spent in each stage. While
hypotheses have been formulated in terms of risk of event occurrence over time, the following
duration information provides useful insight into the data. All militaries in the dataset—aside
from the seven countries (the United States, Russia, China, Israel, North Korea, Greece, and
Thailand) that are left-truncated—begin in the Pre-Adoption stage.25 Most countries remain in
this stage, and it has the longest average stage length of 210.74 months. 58 states have occupied
the Introduction stage; on average, it takes militaries 122.27 months (slightly over 10 years) to
transition out of this stage. Seven cyber forces have undergone Modification, which lasts 74.73
months on average (over six years). Expansion has the shortest spell length at 58.26 months on
average (just under 5 years) before transitioning to Full Implementation. Twelve militaries have
occupied the expansion stage. Only 17 states have completed the implementation process, i.e.
transitioned into a Unified cyber force structure. On average, the entire implementation process
takes 196.24 months to complete—over 16 years.
Table 4.7 describes each potential implementation pathway and its observed frequency in
the dataset. Most militaries reaching a Unified cyber force structure (10 out of 17) have followed
the pathway of Pre-Adoption → Introduction → Full Implementation. Three militaries have
managed to undertake large-scale adoption and implementation via Pre-Adoption → Full
Implementation. Only four militaries have taken more incremental pathways to a Unified cyber
force: Pre-Adoption → Introduction → Expansion → Full Implementation and the Pre-Adoption
→ Introduction → Modification → Expansion → Full Implementation pathways have both
occurred twice. One pathway (Pre-Adoption → Introduction → Modification → Full
Implementation) has not yet been observed.

“Left-truncation emerges in event history data sets when history prior to the first observation point is unobserved.
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social Scientists, 16.
25
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Table 4.6. Mean Stage Length in Months
Stage
Pre-Adoption
Introduction
Modification
Expansion
Complete Implementation Process

N

Spell Length
(mean, in months)

148*
58
7
12
17

210.74
122.27
74.73
58.26
196.24

*155 countries total, 7 countries left truncated

Table 4.7. All Potential Implementation Pathways by Observed Frequency

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Pathway

N

P→I→F
P→F
P→I→E→F
P → I →M → E → F
P → I →M → F

10
3
2
2
0
17

Total

Note: P = pre-adoption; I = introduction; M = modification; E = expansion; F = full
implementation.

Model Penalizations
Modeling the implementation process must account for two additional issues: rare events
and missing data. Table 4.8 summarizes the number of events by each transition. A total of 89
transitions have occurred,26 making the number observed transitions rare compared to the
number of states at risk across the 18-year period covered by the dataset.

Of the 90 raw transitions described in Table 4.1, only one is not captured in Table 4.6: Denmark’s transition from
the Offensive Cyber Warfare Unit (a Subordinated Branch cyber force structure) to the Computer Network
Operations Unit (a Subordinated Joint cyber force structure). Because Denmark’s initial cyber force structure at the
Introduction stage was a Subordinated Service structure (the Army 3 rd Electronic Warfare Company), the transition
between the Offensive Cyber Warfare Unit and the Computer Network Operations Unit represents a second spell of
Modification. As such, although a force structure change has occurred, Denmark remains in the Modification stage.
26
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Table 4.8. Number of Observed Transitions
Transition #

Current Stage

Next Stage

N

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Pre-Adoption
Pre-Adoption
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Modification
Modification
Expansion

Full Implementation
Introduction
Modification
Expansion
Full Implementation
Expansion
Full Implementation
Full Implementation

3
51
7
10
10
4
0
4
89

Total:

Rare events become problematic for Cox models—overfitting models with rare events
can produce biased estimates.27 As a rule of thumb, analysts modeling rare events should aim for
a ratio of one independent variable for every five to ten outcome events.28 This same guideline
can be extended to multistate models. However, as the number of stages and transitions increase,
the number of observed transitions drop.29 This pattern is observed in Table 4.6.
Where an insufficient number of observations exist within a specific transition, there are
two potential solutions to reduce biased estimates in multistate models. First, transitions can be
collapsed to decrease the number of transitions, thereby increasing the number of observations.
A second solution is to hold covariate effects constant across transitions; limiting the number of

For further discussion, see: Menelaos Pavlou et al., “How to Develop a More Accurate Risk Prediction Model
When There Are Few Events,” The British Journal of Medicine 351 (2015): 1–5; G. Ambler, S. Seaman, and R. Z.
Omar, “An Evaluation of Penalised Survival Methods for Developing Prognostic Models with Rare Events,”
Statistics in Medicine 31 (2012): 1150–61; Robert Tibshirani, “The Lasso Method for Variable Selection in the Cox
Model,” Statistics in Medicine 16 (1997): 385–95.
28
Eric Vittinghoff and Charles E. McCulloch, “Relaxing the Rule of Ten Events per Variable in Logistic and Cox
Regression,” American Journal of Epidemiology 165, no. 6 (2007): 710–18.
29
A similar issue occurs in repeated spells models: as the number of occurrences increases, the number of
observations is likely to decrease A. Colin Cameron and Pravin K. Trivedi, Microeconometrics: Methods and
Applications, 8th edition (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 655–57..
27

105
transition-specific specific covariates in a multistate model can help with model convergence and
increase the precision of estimates.30
Accordingly, I penalize this chapter’s models in three ways that are theoretically and
statistically justifiable. First, I reduce the number of total transitions by collapsing transitions #4
(Introduction → Expansion) and #6 (Modification → Expansion). Combining these transitions
increases the number of observed transitions to 14 (ten observations from transition #4 and four
observations from transitions #6). Statistically, variables maintain the same effects for both
transitions. Theoretically, collapsing transitions implies that reaching the Expansion stage entails
unique dynamics, regardless of the previous intermediate stage. Second, I collapse transitions #7
(Modification → Full Implementation) and #8 (Expansion → Full Implementation) into one to
capture the transition from intermediate stages into Full Implementation. Although combining
these transitions only result in four observed transitions, theoretical distinctions prevent any
further consolidation with other transitions into Full Implementation. Change from Modification
or Expansion to Full Implementation is more incremental in nature than the transitions from PreAdoption or Introduction into Full Implementation. As such, combining transitions to improve
statistical fit would inappropriately combine transitions that are qualitatively different. For the
final penalization, I hold several covariate effects constant across the multistate model.
Specifically, the effects of the regime and strategic environment variables are held constant
across the entire implementation process. This aids model convergence and helps to avoid
overfitting the multistate model.31
Metzger and Jones, “Appendix L of Surviving Phases: Introducing Multistate Survival Models.”
The results of the subsequent models are robust to alternative specifications of the transition-specific effects. For
the key personnel and spending variables, the statistical significance of transition-specific effects remain at the same
levels even after (1) holding the effects of all other variables constant across the model, and (2) allowing all other
variables (except the strategic environment variables) to have transition-specific effects. Despite the robustness of
these covariates, the three variable mentioned in the text are held constant across the model to improve the precision
of estimates while allowing the more proximate variables—personnel, spending, government expertise, and latent
30
31
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The second major issue that models must account for—particularly in the face of rare
events—is missingness across the dataset. The dataset has a missingness rate of approximately
4.896% across all potential independent and control variables. Under normal circumstances, this
would not be an issue; however, with rare events, listwise deletion of observations threatens to
greatly reduce the number of observed outcomes. This is the case for my main statistical models:
listwise deletion loses nine observed outcomes, roughly ten percent of all observed transitions.
Moreover, this missingness biases regression results to report primarily on the more democratic
regimes in the dataset. Missing data for more autocratic regimes is relatively unsurprising—
democracies are much more likely to report or record values for the country-time data collected
by the World Bank and other entities. However, this dynamic must be accounted for in some
manner.32 Therefore, I employ multiple imputation to address missingness as a source of bias.33
Accordingly, I use predictive means matching34 and produce five imputations for analysis.35
Appendix 2 models the unimputed data along with additional robustness checks.

cyber capacity—to exert transition-specific effects. Models do not converge when either of the two strategic
environment variables are allowed to have transition-specific effects.
32
For a robust overview of the “advanced democracy bias” in data and the benefits of multiple imputation, see:
Ranjit Lall, “How Multiple Imputation Makes a Difference,” Political Analysis 24 (2016): 414–33.
33
As such, data are not Missing Completely at Random (MCAR); it is more likely that data are Missing at Random
(MAR), i.e. democracies are more likely to report military spending data than autocracies (under the assumption that
regime type does not determine spending). In this case, listwise deletion introduces bias into regression estimates;
multiple imputation can thus serve to reduce biased regression estimates while also recapturing lost variation in the
outcome variable. On listwise deletion and multiple imputation, see: Vincent Arel-Bundock and Krzysztof J. Pelc,
“When Can Multiple Imputation Improve Regression Estimates?,” Poltical Analysis 26 (2018): 240–45; Thomas B.
Pepinsky, “A Note on Listwise Deletion versus Multiple Imputation,” Political Analysis 26 (2018): 480–88.
34
Predictive means matching (PMM) is particularly appropriate for non-normally distributed variables such as those
found in country-year data. For more on applying PMM, see: Katherine J. Lee and John B. Carlin, “Multiple
Imputation in the Presence of Non-Normal Data,” Statistics in Medicine 36 (2017): 606–17; Tim P. Morris, Ian R.
White, and Patrick Royston, “Tuning Multiple Imputation by Predictive Mean Matching and Local Residual
Draws,” BMC Medical Research Methodology 14, no. 75 (2014): 1–13; Shaun R. Seaman, Jonathan W. Bartlett, and
Ian R. White, “Multiple Imputation of Missing Covariates with Non-Linear Effects and Interactions: An Evaluation
of Statistical Methods,” BMC Medical Research Methodology 12, no. 46 (2012): 1–13; Ian R. White, Patrick
Royston, and Angela M. Wood, “Multiple Imputation Using Chained Equations: Issues and Guidance for Practice,”
Statistics in Medicine 30 (2011): 377–99.
35
The number of imputations should be at least equal to the percentage of incomplete cases across the entire dataset.
For additional guidance on this rule of thumb, see: White, Royston, and Wood, “Multiple Imputation Using Chained
Equations: Issues and Guidance for Practice,” 387–88.
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Results
The Overall Implementation Process
Table 4.9 presents the results of the stratified Cox model; for interpretation purposes, coefficients
are reported.36 Positive coefficients indicate that the corresponding variable is associated with a
higher hazard ratio, i.e. a one unit increase in the variable increases the relative risk of
completing the implementation process. Negative coefficients are associated with a lower hazard
ratio: a one-unit increase in the respective variable reduces the relative risk of completing
implementation. In effect, variables with positive coefficients reduce the median duration of the
implementation process, while variables with negative coefficients increase the median duration
time of the implementation process. To avoid violating the proportional hazards assumption, I
include a covariate that interacts my diffusion measure with time.37
Consistent with my expectations for Hypothesis 1, military size as measured by
personnel exhibits a curvilinear relationship to the risk of completing implementation over
time. The coefficients of the personnel and squared personnel variables indicate that initial
increases in organizational size increases the likelihood of transitioning from one stage of
implementation into another over time. After a certain point—as indicated by the squared term—
increases in size decrease the odds of transitioning from one stage to another. Both coefficients
are statistically significant at or above the 95% confidence level.

Interpretation of covariate effects follows the guidelines of Benjamin T. Jones and Shawna K. Metzger, “Different
Words, Same Song: Advice for Substantively Interpreting Duration Models,” Political Science & Politics 52, no. 4
(2019): 691–95.
37
Because the data has been imputed, normal PH tests are unavailable in Stata. Therefore, I test the PH assumption
in two ways: by including time-varying covariates in the regression to assess significance levels; and by extracting
individual imputations and assessing PH violations on each imputation to identify common variables that violate the
PH assumption.
36
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Table 4.9: Stratified Cox Model of the Implementation Process
Variables

B/(SE)

Log Total Military Personnel

2.721**
(1.033)

Log Total Military Personnel Squared

-0.096*
(0.045)
0.282*
(0.138)

Log Military Spending (USD mil)
per 1000 Soldiers
Government Expertise
Government Expertise Squared
Latent Cyber Capacity
Latent Cyber Capacity Squared
Democratic Regime

2.141*
(1.021)
-0.200*
(0.089)
3.387***
(0.897)
-0.248**
(0.097)
2.539***
(0.642)

Total Active Conflicts

0.577†
(0.336)

Intensity of Strategic Environment

-0.305
(0.205)
12.311*
(4.966)

Diffusion
Diffusion x Time

-0.074*
(0.029)

Note: *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. †p ≤ .10. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
N = 72,006. Failures=89. Imputations = 5.
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Specifically, initially each one-unit increase in the log of the total military personnel
(2.718 times increase in the total number of personnel) is associated with a 15.191% increase in
the hazard ratio when holding all other variables constant. However, after a certain point, each
additional one-unit increase in the log of total military personnel is associated with a 1.968%
decrease in the hazard ratio (all other variables held constant). Substantively, this means that for
every initial 10% increase in the total number of military personnel, there is (holding all other
variables constant) an associated 1.294% increase in the hazard of transitioning between
implementation stages. Subsequently, after a given point, for each additional 10% increase in the
total number of military personnel, there is (holding all other variables constant) a corresponding
0.908% decrease in the hazard of transitioning between implementation stages.
Several other statistically significant relationships are worth noting from this model.
Spending per soldier is significant at the 95% confidence level. Holding all other variables
constant, a 10% increase in military spending (in USD million) per 1000 soldiers is associated
with a 1.027% increase in the hazard of transitioning between implementation stages. In effect,
increasing spending by 100 USD per soldier increases the relative risk of transition into the next
stage of implementation by 1.027%. As anticipated, both government cybersecurity expertise and
latent cyber capabilities exhibit threshold effects: the normal and squared measures indicate that
after certain levels are reached, capabilities and expertise no longer accelerate the
implementation process. Additionally, having a more democratic regime increases the hazard of
transitioning between stages. In terms of the strategic environment, the total number of ongoing
conflicts seems to incentivize transitions between implementation stages, albeit at the 90%
confidence level. The intensity of these conflicts does not have a statistically significant effect.
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Finally, the effect of diffusion is statistically significant. As the original distance between
a state’s cyber force structure and the systemic composition of force structures increases, there is
a corresponding increase in the hazard of transitioning between stages. Eventually, as seen in the
interaction with time, this effect is reversed. Over time, increases in the distance between a
state’s force structure and the systemic composition are associated with a decrease in the hazard
of moving between implementation stages. This suggests that in the initial stages of diffusion,
militaries are more likely to move through the implementation process despite drifting away
from the systemic distribution of cyber forces. However, over time, moving away from the
systemic distribution slows implementation, while conformity to systemic pressures (i.e.
decreasing the geometric distance between a state’s force structure and the systemic
composition) increases the hazard of moving through implementation stages. This provides
evidence for claims that, while states may face few pressures to conform early in the diffusion
process, systemic dynamics encourage conformity over time.
Transition-Specific Model
Table 4.10 presents the results of the multistate survival model; coefficients are reported
for each variable according to specific transitions. Positive coefficients indicate that higher
values of the corresponding variable increase the probability of observing that transition;
negative coefficients indicate that higher values of the specific variable decrease the probability
of observing that transition. To facilitate substantive interpretation, I provide simulated transition
probabilities over time. As noted in the section on model penalizations, the effects of regime,
total conflicts, and conflict intensity are held constant across each transition. To avoid violating
the proportional hazards assumption, I include a covariate that interacts my diffusion measure
with time for the Pre-Adoption → Introduction transition.
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Table 4.10. Multistate Model of the Implementation Process

Transition
Covariates

P→F

P→I

I→M

I→E

I→F

M→E

M→F

E→F

Log Total Military Personnel

0.880
(0.620)

0.892***
(0.137)

0.772†
(0.414)

0.408
(0.272)

0.231
(0.232)

0.408
(0.272)

0.459
(0.639)

0.459
(0.639)

Log Military Spending (USD
mil) per 1000 Soldiers

0.695
(0.580)

0.444**
(0.156)

2.303*
(1.084)

1.535*
(0.601)

0.239
(0.491)

1.535*
(0.601)

-0.263
(1.272)

-0.263
(1.272)

Government Expertise

0.332
(0.795)

-0.207
(0.200)

-0.387
(0.480)

-0.686
(0.386)

0.195
(0.311)

-0.686
(0.386)

-2.028
(1.919)

-2.028
(1.919)

Latent Cyber Capacity

0.540
(1.291)

1.196***
(0.246)

-0.787
(1.199)

-0.247
(0.608)

1.209***
(0.370)

-0.247
(0.608)

1.141†
(0.616)

1.141†
(0.616)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

3.673***
(0.669)

Total Active Conflicts

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

0.238
(0.344)

Intensity of Strategic
Environment

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

-0.140
(0.214)

Diffusion

-17.768
(14.058)

40.447***
(11.974)

7.281*
(3.599)

3.323
(2.618)

4.649
(3.747)

3.323
(2.618)

-2.726
(5.665)

-2.726
(5.665)

-

-0.343***
(0.085)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Democratic Regime

Diffusion x Time

Note: P = pre-adoption; I = introduction; M = modification; E = expansion; F = full implementation.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. †p ≤ .10. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
N = 72,006. Failures = 89. Imputations = 5.
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The transition-specific model provides a more complex picture of the implementation
process. Coefficients in the model provide initial support for Hypotheses 2 (Introduction) and 3
(Modification) but provides no support for Hypotheses 4 (Expansion) and 5 (Full
Implementation). However, the simulated transition probabilities provide additional details that
the model coefficients alone cannot capture. As such, the results of the simulated transition
probabilities provide support for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 but do not provide support for
Hypothesis 5. Therefore, the transition-specific model provides support for all hypotheses except
Hypothesis 5.
Table 4.10 presents transition-specific covariate coefficients, while Figures 4.5 and 4.6
use the multistate model to present stacked transition probabilities for two different covariate
profiles based on 1,000 simulations over nineteen years. Figure 4.5 portrays the simulated
transition probabilities for a large military with approximately 750,000 soldiers (representing the
75th percentile of the logged military personnel measure, roughly the size of the Brazilian
military in 2006), while Figure 4.6 presents the simulated transition probabilities for a small
military with approximately 40,000 soldiers (in the 50th percentile of the logged measure,
roughly the size of Slovakia’s military in 2000). All other variables are held constant: both
militaries are set in highly democratic countries, with high levels of spending per soldier, high
levels of government cyber-security expertise and latent cyber capacity and are engaged in four
mildly intense conflicts. These profiles are used for all subsequent figures utilizing simulations.
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Figure 4.5. Simulated Stacked Transition Probabilities for a Large Military

Figure 4.6. Simulated Stacked Transition Probabilities for a Small Military
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Results for Organizational Size. All other variables held constant, increases in the log of
military personnel are associated with increases in the probability of transitioning from PreAdoption to Introduction. The variable’s coefficient in the model provides strong support for
Hypothesis 2: holding all other variables constant, a 10% increase in the total number of military
personnel is associated with a 1.088% increase in the hazard of transitioning from Pre-Adoption
to Introduction (at the 99.9% confidence level). The stacked transition probabilities illustrate this
relationship. For instance, Figure 4.5 shows that ten years into the simulation, the larger military
has roughly a 50% chance of transitioning from Pre-Adoption to Introduction, while Figure 4.6
shows the smaller military has approximately a 5% chance of making the same transition at year
ten. At year fifteen, the large military has over a 95% probability of transitioning into
Introduction, while the probability of transitioning for the small military remains under 30%.
Both figures also appear to support Hypotheses 3 and 4, with little support for
Hypotheses 5. However, the coefficients from Table 4.10 provide mixed support. With statistical
significance at the 90% confidence level, the model only provides moderate support for size’s
effect on transitioning from Introduction to Modification (Hypothesis 3). For every 10% increase
in the total number of military personnel, there is a corresponding 1.076% increase in the hazard
of transitioning from Introduction to Modification. Coupled with the lack of support (i.e. no
statistically significant effect) for Hypotheses 4 (Expansion) and 5 (Full Implementation), these
results suggest that organizational size exerts direct effects only the early stages of the
implementation process.
However, Figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 show that interpretations based on coefficients
alone can be misleading. Each figure shows the transition probabilities for the large and small
military profiles across the number of years since a cyber force was initially introduced.
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Figure 4.7. Simulated Transition Probabilities for Modification over Years Since Introduction

Figure 4.7 compares the probabilities for transitioning into Modification over time since
entering Introduction; 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Within the first two years
occupying the Introduction stage, the is no statistical difference in the likelihood of the small or
large military transitioning into Modification. However, after two years until the 15-year mark, a
large military is on average almost 50% more likely to transition into Modification (over a 90%
probability) than a small military (approximately a 40% probability). Only after year 15 does the
large military’s probability of entering Modification significantly decline, and eventually
confidence intervals overlap with those of the small military profile near year 17. These
overlapping confidence intervals explain the coefficient’s level of statistical significance in Table
4.10. Figure 4.7 offers strong support for Hypothesis 3.
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Figure 4.8. Simulated Transition Probabilities for Expansion over Years Since Introduction

Figure 4.8 provides additional insight into transitions into Expansion. Whereas the
coefficients of the logged military size variable provide not support for Hypothesis 4, Figure 4.8
shows qualified support for Hypothesis 4: organizational size only produces a statistically
significant effect (i.e. no overlapping confidence intervals between the large and small profiles)
after roughly 16 years of a cyber force’s existence. At 16 years, cyber forces in a large military
have approximately a 40% probability of expanding; at year 19, this probability increases to over
60 percent. Meanwhile, cyber forces in a smaller military have slightly above a 10% probability
of transitioning into Expansion at year 16; by year 19, this probability increases to roughly 20
percent.
In line with the variable coefficients in Table 4.10, Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provide no
support for Hypothesis 5: cyber forces in large organizations are no more likely to transition into
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Full Implementation than are cyber forces in small organizations. Figure 4.9 charts the respective
probabilities for transitioning into Full Implementation according to the time since a cyber force
has been introduced. To capture the potential that Full Implementation may be more likely out of
Pre-Adoption, Figure 4.10 charts transition probabilities over time since Pre-Adoption instead of
Introduction. Figure 4.9 indicates that, counter to theoretical expectations, after approximately
year 13 of possessing a cyber force, smaller organizations become more likely to transition into
Full Implementation than larger militaries. Figure 4.10 shows the mixed effects of size on
transitioning from Pre-Adoption to Full Implementation. For roughly the first 12.5 years of
occupying Pre-Adoption, there is not statistical difference between the transition probabilities of
the large and small military profiles. From years 13 to 15, large militaries become marginally
more likely to transition than small militaries; however, after year 17, smaller militaries become
more likely than larger militaries to transition into Full Implementation.
When taken in context with the results from the stratified Cox model and the results from
Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, the conclusions from Figures 4.9 and 4.10 are unsurprising. Larger
militaries have a lower risk (relative to smaller organizations) of completing the implementation
process and are more likely to transition into Modification and Expansion as intermediate stages.
As such, it makes sense to say that smaller militaries are more likely to reach Full
Implementation within a 19-year period: larger militaries are predisposed to occupy more stages
for greater periods of time than smaller militaries. As more data on cyber force structures
becomes available over time, a necessary extension of this modeling will be to extend simulation
time periods to further assess the role of organizational size in reaching Full Implementation.
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Figure 4.9. Simulated Transition Probabilities for Full Implementation over Years Since
Introduction

Figure 4.10. Simulated Transition Probabilities for Full Implementation over Years Since
Pre-Adoption
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Control Variable Results. Of the three background factors held constant in the multistate
model, only regime has a statistically significant effect (at the 99.9% confidence level) in Table
4.10. As with the stratified Cox model, increases in the democratic nature of the regime are
associated with increases in the hazard of transitioning out of each intermediate implementation
stage.38 The total number of active military conflicts and the intensity of these conflicts have no
statistically significant effect on transitions. Of the covariates with transition-specific effects,
only government cybersecurity expertise has no statistically significant on any transition.
Increasing spending levels per soldier appears to be a crucial factor across the
implementation process in Table 4.10. The log of military spending (USD mil) per 1000 soldiers
has statistically significant effects on transitioning from Pre-Adoption to Introduction and from
Introduction to Modification. All else held constant, 10% increase in military spending (in USD
million) per 1000 soldiers (an increase of 100 USD per soldier) is associated with a 1.043%
increase in the hazard of transitioning from Pre-Adoption to Introduction (99.9% confidence
level) and a 1.244% increase in the hazard of transitioning from Introduction to Modification.
This suggests that relative spending increases facilitate the introduction of an innovation; once
introduced, increases in relative spending levels appear to spur competing interests and increase
the likelihood that the organizational model underpinning an initial cyber force structures is
altered. Spending levels per soldier appear to a critical variable behind expansion. For every oneunit increase in the log of military spending (in USD million) per 1000 soldiers, there is a
corresponding 4.641% increase in the hazard ratio in transitioning into Expansion (i.e.
Introduction → Expansion and Modification → Expansion) when all other variables are held

38

Although the constant regime variable is significant, it is worth noting that robustness checks and alternative
specifications using transition-specific covariates show that effect of regime is only significant for the transition
from Pre-Adoption to Introduction.
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constant. Substantively, for each additional 100 USD per soldier, there is a 1.157% increase in
the hazard of reaching Expansion.
Latent cyber capacity looks to be a necessary precondition for both the introduction of a
cyber force and for reaching Full Implementation when all other covariates are held constant. A
10% increase in latent cyber capacity correlates with a 1.120% increase in the hazard of
transitioning from Pre-Adoption into Introduction (at the 99.9% confidence level). A 10%
increase in latent cyber capacity is also associated with a 1.114% increase in the hazard of
transitioning into Full Implementation from Expansion or Modification, albeit at the 90%
confidence level. Increases in latent cyber capacity also facilitates a jump from Introduction to
Full Implementation: a 10% increasing in latent cyber capacity is associated with a 1.122%
increase in the hazard of transitioning (99.9% confidence level).
Finally, diffusion pressures only exert statistically significant effects on the transitions
into Introduction and Modification. Mirroring the pattern identified in the stratified cox model,
as the original distance between a state’s cyber force structure and the systemic composition of
force structures increases, there is a corresponding increase in the hazard of transitioning from
Pre-Adoption into Introduction; eventually, this effected reverses, where an increase in the
geometric distance is associated with a decrease in the hazard of moving into the Introduction
stage. There is no time-varying effect for the transition from Introduction to Modification:
increases in the geometric distance are associated with an increase in the hazard of transitioning.
Conclusion
The statistical analyses in this chapter provides evidence to support my primary claim:
organizational size plays an important role in shaping the implementation of cyber forces. More
specifically, organizational size exerts direct effects on the implementation process: larger
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militaries are much more likely than smaller militaries to both introduce cyber forces in a limited
manner ( support for Hypothesis 2) and modify initial cyber force structures (support for
Hypothesis 3). Only after approximately 16 years of possessing a cyber force do large militaries
become more likely to expand cyber forces than small militaries (partial support for Hypothesis
4). At the same time, the greater likelihood of transitioning into these intermediate stages means
that larger organizations possess a lower risk of completing the implementation process relative
to smaller militaries (support for Hypothesis 1). However, this increases the average length of the
implementation process for large militaries, making them less likely than small militaries to
transition into Full Implementation over the course of 20 years.
The significance of several control variables points to the possible indirect effects of
organizational size. Spending increases appear to be crucial for expanding cyber forces.
Possessing sufficient latent cyber capacity is a prerequisite for fully implementing cyber forces
both in an incremental manner (from the Expansion stage) and in a more wide-ranging fashion
(from Introduction). Larger militaries may be better positioned than smaller militaries to increase
spending levels per soldier. Moreover, larger militaries might have greater potential to turn latent
cyber capacity into actualized capabilities than smaller militaries. As such, organizational size
may have indirect effects on the implementation process that are not captured by the models
utilized in this chapter. Accordingly, the next two chapters trace the role of size across the
implementation of two different cyber forces: Chapter 5 assesses the evolution of U.S. Cyber
Command; and Chapter 6 examines the creation of Estonia’s Cyber Command. A preliminary
assessment of Germany’s Cyber and Information Domain Service is provided in the concluding
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
The Origins and Development of United States Cyber Command:
Incremental Change in a Large Organization

The U.S. works at a scale that, literally outside of China and Russia, nobody else—our closest
allies, nobody—operates at the scale we do.1
- Ret. Admiral Michael Rogers
Fmr. Commander U.S. Cyber Command/
Director of the National Security Agency
Introduction
This chapter examines the implementation dynamics in one of the largest military organizations
across the globe: the United States Armed Forces. Specifically, this chapter details the
development of the United States’ cyber force structure and assesses three competing logics
advanced in the theory chapter: organizational size, adoption-capacity, and military culture.
Using the operationalization advanced in Chapter 4, Figure 5.1 summarizes the changes in U.S.
cyber force structure contained in this chapter by listing implementation stages, the
corresponding force structure, and the respective institutional body within the military.
The chapter proceeds in five major sections. The first section provides background on the
introduction and initial modification of the U.S. cyber force structure by examining
organizational initiatives from 1998 to 2005. The second section details an episode of failed
modification; specifically, it examines the Air Force’s (ultimately failed) attempt to create Air
Force Cyber Command (Provisional) as the military-wide locus for conducting computer
network operations. The third section examines the stand-up of United States Cyber Command.

1

U.S. Admiral (ret.) Michael Rogers interview with author, interview by Jason Blessing, Tallinn, Estonia, May 27,
2019.
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This section lays out the major arguments and events surrounding an expansion of the existing
joint model (a subordinated joint force structure via joint task force). The fourth section
examines the decision to elevate U.S. Cyber Command to a unified combatant command and
thus transition the U.S. to a unified joint cyber force structure. Finally, the chapter concludes by
evaluating the strengths and weakness of each theoretical explanation.

Figure 5.1. The Evolution of U.S. Cyber Force Structure: Implementation Stage, Force Structure,
and Institution.

Background: Reorganizations from 1998 to 2005
In the summer of 1998, the United States Department of Defense (USDOD) established the Joint
Task Force – Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) subordinate to the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) as the primary office responsible for the protection of USDOD’s
computer networks.2 The Joint Task Force was the Defense Department’s response to

2

Jason Healey, ed., A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Arlington, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies
Association, 2013), 44.
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vulnerabilities discovered during the 1997 ELEGIBLE RECIEVER exercise3 and the ensuing
realization of those vulnerabilities during the SOLAR SUNRISE attacks on USDOD networks in
February of 1998.4 Both ELIGIBLE RECEIVER and the SOLAR SUNRISE incident left a
crucial question unanswered: ‘Who is in charge?’.5 As the USDOD Chief Information Officer at
the time, Art Money had been tasked with developing a coordinating body to fill this role.6
The combat services raced to establish new computer network defense and/or information
warfare units to stake a claim in the upcoming budgetary battles. The emergence of JTF-CND
was a natural first step for USDOD and the combat services to address network defense7 and
initial operating capability was reached by December of 1998. Initial debates over the structure
of JTF-CND nearly resulted in the Air Force gaining sole control over the task force; however,
the commander of DISA provided an alternative proposal to host JTF-CND. The other combat
services agreed with this proposal, as it would prevent the Air Force from capturing new
responsibilities and thus more influence.8 Despite having to operate from temporary trailers in
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the DISA parking lot due to a lack of sufficient office space,9 JTF-CND reached full operational
capability by June 1999.10
Originally, Money had planned to incorporate an offensive role (conducting computer
network attacks) into JTF-CND. However, both Money and Major General John H. “Soup”
Campbell, the one-star Air Force officer in command of the task force, realized that the combat
services would not give such responsibility to a small task force that had virtually no command
authority. Major General Campbell had successfully lobbied for JTF-CND to be briefed on
offensive operations; yet, even this had been undermined by the combat services. Vice service
chiefs, at the direction of the service chiefs, continuously redefined attack plans so that they no
longer fell under the combat services’ requirement to brief the task force. Without a broader
charter and a more powerful institutional home, JTF-CND lacked true coordinating power.11
In October of 2000, JTF-CND was officially reassigned from DISA to U.S. Space
Command (USSPACECOM) by the Unified Command Plan 1999; USPACECOM was also
given primary military authority for computer network attacks.12 Although USSPACECOM was
located in Colorado, it was the only command that wanted cyber mission. At this time, the cyber
mission did not offer a substantial opportunity for prestige or resource capture, and
USSPACECOM’s technologically oriented command presented a potential fit for the Task
Force. The arrangement with USSPACECOM was a temporary fix; yet through
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USSPACECOM, JTF-CND gained crucial access to combat authority and resources that were
previously not available under DISA.13 Accordingly, JTF-CND’s mission ultimately expanded
on April 1, 2001 to include exploitative and offensive operations: the task force was no longer
limited to purely computer network defense. To reflect the new mandate, JTF-CND was renamed
Joint Task Force – Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO).14 This broader scope of authority
coincided with the April 2001 release of USDOD’s Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of
Military and Related Terms, where the Department advanced an initial definition of cyberspace
but did not recognize it as a unique domain.15
With the dissolution of USSPACECOM in October 2002, JTF-CNO and the cyber
mission (along with USSPACECOM’s other units and their missions) were absorbed by U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). USSTRATCOM subsequently divided authority over the
task force’s missions: USSTRATCOMS’s Deputy Commander for Network Planning and
Integration (a three-star officer who doubled as DIRNSA) oversaw network attacks, while
USSTRATCOM’s Deputy Commander for Network Operations and Defense (a three-star officer
who doubled as the Director of DISA) became responsible for network defense.16 These
authorities were formalized and expanded in February of 2003 with a more comprehensive
definition of cyberspace in the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace17 and the National
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Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-16.18 Eventually, in conjunction with the release of the
National Military Strategy in June 2004—which included specific references to cyberspace as a
battlespace and domain19—JTF-CNO was expanded and renamed Joint Task Force – Global
Network Operations (JTF-GNO).20
Responsibilities for computer network attacks were ultimately transferred in January
2005 to Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare (JFCC-NW). JFCC-NW
emerged from U.S. Marine Corps General James Cartwright’s reorganization of USSTRATCOM
during his tenure as commander. Only the network attack mission was given to JFCC-NW; the
DIRNSA/Commander for Network Planning and Integration at USSTRATCOM retained
authority over the new JFCC-NW. Network defense responsibilities remained with JTF-GNO
under the STRATCOM-DISA dual hat arrangement.21 It is against this backdrop that the U.S.
Air Force sought the cyber mission and ultimately failed and from which U.S. Cyber Command
eventually emerged.
The Cyber Command that Wasn’t: The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Air Force Cyber
Command (Provisional)
Although JTF-CND had been established under DISA in 1998 instead of the Air Force, the
United States Air Force (USAF) had been building a service-level foundation for computer
network operations since 1995. The USAF established the nation’s first service-level unit to
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explicitly incorporate cyberspace in 1995: the 609th Information Warfare Squadron.22 Therefore,
it was no surprise that an Air Force officer—Major General “Soup” Campbell—was tapped to be
the first commander of JTF-CND. Despite losing out on command of JTF-CND, the Air Force
would continue building its capacity to carry out the cyber mission. The attempted establishment
of Air Force Cyber Command Provisional (AFCYBER(P)) under Air Force Secretary Mike
Wynne from 2005-2007 demonstrated both the service’s ambition and its overreach.
USAF and Mission Expansion
Michael Wynne was nominated as Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) in June of 2005
(he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on November 3, 2005). Prior to this appointment, Wynne
had been Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics (July 2001 – April 2003) and the acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (May 2003 – June 2005).23 These roles exposed him to the severe
problems with the technology acquisition process and decisions in military and in the
Department of Defense. He developed a deep concern over how the Department approached the
cyber domain and emerging technologies. In early 2005, Wynne was anticipating that he would
be nominated as the new Secretary of the Navy; his goal was to turn the Navy into the “cyber”
force—to establish the Navy as the leading strategic and operational force vis-à-vis the cyber
domain. Instead, Wynne was surprised by the nomination to head the Air Force. As a result, he
pivoted and took his plans to the Air Force to incorporate cyber into the service’s mission.24
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After his confirmation in November 2005, Wynne authored a Joint Letter to Airmen detailing
why the USAF was uniquely capable of operating in the cyber domain.25
Wynne and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Michael “Buzz” Moseley announced
the service’s revised mission in December 2005. The new mission statement detailed that the Air
Force would be the service to “deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of
America and its global interests—to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace.”26 However, no
one in the Defense Department knew what the inclusion of cyberspace meant for the service or
even what it meant in a broader strategic sense.27 To shed more light on the implications of the
new cyber mission, in January 2006 SECAF Wynne created the Cyberspace Task Force to
develop recommendations for strategy, operational concepts, and doctrine for the USAF.28 At the
same time, Wynne sent a memo to SECDEF Rumsfeld indicating that the Air Force was
planning to forge a new military orientation towards computer network operations, i.e. that the
USAF would carry out computer network attacks as a military operation.29
The Air Force’s drive to incorporate the cyber mission was not necessarily a surprise to
the other combat services and the Joint Staff. The Air Force had been talking internally about the
cyber domain prior to Wynne, particularly in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks.
However, discussions regarding computer network operations and approaches to cyberspace
were not tied to counterterrorism. Instead, the Air Force initially argued in 2002 that the cyber
mission was an expansion or extension of the space mission. As the service that had the most
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resources and personnel invested in the space domain, USAF officials thought it only natural that
the Air Force should be the primary driver in the cyber domain. Thus, it made sense to explore a
service-based construct within the Air Force to develop and carry out the cyber mission.30 Even
though the other services had heard this line of argumentation for some time, there was still a
perception after Wynne’s announcement about mission expansion —particularly within the Joint
Staff—that the Air Force was out to set the military agenda for cyberspace and capture any
future resources. Officers outside the Air Force thus thought that the service’s mission expansion
would focus on seizing existing and new resources at the expense of generating better outcomes
for the Department of Defense and the nation in cyberspace.31
Towards a USAF Major Command for Cyber
The release of the Quadrennial Defense Review on February 6, 2006 appeared to validate
the Air Force’s concern over cyberspace: the review discussed the dangers of attacks on U.S.
critical infrastructure or the Internet.32 By Fall 2006, the idea of establishing a major command
for the cyber mission within the Air Force had begun to emerge as the institutional response to
the service’s newly expanded mission. The Cyberspace Task Force had concluded its work and
presented its findings at the Air Force’s CORONA Conference, a tri-annual summit attended by
the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, all four-star general officers, and select threestar officers. At the conference, the task force presented two potential arrangements for an Air
Force command structure for the cyber domain: the creation of a Numbered Air Force to be
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subordinated to an existing major command; or the creation of a new Major Command dedicated
to the cyber mission.33
Many of the existing Major Command commanders at the conference preferred a
Numbered Air Force over a new Major Command for three reasons. First, a Numbered Air Force
would have more influence over operational warfighting: Numbered Air Forces provided
personnel and doctrinal ideas to combatant commanders, while Major Commands rarely
performed these functions. Second, the Major Command commanders thought that the cyber
mission lacked the resources needed to justify the formation of a new Major Command. Third,
the creation of a new Major Command would take away resources from existing Major
Commands; no commander was willing to relinquish mission resources when a new Numbered
Air Force could provide assets to an existing Major Command. Despite these objections, the task
force advocated for the creation of a New Major Command. Secretary Wynne agreed with the
task force.34
On November 2, 2006, Wynne announced that the Eighth Air Force, a Numbered Air
Force, would be the service’s designated command for cyberspace and would lead the transition
into a new, cyber-specific Major Command.35 While the Eighth Air Force maintained a portfolio
of capabilities related to network warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the
force’s primary mission was to control strategic, long-range nuclear-capable bombers.36
Spearheading the development of a new Major Command for the cyber domain represented a
drastic departure from the Eighth Air Force’s existing expertise. Yet, at the direction of Secretary
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Wynne, Chief of Staff General Moseley ordered Lieutenant General Robert Elder, the
commander of the Eighth Air Force, to redefine air power by integrating both kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities with the dual goal of presenting combatant commanders with a spectrum of
warfighting capabilities and enhancing the USAF’s presence at USSTRATCOM.37
The selection of the Eighth Air Force imparted an additional strategic meaning to a new
major command. The Eighth Air Force had been renowned for partnering its strategic bombers
with the United Kingdom’s forces in World War II; they had also been the primary force
underlying U.S. Strategic Air Command, which was responsible for two legs of the U.S. nuclear
triad (the Navy possessed the third) until the creation of U.S. Strategic Command. In delegating
the development of a new cyber command to the Eighth, the USAF was sending a signal that,
like with the nuclear mission, it would lead the way to and shape the cyber domain.38 Figure 5.2
elaborates this intent by comparing the nearly identical shields for U.S. Strategic Air Command
and the subsequent Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional).39
There was some confusion, however, over what the new major command would actually
look like. Most in the Air Force expected the Eighth Air Force to incorporate computer network
operations into their existing mission and thus transform into a “global effects” command led by
a three-star general. But Wynne declared that the new major command would be led by a new
four-star general, placing it on equal footing with Air Combat Command and Air Force Space
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Figure 5.2. Comparison of Shields for U.S. Strategic Air Command and Air Force Cyber
Command (Provisional)
Strategic Air Command
Shield

Source: U.S. Air Force, “Air Force Art: Strategic Air
Command (SAC) Shield (Color),”
https://www.af.mil/News/Art/igphoto/2000639834/.

Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional)
Shield

Source: Robert Krause, “Air Force Cyberspace
Symposium Now a Reality,” Eighth Air Force Public
Affairs, November 29, 2007,
https://www.8af.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/Article/333938/air-force-cyberspacesymposium-now-a-reality/.

Command. However, a four-star position was highly unlikely: it was the same rank held by
unified combatant commanders and required legal changes to the U.S. Code.40
Moreover, the initial delegation of the Air Force’s cyber mission to a command known
best for strategic bombing flew in the face of the larger trend at the Department of Defense
which saw the other combat services expand their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) divisions to include computer network operations in the cyber domain.41 The merger of the
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other service’s cyber and ISR capabilities reflected the Department’s larger concern with ISR
capabilities heading into 2007—namely, the need for greater ISR capabilities for commanders in
Iraq and Afghanistan.42 The surge of U.S. troops in Iraq, announced in January 2007, required a
corresponding surge in ISR capabilities to support the warfighting effort.43 At the same time,
increasing difficulties on the ground in Afghanistan compounded the need for additional ISR
capabilities.44
The Department of Defense faced three major problems in meeting the increased demand
for ISR. First, General Atomics, the single company that made Predator drones and the
corresponding ground stations that processed information collected by the drones, had limited
production capacity and could not fully meet the Department’s demands. Second, the
Department required additional manned, propeller-driven reconnaissance aircrafts (like the
Navy’s P-3 aircraft) at a time when the services, and particularly the Air Force, sought to phase
out these aircrafts.45 Third, the Department lacked an adequate supply of intelligence analysts,
linguistic specialists, and broader data fusion capabilities. For newly appointed Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates, the underlying cause of the struggle to increase ISR capabilities was a
“peacetime mindset” pervasive through the services and the Department as a whole. The United
States was engaged in two wars; yet, the Department of Defense lacked a sense of urgency and
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the services continued to plan for “the next war” instead of participating in the current ones in
Iraq and Afghanistan.46
Gates felt that the Air Force in particular (in which he had served in the late 1960s)
lacked the enthusiasm and urgency to develop greater ISR capabilities for the efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Despite embracing the drone mission in the 1990s and 2000s—and repeated
attempts to gain control over all drone programs and capabilities—the Air Force continued to
prioritize F-22s and new bomber planes better suited to nation-state wars. The lack of emphasis
on the drone mission was clear on two accounts. First, in mid-2007, the Air Force had no plans
to increase the number of drone crews: they were only providing 48 crews consisting roughly of
80 people and three drones each—a far cry from what Gates thought was necessary. Second, the
Air Force had made drone-flying an unappealing career path. While the Army used both warrant
officers and non-commissioned officers to fly the Warrior drone (that service’s version of the
Predator), the Air Force mandated that only flight-qualified aircraft pilots could fly drones. In
effect, this limited the supply of Air Force officers to fly drones. Although drone pilots and
fighter pilots required the same credentials, flying actual planes offered more opportunities for
career advancement within the Air Force. Thus, Secretary Gates directed the Air Force to
increase its capacity to conduct Predator drone missions and would not allow the service to take
control of the drone missions of other services. In response, General Moseley initiated a study to
examine how the Air Force could increase the number of Predator crews by October of 2008.47
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Establishing AFCYBER(P) amidst Turmoil in the Air Force
Despite Secretary of Defense Gates’ criticisms of the Air Force’s slow progress to
increase the number of drone crews and the service’s persistent emphasis on “the next war,”48
Air Force Secretary Wynne moved forward with the plan to establish a new Major Command
dedicated to cyberspace. On September 17, 2007, Wynne announced the activation of the Air
Force Cyberspace Command (Provisional) – AFCYBER(P) – a new Major Command that would
bring previous service capabilities under a single commander.49 As a provisional command,
AFCYBER(P) had no actual forces—authorization would only occur once the command gained
initial operating capability. Until the command became operational, all direction in terms of
policy and doctrine were delivered through the Commander of Air Force Network Operations
under the Eighth Air Force.50 The goal for the command was to reach initial operating status by
October 2007 and to establish three preliminary components to the command: and a traditional
electronic communications component, an electronic warfare component, and a network warfare
component. These three dimensions of the command would consolidate existing programs from
across the Air Force.51 Major General William Lord was tapped to lead this effort as commander
of AFCYBER(P).
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In October of 2007, the Air Force announced that AFCYBER(P) would be located at
Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.52 However, the provisional command would have to
delay its timeline for initial operating capacity for four major reasons. The first was related to
funding. No new money had been allocated for the standup of a new Major Command—
AFCYBER(P) had to work through the Air Force’s corporate structure to streamline the funding
that existed for programs across the service.53 However, this effort was complicated by the fact
that Lieutenant General Elder, Major General Lord, and the commanders to be subordinated to
AFCYBER(P) were wary of absorbing the resources of other commanders across the Air Force.54
Additionally, Major General Lord had projected that the new command would require a budget
of roughly 5 billion dollars per year over five years with approximately 10,000 personnel
assigned to the command.55 This projection came at a time when the Air Force was making
significant cuts to personnel and spending to finance new fighter planes: 20,000 enlisted
personnel had just been phased out of the service, and a further reduction of 20,000 enlisted
personnel was scheduled to be completed by 2011.56
Second, the role of the new command vis-à-vis combatant commands and the other
services was not at all clear. Major General Lord portrayed two conflicting functions. On one
hand, AFCYBER(P) would maintain a sole focus on computer network defense within the Air
Force:
We have talked to Naval Network Warfare Command [NETWARCOM] and the
Army's NETCOM [Network Enterprise Technology Command] because they
52
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have been established longer than we have…there is a direct correlation to what
[the Navy’s] NETWARCOM does and what we will do for the Air Force.
Terrestrial networks and airborne networks will be our responsibility.57
There would be little operational overlap with the other services—overlap would only occur in
the sense that all the services provided forces to USSTRATCOM. Collaboration with the other
services was expected to be largely administrative in nature.58 On the other hand, a more
expansive role was envisioned once the command reached full operational capacity. As a force
provider for combatant commands, AFCYBER(P) would train and equip its personnel in order to
provide offensive capabilities to combatant commanders.59 Yet, several issues remained unclear:
the scope of personnel provision to the combatant commands; how offensive operations would
be deployed and interact with other service capabilities; and how the major command would
relate to JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW.
A third hurdle also complicated the stand-up of AFCYBER(P): the Air Force itself lacked
a clear vision of the boundaries of the cyber mission and the new command’s responsibilities. In
addition to the consolidation of previous efforts, Air Force leadership also justified the creation
of AFCYBER(P) in terms of the service’s dependence on technology and the cyber domain.60
According to Major General Lord, “One of the reasons that the Air Force decided to stand up this
capability is because of the Air Force's dependence on technology in command and control of
our own forces. If you are flying a Predator from Las Vegas over Afghanistan, that is a thin
command and control link.”61 However, this reasoning—the service-wide dependence on
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cyberspace—created internal confusion over who would actually be included in the new mission
set. Prior to the activation of AFCYBER(P), Lieutenant General Elder led the effort at Barksdale
Air Force Base with representatives from across the Air Force to stand up the new command
dedicated to the cyber domain. Almost everyone in the Air Force had sent a representative. Each
looked around with the same question: well, why are you here? The responses were indicative of
the Air Force’s problem. ‘I’m in communications, so I do cyber. I do intelligence work—that’s
cyber. I’m a bomber; we rely heavily on cyberspace, so I do cyber too.’ The Air Force still did
not have a clear picture about what cyber meant for a new Major Command, to the service, or
even in a broader strategic sense.62
The final reason why the implementation of AFCYBER(P) suffered dealt with
reorienting the service to address the cyber mission area while still undertaking existing mission
sets—namely, the nuclear mission. While the Eight Air Force had been preoccupied with onramping the new cyber command, they experienced a gradual erosion of standards regarding the
handling of nuclear weapons. Just eighteen days prior to the activation of AFCYBER(P), this
erosion of standards manifested in an incident at Barksdale Air Force Base (the soon-to-be home
of the new Major Command). In his memoirs, Secretary of Defense Gates recounts the incident:

On August 30, 2007, a B-52 bomber took off from Minot Air Force Base in North
Dakota at 8:40 a.m. carrying six air-launched cruise missiles, each armed with a
nuclear weapon capable of explosive power more than ten times that of the atomic
bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The plane landed at Barksdale Air Force Base in
Louisiana at 11:23 a.m. It was parked there without any of the stringent security
measures required for such weapons. At ten that evening, a member of the
munitions crew at Barksdale discovered that the warheads were not mock training
rounds but actual nuclear weapons that had been loaded in error. Only then was
the incident reported to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) as a
‘Bent Spear’ event—‘an incident involving nuclear weapons, warheads,
components or vehicles transporting nuclear material of significant interest.’63
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The next day, August 31, Lieutenant General Mosely reported the incident to Secretary Gates,
who notified President Bush. Bush directed Gates to investigate the incident, and the Air Force
immediately conducted and inventory of its nuclear weapons and launched its own investigation
into the event.64 This incident and the ensuing investigation would eventually undermine all
progress made towards the realization of AFCYBER(P).
Nuclear Fallout, Missing Missiles, and the Suspension of AFCYBER(P)
On October 19, 2007, less than one month after the Minot-Barksdale nuclear mishandling
incident, Air Force Secretary Wynne announced the findings of the Air Force’s internal
investigation. The inquiry linked the incident to a gradual erosion of adherence to the
Department of Defense’s nuclear weapons-handling standards. In response, Wynne immediately
relieved three colonels and four noncommissioned officers of their commands and positions.65
After Wynne’s announcement, Secretary Gates directed an additional investigation to be led by
General (retired) Larry Welch—a former Air Force Chief of Staff now associated with the
Defense Science Board within the Defense Department. General (ret.) Welch and the Board
would study the Minot-Barksdale incident as part of a broader, more comprehensive examination
of nuclear handling policies and procedures across the Department. Welch eventually briefed the
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee of the Defense Science Board inquiry on February 12,
2008: the Minot-Barksdale incident occurred due to an increasing lack of both resources and
attention in the Air Force to adequately perform the service’s nuclear mission. The implications
were clear: in the midst of setting up AFCYBER(P), the Eight Air Force had compromised its
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primary mission. In the wake of Welch’s testimony, Gates ultimately decided to let the Air Force
determine any additional disciplinary measures to be taken related to the incident.66 (Duty, 241).
Things did not get any better for the Air Force as the year progressed. A mislabeled
missile shipment to Taiwan in March 2008 would provide additional evidence of the Air Force’s
lack of attention to the nuclear mission. On March 21, Secretary Gates was notified that the
Taiwanese military had mistakenly received a shipment of four intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). The original shipment, ordered in August 2006, was for helicopter batteries. The
Taiwanese immediately alerted their U.S. security assistance contact that they had received the
ICBMs; while the missiles were non-nuclear, the shipment did contain nose cones and the
associated electronics. Fearful that the Chinese government might interpret this shipment as an
aggressive move, on March 24 Secretary Gates notified the Senate Armed Services Committee,
the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Chinese ambassador of the mistake.67 After this
second incident involving the Air Force’s mishandling of weapons, Gates announced in a press
conference that Admiral Kirkland Donald—head of the Navy’s nuclear programs—would
investigate the Taiwanese shipment.68 Admiral Donald’s initial report to Gates, delivered on
April 15, indicated that (1) the Taiwanese had not tampered with the nose cones on the ICBMs
and (2) that the mislabeling had occurred as an accident without nefarious intent. To Gates, this
confirmed that the Air Force no longer maintained adequate nuclear standards.69
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These two incidents involving the Air Force occurred amidst Gates’ frustration with the
service over his continued push to increase ISR efforts for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.70 In
late April, Gates had established an ISR task force to expand capabilities in response to Admiral
Mike Mullen’s briefings on the Department’s initiatives. A few days after creating the task force,
Gates delivered a speech to Air Force personnel emphasizing the need for unorthodox thinking
and cultural change: the service needed to focus on the wars it was already fighting instead
looking forward to the “next war.”71 Despite the importance of unmanned aerial vehicles to the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Air Force leadership would not commit to Gates’ vision: drones
were a crucial part of the service’s future and should be a significant and permanent part of
warfighting capabilities. For example, in summer of 2008, the Air Force had between twelve and
eighteen drone crews at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada that were each only piloting
unmanned crafts for roughly 60 hours a month. The base increased the crews’ flight hours only
after two Department of Defense officials visited and reported the situation back to Secretary
Gates.72
The Air Force’s nuclear troubles culminated in June of 2008. On June 2, Admiral Mullen
emailed Secretary Gates in response to Admiral Donald’s finalized report. Admiral Mullen stated
that “’the decline in the nuclear mission in the Air Force is representative and symptomatic of a
greater decline, for which I can tie responsibility directly to the two most senior leaders…I
believe the Air Force leadership has to be held accountable.” Marine Corps General James
Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had expertise on nuclear issues
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due to his previous command of USSTRATCOM, concurred with Mullen’s recommendation to
Gates. Moreover, President Bush supported the dismissal of Air Force leadership.73 Accordingly,
on June 5, 2008, Secretary Gates requested the resignations of both Air Force Secretary Wynne
and his Chief of Staff General Mosely,74 and he recommended Mike Donley and General
Norman Schwartz as their replacements, respectively. Admiral Mullen had been sent to notify
General Moseley while Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England had been tasked with
notifying Wynne.75
The removal of Air Force leadership entailed the removal of support for AFCYBER(P).
For many in the Defense Department, the decline in the Air Force’s nuclear handling standards
was directly related to the service’s attempt to set up AFCYBER(P). The firing of Wynne and
Moseley would redirect the service’s attention to core missions and current war efforts. For
others who held grudges against the Air Force—such as Deputy Secretary England, a former
Secretary of the Navy—removal of top leadership also represented an opportunity to punish the
service that acted as “rebels” by expanding into the cyber mission as a political power grab.76
Without the support of its new top leadership and increasing pressure from the Department of
Defense, the Air Force suspended AFCYBER(P) in August of 2008.77 The next month, the Air
Force announced that the command would officially be downgraded to become a Numbered Air
Force—the Twenty-Fourth Air Force—under the Air Force Space Command.78
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After the announcement, General Schwartz, the new Air Force Chief of Staff, wrote a
letter in September stating that the service would craft a new implementation strategy for its
nuclear deterrence capability. This would have impacts for several other mission areas, including
cyber. While the letter floated an idea for a new Major Command to create global effects (i.e., a
strategic air command with a cyber component)79 one major question remained: now that the Air
Force has lost AFCYBER(P), who would get the cyber mission? As a whole, the Department did
not really know how to implement a “cyber command,” and nobody wanted to dip into anyone
else’s funding to set up a new command. However, many in the Air Force—including Secretary
Donley and General Schwatrz, who had held a number a joint positions in the military—agreed
that if the Air Force could not have the command and the mission, then any new command
dedicated to the cyber domain should be a joint-service endeavor. The Air Force had slowly
aligned with a broader consensus emerging across the Department of Defense: the need to
establish a joint, sub-unified cyber command. Eventually (and ironically), the Twenty-Fourth Air
Force would become part of Air Forces Cyber, the Air Force’s service component to U.S. Cyber
Command. The very same Air Force contingent that had intended to be the leader in the cyber
domain would follow the pattern of the other services by merging with the intelligence wings of
the Air Force (the Twenty-Fifth Air Force ) to create a component for a new joint command.80
U.S. Cyber Command, Part I: Expanding the Joint Approach
At the same time that the Air Force was activating AFCYBER(P), the idea for what
would become an expanded joint approach to cyberspace—U.S. Cyber Command—had been
gaining support.81 In fact, Secretary Gates had acknowledged the broader importance of the cyber
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mission after assuming office at the end of 2006. Shocked by the daily number of attempted
intrusions into military networks, Gates sent an inquiry to the Pentagon’s deputy general counsel
about when a cyber incident would constitute an act of war according to international law.
(Notably, Gates did not receive a response until December 31, 2008, when the counsel replied
that the threshold for a military response to cyber incidents was a political consideration, not a
legal one).82 However, the Air Force’s argument for a service-based approach acted as a
springboard: the development of capabilities at the service-level was great for the Air Force, but
what would a joint-warfighting approach look like? AFCYBER(P) had made this broader
conversation about a joint approach much more explicit in the Pentagon. While a joint approach
to the cyber domain had been the basis for JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO (and its previous
incarnations), the joint task force construct lent itself to the creation of stovepipes. With only a
two- or three-star commander, the joint task force structure could not impose true coordination
upon the services, operational knowledge and expertise tended to “stovepipe” with the individual
services with little sharing amongst the other services.83
Laying Foundations for a New Command
One of the main advocates of a joint-service approach to cyber was Admiral Michael
McConnell. Sworn in as Director of National Intelligence on February 20, 2007, McConnell
sought to elevate cyber issues on the defense agenda. Despite the limited bureaucratic tools at the
disposal of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—McConnell could not set budgets
or hire or fire personnel84—McConnell actively built support for his initiatives by linking cybersecurity issues to the post-9/11 strategic environment.
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While the Air Force’s strategic justification for AFCYBER(P) rested on a future war
against great power foes, DNI McConnell grounded cyber initiatives in the context of existing
military engagements. McConnell entered office shortly after the January 2007 announcement of
the surge in Afghanistan. With the shift in strategy and a new commander in General David
Petraeus, a plan to deploy offensive cyber means against insurgents in Iraq had been devised and
honed by devised by General Petraeus, General Stanley McChrystal (Commander of Joint
Special Operations Command and Commander of Joint Special Operations Command Forward),
General John Abizaid (Commander of U.S. Central Command until March 16, 2007), Director of
the National Security Agency Keith Alexander, and DNI McConnell. This plan reached
President Bush in late April 2007.85 McConnell saw this as a window of opportunity and
subsequently scheduled a briefing with President Bush to explain the proposal. McConnell met
with the president on May 16, 2007. Within ten minutes of the briefing, Bush had cut off
McConnell to approve the plan. McConnell, stunned, adeptly pivoted from briefing the president
on offensive operations to discuss broader issues of computer network defense. McConnell made
the case that 9/11 could have been much worse had terrorists hacked into a major bank and
contaminated its files—there would have been far more economic damage done than occurred
with the destruction of the Twin Towers. Bush, furious at the thought of another 9/11-scale
incident, gave McConnell 30 days to ‘solve it’.86
McConnell’s briefing resulted in the formulation of a comprehensive national initiative in
May 2007 that would be presented to President Bush several months later. In addition to getting
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the president’s attention, McConnell had continuously built support behind a cyber-security
agenda. He inserted himself into decision processes wherever possible: he stayed as close as he
could to the Oval Office and arranged not-so-random drop-ins to visit White House aides and
cabinet secretaries who were unaware of their own stakes in cyber policy. To build support for
his agenda, McConnell would deliver memos to cabinet secretaries—memos that the secretaries
themselves had written the previous week. He would explain that the Chinese had hacked it from
the secretary’s computer, and that Department of Defense intelligence had hacked it back from
Chinese computers. Many secretaries and aides immediately scheduled full-scale briefings to
learn more about cyber issues and McConnell’s solutions.87
Ultimately, McConnell set in motion what would become National Security Presidential
Directive 54 (NSPD-54) signed by President Bush on January 9, 2008. NSPD-54 set in motion
the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative that would clarify the cyber-security roles
and responsibilities across the federal government.88 Shortly thereafter, Congress approved $17.3
billion for McConnell’s five-year implementation plan. While primarily focused on the
protection of civilian agencies, the Initiative outlined in NSPD-54 remained classified: the
National Security Agency (NSA) was tasked with providing technical support to the Department
of Homeland Security. In reality, this was more than support—the NSA led implementation
efforts due to its extensive resources and expertise.89 Importantly, NSPD-54 provided a
foundation and momentum for the Department of Defense to assess the military’s current joint
task force structure for conducting computer network operations.90
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Debating Force Structure Alternatives
Shortly after President Bush signed NSPD-54, Secretary of Defense Gates set in motion a
series of studies to examine the organization of the Department of Defense’s cyber capabilities
and provide ideas for new, alternative arrangements.91 These studies produced a clear consensus:
the Department was poorly organized to deal with cyber threats.92 The current arrangement for
the military services via a joint task force structure, although a necessary first step to deal with
computer network operations, tended to create stovepipes of skills and expertise within the
service components. Task force commanders generally lacked the authority and resources to
impose true coordination across the services.93
Accordingly, in May of 2008, Secretary Gates directed a departmental-level review of all
cyber roles and missions94 to be led by the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review's Cyber
Team. The team proceeded under the direction of Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
(Policy) Christopher "Ryan" Henry and USSTRATCOM' s Deputy Commander, Vice Admiral
Carl Mauney.95 After the studies concluded, the ensuing debates over the military’s cyber force
structure hinged on four issues: whether the military should maintain primary cyber
responsibilities in the first place; the appropriate organizational model for a military-based
approach; the potential scale of command; and defining a new military structure’s relationship to
the National Security Agency.
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Title 10 vs. Title 50 Orientation. Gates’ department-wide review rekindled a debate
between the DOD and the Intelligence Community: should cyber responsibilities rest primarily
with the military or with civilian intelligence agencies? There continued to be significant overlap
between military and intelligence presences in cyberspace. Like the military, intelligence
agencies—particularly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency
(NSA)96—possessed both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities.97 However, the CIA and
the broader Intelligence Community had traditionally claimed operational responsibility for
conducting network attacks.98 The development of a more robust military presence in the cyber
domain naturally raised questions over the appropriate legal framework for conducting cyber
operations, i.e. whether operations would be carried out under Title 10 or Title 50 authority. Title
10 provided the legal authority for the executive branch to carry out military operations; Title 50
authorized the executive branch to conduct intelligence activities and covert action.99
Categorizing cyber operations under either legal regime would entail different reporting
requirements as well as different operational and strategic emphases.100
A Title 50 orientation would place cyber operations under the purview of intelligence
activities. In doing so, cyber operations would constitute either clandestine operations or covert
actions, where the role of the U.S. government would not be publicly acknowledged. Covert

96

Even though the NSA is a component of the Department of Defense (unlike the CIA), it has a substantial civilian
workforce and capacity to operate under non-military authorities. Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5 (2012):
607.
97
A full review of civilian intelligence cyber capabilities—and how the military coordinates with those civilian
elements—is outside the scope of this dissertation.
98
Omry Haizler, “The United States’ Cyber Warfare History: Implications on Modern Cyber Operational Structures
and Policymaking,” Cyber, Intelligence, and Security 1, no. 1 (January 2017): 37, 41.
99
Aaron P. Brecher, “Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for
Offensive Cyberoperations,” Michigan Law Review 111, no. 3 (December 2012): 425–26; Andru E. Wall,
“Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert
Action,” Harvard National Security Journal 3 (2011): 87–88.
100
Brecher, “Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for Offensive
Cyberoperations,” 425–26.

150
cyber actions would require the president to produce written findings to congressional
intelligence committees on the importance of an operation to national security in advance of
carrying out that operation.101 Conversely, a Title 10 orientation would designate cyber
operations as military activities and place cyber responsibilities primarily under the military.
Unlike the rigorous reporting requirements for operations carried out under Title 50 authorities,
many “execute orders” given to the military would not require advance notice to Congress.102
However, computer network operations collapsed the traditional distinctions between
intelligence collection, covert action, and traditional military activity—the same line of code
could be used for both intelligence collection and network disruption.103
The CIA and other civilian intelligence agencies argued that cyber operations did not
constitute traditional military activities and should be subjected to the Title 50 oversight
requirements—and should thus primarily be the responsibility of the Intelligence Community,
not the Department of Defense.104 Intelligence agencies also asserted that a Title 50 orientation
would provide greater latitude for conducting network operations—conducting cyber operations
in a military capacity would limit action to wartime contexts in geographic warzones, a factor
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complicated by networks operating across multiple countries.105 As a result, a military
organization would be unable to retaliate against an adversary in peacetime settings.106
More importantly, for the CIA, maintaining cyber operations under Title 50 authorities
would reduce the likelihood that military operators disrupted enemy networks and servers, thus
alerting adversaries of network presences and burning sources of intelligence.107 This tension
between the Intelligence Community’s preference for network exploitation and the preference of
the military for network attack had manifested earlier in 2008. In partnership with the Saudi
Arabian government, the CIA had set up a “honeypot” website to monitor extremists, identify
attackers, and gain information about terrorist plots in Saudi Arabia. However, by early 2008,
military officials in U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) became concerned that the site was
actually facilitating terrorist operations. USCENTCOM had tracked dozens of Saudi jihadists
who had entered Iraq to carry out attacks and requested that the site be shut down.108
A task force was assembled to discuss an operation that would take down the CIA-backed
website. The task force consisted of representatives from the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security
Council, the CIA, and the NSA. Debates centered on whether to go forward with the operation
and whether the operation would be carried out under Title 10 or Title 50 authorities. General
Alexander, Director of the NSA, had made the case that taking down the site was a legitimate
operation—and a traditional military action given that extremists were using the site to plan
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attacks in Iraq. The CIA did not support taking the site down, arguing that doing so would create
a significant loss of intelligence and would damage cooperative relationships with foreign
intelligence agencies.
After considering the potential collateral damage, military interests prevailed:
USCENTCOM was adamant that the site posed a risk to the lives of American troops, and CIA
representatives knew the site would be dismantled by the military.109 Accordingly, a team from
Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) carried out the
operation to take down the website. However, the operation inadvertently disrupted over 300
servers across Saudi Arabia, Germany, and the United States. Although some Saudi officials had
been informed of the operation prior to its execution, they were still outraged over the loss of
intelligence. The CIA resented the operation, maintaining that the website had produced valuable
intelligence.110
After the operation, the CIA requested an official review of U.S. law for cyber
operations, arguing that the operation had disregarded existing deconfliction mechanisms
between military actions and ongoing intelligence operations.111 The Agency claimed more
broadly that network attacks constituted covert actions: both operations and sponsors were meant
to be concealed from both adversaries and other actors in the cyber domain. As such, offensive
cyber operations were only to be conducted by the CIA under Title 50 frameworks. Ultimately,
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the Title 10-Title 50 issue went unresolved—any ruling or interpretation of the law would create
a precedent where no legal basis existed.112 As a result, the lack of precedent allowed debates in
late 2008 over enhancing military posture in cyberspace to proceed without legal restrictions.
The Organizational Model. At least three alternative structural alternatives for military
organization emerged throughout the Defense Department’s review process. Two organizational
models received serious consideration: a service-based model and the existing joint approach.113
The service-based arrangement would entail the creation of a new military service for the cyber
domain. For three reasons, both civilian and military officials eventually dismissed this
approach.
First, the service approach would face immense political costs and hurdles. A new service
would require new legislation and the establishment of new bureaucratic processes to integrate
the service into existing interagency dynamics. Theoretically, a new service was possible;
however, the general consensus was that only a large-scale war would be likely to facilitate such
a massive political rift within the Department.114 Second, a new service raised major concerns
about the strategic integration of cyber tools into other warfighting efforts. The payoff of a
service-based approach was the prospect of in-depth technical expertise. However, the risk was
that a narrow, cyber-intensive organization would fail to understand the application of cyber
means in a broader strategic context. This narrow aperture would fail to optimize outcomes in
cyberspace and other domains.115
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Moreover, many military commanders approached the service-based approach with
lessons drawn from the prior restructuring of special operations forces. For example, Admiral
Mike Rogers, Director of Intelligence for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command at the time, was strongly
opposed to a service-level arrangement for cyber based on the success of U.S. Special Operations
Command. As Admiral Rogers recounts, the decision to create a joint command for special
operations forces provided a strong analogy against the creation of a cyber service:

I lived through this once before in my career that I can remember. In the aftermath
of Desert I [Operation Desert Shield in 1990], you get some people making the
argument that special operations are so unique—so specialized, so narrow, so
misunderstood by the conventional or traditional military—that we need to create
a separate service. This had been the argument throughout the 1980s, that we
needed a separate service. Ultimately, we decided in the late 1980s that the best
construct was a joint warfighting construct, and from this was ultimately borne
Special Operations Command. We ultimately decided the best solution was not a
service, but a joint warfighting construct. I look at how that played out for us in
Desert I and over the course of next 30 years and I think ‘boy that was a smart
decision.’116
The Special Operations Command analogy certainly lent credibility to the idea of building on the
existing joint approach to cyberspace,117 particularly given the implications special operations
had for the Title 10-Title 50 debate in cyberspace.118 But this was not the sole (or even primary)
reason why a joint construct remained more popular than other organizational models.
The primary selling point for advocates of a joint command was that it would execute the
cyber mission in an operational framework consistent with the Department of Defense’s broader
methodology. Why have one approach for everything else and create a new approach for cyber?
Other military components worked within and understood the joint framework for operations.
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Keeping the joint arrangement would align cyber forces with the existing core processes and
decision-making venues of the Department. An alignment with existing practices ameliorated
concerns many feared under the service approach, i.e. greater potential technical expertise at the
expense of strategic integration with other commands.119
At the same time, a revised joint approach could build on existing interests and
relationships, particularly among the combat services. A joint combatant command for cyber
would place the services as force providers; this would have the two-fold effect of capitalizing
on the expertise and ethos within each service while structuring inter-service competition. On
one hand, each service would get a share of the cyber mission, and pooling service-level
expertise could enhance effectiveness. On the other hand, by giving each service a stake in the
cyber mission, a joint command could redirect inter-service from the question of ‘who gets the
mission?’ to the more productive question of ‘how do we carry out the mission?’. In this way, a
joint approach could facilitate healthier inter-service competition.120 On this last point, many
commanders recalled their experiences in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols military as an argument
against creating a new service. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 fundamentally changed how
the services interacted: it removed operational control of forces from the services chiefs and
transferred it to combatant commanders. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, each of the services
planned and operated independently and according to different standards. This bred intense
operational and bureaucratic conflicts and competition. Having served through the pre-
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Goldwater-Nichols era, commanders were not eager to consider a service construct for fear of
renewed interservice animosity.121 For these reasons, the joint command emerged as the least
politically costly option; it would produce fewer negative political externalities than the creation
of a cyber-specific service.
Unified vs. Sub-Unified Command. With preferences congealing around a revision of
the existing joint structure, command elevation became the next pressing question: should the
new force structure be implemented as an independent, unified combatant command (COCOM)
or elevated to a sub-unified combatant command that operates under an existing COCOM?
Traditionally, when Joint Task Forces are elevated to a new command in DOD, they transition
into a sub-unified command before reaching unified combatant command status. Many
supporters of the joint command thought the organization would eventually reach a unified
command; it would just take time.122 However, there were several in DOD who advocated for a
unified command from the outset.
Chief among those pushing for a unified command was DNI McConnell. He had
continually urged SECDEF Gates to create a separate, unified combatant command to coordinate
responses to cyber threats.123 General Keith Alexander, a three-star general and Director of the
NSA at the time, had also supported a unified command.124 Both believed that a unified
command—with the resources of a four-star general—would help drive changes in not only the
operational execution of the cyber mission, but also the execution of Department of Defense
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missions more broadly.125 Together with General James Cartwright, Vice Charmain of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and previous Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, McConnell and Alexander
sent a letter in early October 2008 to Secretary Gates recommending the creation of Cyber
Command as a unified combatant command.126
Secretary Gates had largely agreed with the letter of recommendation but had told
McConnel that a unified command was not feasible. The main constraint on creating a unified
Cyber Command was the recent stand-up of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM).127
USAFRICOM became the tenth unified combatant command reaching initial operating
capability September 28, 2008 and full operating capability October 1, 2008. Gates relayed that
too much political capital had been spent creating USAFRICOM; as Gates later recollected: “I
thought the president and Congress would balk at yet another major command.”128 Some
resistance to a unified command also came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saw no need to
create a brand new command. Moreover, there existed an unspoken rule of thumb across both
Congress and the Department of Defense (including the military): no more than ten unified
combatant commands. As USAFRICOM was the tenth, there was no room for a unified Cyber
Command.129
What Gates could do, he told McConnell, was create a sub-unified command under U.S.
Strategic Command, where JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW were located.130 USSTRATCOM had
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developed a cyberspace strategy earlier that year in February131 and made the most sense given
the political and resource limitations on creating a new command. Creating a subordinate
command under USSTRATCOM was the quickest way to stand up Cyber Command,132 and few
overtly opposed the idea.133 McConnell did push back—USSTRATCOM had a wonderful
mission but a lot on its plate, and it was hard to effectively undertake signals intelligence with
the current demands on the command—but to no avail.134 If a new joint Cyber Command would
materialize, it would have to be as a sub-unified command.135
The Dual-Hat Arrangement. The October 2008 letter from McConnell, Alexander, and
Cartwright to Secretary Gates also contained a crucial recommendation: authority over the
command should be merged with authority over the NSA, i.e. the Commander of Cyber
Command and the Director of the NSA should be the same person. This “dual-hat” arrangement,
they argued, was needed both to ensure that Cyber Command had resource access—particularly
with regards to talent—and to quell an inevitable bureaucratic conflict. A key issue the May
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2008 departmental-level review directed by Secretary Gates dealt with the relationship between
offensive and defensive computer network operations. Part of McConnell’s vision for Cyber
Command was to combine offensive and defensive elements under a single commander.136 By
summer 2008, discussions had begun in earnest about merging JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO, the
respective homes of offensive and defensive operations.137 The real question was how to combine
the two joint task forces in a way that made operational and bureaucratic sense.138
Both McConnell and Alexander knew that network attack, defense, and exploitation
operations relied on the same technology and similar skillsets.139 Technology and expertise were
both concentrated at Fort Meade; if a new command were to succeed, it had to have some sort of
relationship—and ideally, colocation—with the National Security Agency. The NSA workforce
had the highest level of skill in the nation: exploiting computer networks (for example, via the
extraction of information) without leaving a fingerprint was far more challenging than the
military’s concern with degrading network capabilities.140 Having access to this talent pool
would make a Cyber Command far more effective in carrying out its mission, particularly since
service personnel rotate in and out of joint commands.141
At the same time, McConnell and Alexander acknowledged the tension between
exploitation and attack operations—degrading a computer network can compromise intelligence
collection efforts by notifying defenders of an adversarial presence on their networks.142
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Moreover, the NSA behaved like any other bureaucracy: they did not like to share sensitive
technical information or intelligence with military operations commands, even for national
security purposes.143 The solution was to structurally force cooperation, as military commanders
and NSA directors would have no interest in carrying out each other’s mission if left to their own
devices.144 As such, McConnell, Alexander, and Cartwright recommended the integration of
offensive, defensive, and exploitative operations under a single commander. This would also
entail transferring JTF-GNO from DISA to the commander of JFCC-NW, the Director of the
NSA, who would simultaneously act as the commander of the new Cyber Command.145
The Tipping Point: SIPRNet Compromise
With debates over cyber force structure settling on a sub-unified joint command under
U.S. Strategic Command, the creation of the new command was only a matter of time. The
tipping point for bureaucratic change came in late October of 2008 with the compromise of the
Department of Defense’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), a computer
network used to transmit classified information and widely used by the military.
On Friday October 24, 2008 at approximately 4:30 PM EST, U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM)—the unified command responsible for operations in both Afghanistan and
Iraq—experienced a breach of its computer networks that included SIPRNet.146 The NSA, at the
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invitation of USCENTCOM,147 investigated the breach that afternoon. Richard Schaeffer, head of
the NSA’s Information Assurance Directorate, had assigned his Red Team—the same unit
responsible for conducting the ELIGIBLE RECEIVER exercise in 1997—to inspect
USCENTCOM’s networks. The team discovered several beacons attached to a malicious worm:
the worm was programmed to penetrate the classified network, extract information, and the
beacons would transmit the extracted information back to the worm’s source.148 As far as
leadership in the military, the NSA, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense knew, this was
the first time an adversary had compromised a classified military computer network.149
Schaeffer reported the Red Team’s findings back to General Alexander. They suspected
the malicious worm to be Russian-made, a hypothesis that would later be confirmed in 2009 by
Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Lynn. The breach had occurred after a USB flash drive,
infected with the agent.btz virus by Russian foreign intelligence, was found in a parking lot of a
U.S. military base in Afghanistan and subsequently inserted into an air-gapped DOD computer.
The malicious worm had then spread across classified networks. Alexander called both Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to inform them of
what Schaeffer’s team had found. Shortly thereafter, Alexander, Schaeffer, and four others sat
down in Alexander’s office to discuss solutions.150 The remediation effort that emerged—
codenamed “Buckshot Yankee”—involved writing a software program that would reroute the
beacons to send the extracted information to a storage bin on NSA networks. Within 22 hours,
the program has been successfully tested at Fort Meade and deployed to SIPRNet and other
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military networks at approximately 2:30 PM that Saturday. Within 22 hours, the NSA had
detected, diagnosed, and remediated the compromise.151
That Monday morning, October 27, Admiral Mike Mullen called an emergency meeting
about the SIPRnet compromise to discuss the scope and immediate next steps since
USCENTCOM was conducting two wars. To his shock, the service chiefs had sent colonels to
attend the meeting; he needed to meet with three- and four-star commanders, not colonels. As a
result, Mullen scheduled a teleconference later that morning with McConnell, Alexander, and
General Chilton of USSTRATCOM to figure out who was in charge of these types of problems
and what the plan would be. General Chilton asserted that, because JTF-GNO reported to
USSTRATCOM, he should take the lead. When Mullen pressed for his plan, Chilton pivoted and
deferred to Alexander.152 Unfortunately, USSTRATCOM and the combat service components of
JTF-GNO lacked the expertise of the NSA: the default response of the military commands was to
count the number of computer systems as they would with physical military equipment.153
Alexander saw this as an opportunity to drive home the point that only the NSA had the expertise
to take the lead; military efforts moving forward must include the NSA.154 The dual-hat option
for Cyber Command became more attractive.
The SIPRNet compromise and Buckshot Yankee remediation efforts convinced Secretary
Gates that McConnell, Alexander, and Cartwright were correct—dual-hatting a cyber command
with the NSA was the right call. And it needed to happen sooner rather than later, as Gates
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witnessed bureaucratic dysfunction play out during the compromise and through the rest of Fall
2008.155 Accordingly, Gates wrote a memo on November 11 that placed JTF-GNO under the
operational command of General Alexander, effectively removing the Joint Task Force from
DISA control.156 This had de facto created what would later be formalized as U.S. Cyber
Command.
By January of 2009, Secretary Gates pushed more aggressively to stand up Cyber
Command with both President Bush and then President Obama. Both had agreed on the need for
the new command. Buy-in from both the outgoing and the incoming presidents was crucial;
however, another factor behind the timing of Gates’ push was Alexander’s rumored retirement
from both the NSA and the Army. Gates knew Alexander was one of the few people who really
understood cyber threats.157 Hearing that Alexander had just attended a retirement briefing, Gates
called Alexander to explain that he wanted Alexander to stay on as both Director of the NSA and
Commander of Cyber Command: he would create the new command and promote Alexander
from a three-star to a four-star general, thus extending his tenure at least three more years. As it
turns out, Alexander’s retirement was a false rumor—the briefing had been mandated since he
had put it off multiple times already. Alexander agreed to Gates’ proposition, and the wheels
were put in motion for formally establishing Cyber Command.158
The transition to the Obama administration in early 2009 meant the official stand-up of
Cyber Command would be delayed—major organizational changes tended not to take place
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during election years.159 Ultimately, on June 23, 2009, Secretary Gates signed a memorandum
that directed General Chilton of USSTRATCOM to establish U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) as a sub-unified command subordinated to USSTRATCOM. Gates had
planned to announce the new command in a speech the week before; however, the announcement
was delayed a week and put in memo form to abate concerns from the CIA that the Department
of Defense and the NSA would dominate the government’s cyberspace efforts.160 The memo
formally recommended that General Alexander run the command while retaining his title of
Director of the NSA. The purpose of U.S. Cyber Command would be “to better organized
Defense operations in cyberspace, to ensure our freedom of access to cyberspace, and to oversee
investments in people, resources, and technology to prevent disruptions of service to the
military.”161 An implementation plan was subsequently issued in September of 2009.162
Despite a slow Congressional process, Alexander’s appointment was approved the next
year in 2010. By that time, several Department of Defense reviews—specifically, the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review—hinted at the
growing strategic importance of cyberspace. Both reviews indicated that the Department had
been preparing to fight two conventional wars at the same time, not the two conflicts in which it
was currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. The QDR in particular had shown that more
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resources were needed for special operations, helicopters, drones, and
intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR).163 Investing in the establishment of U.S. Cyber
Command would be an important step in enhancing ISR capabilities in cyberspace.
On May 21, 2010, U.S. Cyber Command was officially established as a sub-unified
combatant command with General Alexander in charge.164 An announcement from U.S. Strategic
Command stated that USCYBERCOM had reached initial operating capability (IOC).
USSTRATCOM’s announcement also specified the new command’s mission, responsibilities,
organizations, and relationship to other commands.165 The command would start with a staff of
roughly 750 personnel and an approximate budget of $155 million.166 Four months later in
September, General Chilton sent a classified memo recommending that U.S. Cyber Command be
deemed fully operational.167 The news that USCYBERCOM had reached full operating
capability (FOC) became public on October 31 with the following service components: U.S.
Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command
(FLTCYBER), and the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER).168
As USCYBERCOM worked towards full operating capacity, disputes between the
Department of Defense and the CIA flared over which entity—the military or the CIA—should
be the lead organization for conducting cyber operations against al-Qaeda targets. As with the

163

United States Department of Defense, “Report of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Quadrennial Defense
Review (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, February 2010),
https://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf.
164
Secretary Gates had concordantly created a new civilian office to lead policy development and command
oversight; Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 449–50.
165
United States Strategic Command, “USCYBERCOM Announcement Message,” May 21, 2010, The National
Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=2692108-Document-6.
166
Nakashima, “Cyber-Intruder Sparks Massive Federal Response - and Debate over Dealing with Threats.”
167
It also summarizes the Cyber Command's six key missions, including one that is partially classified. Kevin P.
Chilton, “Full Operational Capacity (FOC) of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM),” Memorandum (United
States Strategic Command, September 21, 2010), The National Security Archive,
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=2692110-Document-8.
168
U.S. Cyber Command, “U.S. Cyber Command History.”

166
CIA-Saudi website incident, the CIA maintained that these operations were covert action; the
nascent Cyber Command pushed for greater authority, arguing that offensive cyber operations
were part of the military mission to counter terrorism. The primary issue for senior policymakers
and lawyers, however, was defining the battlefield. Most wanted to limit the scope of military
computer network attacks to the war zones—the CIA was responsible for covert operations
outside battle zones, and the State Department was concerned with the diplomatic backlash of
military operations outside war zones. Yet, like with the CIA’s inquiry after the takedown of the
CIA-Saudi site, officials were unable to resolve the mission dispute, leaving the door open for
both the CIA and the military to carry out offensive cyber operations against al-Qaeda.169
U.S. Cyber Command, Part II: Implementing a Unified Command
U.S. Cyber Command’s relationship with USSTRATCOM was always an imperfect marriage.
The cyber mission was not a logical fit under U.S. Strategic Command. As with the joint task
force, the arrangement remained logistically difficult with USSTRATCOM located in Omaha,
Nebraska and USCYBERCOM at Fort Meade in Maryland. The relationship between the two
commands appeared to work the best when USSTRATCOM did not assert day-to-day control
over U.S. Cyber Command. For both reasons, many in the military and the broader Department
began to realize—just like McConnell, Alexander, and others had advocated—that Cyber
Command would need to become a standalone, unified command.170
Continued Expansion, Setbacks, and a Near-Miss
Secretary Gates was among those who believed that Cyber Command would eventually
be elevated to a unified command. However, he also knew that the “ten command” rule meant
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that an existing combatant command first had to be eliminated. Gates’ solution to this problem
was to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), one of the unified combatant
commands that was located in Norfolk, Virginia.171 As U.S. Cyber Command was working
towards full operating capability, Gates announced on August 9, 2010 that U.S. Joint Forces
Command would be slated for disestablishment as a cost-saving measure for the Department.172
Once completed, this move would make room for the elevation of USCYBERCOM.
However, any efforts to elevate Cyber Command would have to wait. February 2010 saw
the initial leak of U.S diplomatic cables to Wikileaks, and in June the U.K.-based newspaper The
Guardian reported that it had received classified cables that had been sent over SIPRNet. Then,
in late November, at least five newspapers across the world released coverage of the leaked
cables.173 U.S. Cyber Command was tasked with assessing the operational and strategic impact of
the leaks on cyber operations. A fusion cell established within USCYBERCOM released a
classified evaluation on December 2, 2010 that indicated the leaks revealed extensive U.S.
intelligence on the cyber operations of adversaries. The classified cables showed that the U.S.
possessed knowledge of “specific adversary TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures],
including malware, toolsets, IP addresses, and domains used in intrusion activity.”174 The report
suggests that the leaks hampered the United States’ ability to track and disrupt advanced
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persistent threats (APTs), as it expects adversaries to “modify their current infrastructure and
intrusion techniques.”175
Although the Wikileaks revelations delivered a set-back to U.S. Cyber Command, a
window of opportunity to elevate USCYBERCOM emerged in late-2011 through 2012. During
this period, several changes were made by senior-level leadership that facilitated the elevation
debate.176 In January 2011, President Obama approved Secretary Gates’ recommendation to
disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command. On August 4, 2011, U.S. Joint Forces Command was
officially disestablished, leaving nine unified combatant commands. This created the institutional
space needed to upgrade U.S. Cyber Command to a unified command.177
Other changes facilitating a new unified command were occurring in the Department of
Defense. Earlier that May, DOD had developed a list of offensive cyber tools to streamline
USCYBERCOM’s operations. This list entailed several conditions for utilizing cyber tools. For
usage in war zones, the president could grant approval in advance; however, any usage outside
war zones or during peacetime would require prior presidential approval. These developments
reignited the debate between the CIA and DOD from the year before—whether disrupting a
terrorist computer network or website was a traditional military activity or covert action.178
Despite the lack of resolution, the military de facto gained the upper hand on July 1, when
former CIA Director Leon Panetta was sworn in to replace Gates as Secretary of Defense.179
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Later that month, the Department officially recognized cyberspace as a warfighting domain with
the release of the Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.180 The decision
to recognize cyberspace as a military domain was actively debated in the administration.
Ultimately, senior leadership saw this as a crucial step in developing doctrine as well as
expanding military structures, training, and the technologies needed to operate in cyberspace and
organizing DOD’s overall efforts.181
Cyber Command was nearly elevated to a unified combatant command in October 2012.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already approved the USCYBERCOM 2012 concept of
organization that involved the creation of a Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The Cyber Mission
Force would be comprised of 133 teams across three categories: Cyber Protection Teams that
would augment and defend DOD’s priority networks and systems; Cyber National Mission Force
teams that would undertake and support wider national defense initiatives; and Cyber Combat
Mission Force teams that would integrate with the other combatant commands and conduct
computer network operations in support of those combatant commands. However, the CMF
would not receive budgetary support until Fiscal Year 2014.182 After the approval of the CMF—
and in the wake of media reports on Operation Olympic Games, a suspected joint U.S.-Israel
cover operation to degrade industrial control systems in an Iranian nuclear facility183—President
Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20). PPD-20 provided a more explicit
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framework for conducting computer network operations; in particular, it established core
principles and processes for conducting network attack operations.184
It was at this point that many in the Department of Defense and the White House joined
General Alexander in thinking that U.S. Cyber Command should be elevated to a unified
command. For at least three reasons, however, Secretary Panetta felt the discussion should be
tabled and the decision to elevate be postponed. One was the underdevelopment of the Cyber
Mission Force. The CMF was still essentially on the drawing board: the initiative had no money
for implementation at the time and was an unproven concept.185 Second, there was disagreement
on the dual-hat arrangement with the NSA. For many, elevating USCYBERCOM meant the
command was one step closer to an eventual split from the NSA. The administration could not
reach a consensus on whether to dissolve the dual-hat arrange and, if separated from the NSA,
how to proceed. This gridlock promoted the status quo, i.e. USCYBERCOM as a sub-unified
command.186 Finally, 2012 was an election year; Panetta did not want to turn the elevation of
U.S. Cyber Command into a partisan issue and thus a campaign distraction.187 As a result, U.S.
Cyber Command remain subordinated to USSTRATCOM.
The ensuing two years were marked by continued expansion, additional setbacks, and a
change in command of USCYBERCOM. Two events increased U.S. Cyber Command’s strategic
relevance. The first was the February 3, 2013 release of Joint Publication 3-12 (R), Cyberspace
Operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This document provided further guidance on the roles,
responsibilities, planning and coordination processes for computer network operations as well as
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a foundation for further doctrinal development.188 Outside of DOD, the release of a report by
security company FireEye on February 19 publicly revealed a growing issue of concern for the
Obama administration and General Alexander: Chinese espionage in cyberspace.189 The White
House saw the report as additional political capital to address cyber operations at a June 2013
summit planned with China’s Xi Jinping. However, 48 hours prior to the June summit, The
Guardian published a story on classified U.S. global surveillance initiatives that had been leaked
by NSA contractor Edward Snowden. President Obama lost key leverage over the summit.190 The
Snowden leaks, coupled with a change in the Secretary of Defense that February (Panetta was
replaced by Chuck Hagel), effectively stalled the expansion of U.S. Cyber Command, as it was
doing damage-control for at least the next year.191
Moreover, the 16-day shutdown of the federal government in October 2013 significantly
delayed the development of the Cyber Mission Force. The inability of the U.S. Senate to agree
on a spending bill resulted in the postponement of 44 courses and a loss of approximately
278,000 total training hours for over 1,000 CMF personnel.192 Eventually, USCYBERCOM was
able to activate the Cyber National Mission Force Headquarters at Fort Meade on January 17,
2014, a key step in actualizing the 2012 proposal.193 Despite funding delays and the continued
fallout from the Snowden leaks, Cyber Command did receive support to continue developing the
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Cyber Mission Force. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), delivered to Congress on March
4, 2014, identified the CMF as a top priority for U.S. presence in cyberspace.194
U.S. Cyber Command experienced its first official change of command on Friday March
28, 2014, when General Alexander retired from military service, thereby relinquishing command
of both USCYBERCOM and stepping down as Director of the NSA. Three days later, that
Monday, Admiral Michael Rogers assumed command of USCYBERCOM and took control of
the NSA.195 At the beginning of his tenure, Rogers continued to advocate for Cyber Command’s
elevation to a unified command.196 Much of Rogers’ efforts were directed at the continued
development of the Cyber Mission Force. This included assigning the Cyber Combat Mission
teams (via service components) to the unified combatant commands. Marine Corps Cyberspace
Command (MARFORCYBER) would be assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM); Army Cyber Command would be assigned to U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM), U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), and U.S. Northern Command
(USNORTHCOM); Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBER) would support U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); and Air Forces Cyber
(AFCYBER) would be assigned to U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).197
Locating CMF teams within each combatant command mirrored the Special Operations
Command model and allowed technical personnel to be assigned and rapidly deployed to
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accomplish specific objectives for the respective combatant command to which they were
assigned.198
Admiral Rogers had made a three-fold argument for moving U.S. Cyber Command to a
unified combatant command. First, because cyberspace would be foundational for future military
operations, the Department of Defense needed mission expertise and insight at the level where
budgeting, resourcing, strategy, and prioritization decisions are made, i.e. the unified combatant
command level. Keeping USCYBERCOM as a sub-unified command meant that it did not have
a seat at the table, and that would hurt overall military outcomes. Second, the cyber mission
demanded “speed”: target lists changed constantly and operational decisions required quicker
decision-making than many kinetic operations in other domains (land, air, sea, space).199 Admiral
Rogers routinely emphasized the need for decision-making speed. Why did he have to go from
Fort Meade in Maryland all the way to Omaha, Nebraska for approval from U.S. Strategic
Command when he was 24 miles from the Pentagon, Capital Hill, and the White House?
Finally, he argued that the cyber mission was not a niche mission relegated to
USCYBERCOM. It had to be integrated across all the operational elements of the Department
and within the service structures, and a unified U.S. Cyber Command would be the vehicle to
drive this integration. He drew an explicit comparison to the experience of the first U.S. Space
Command (USSPACECOM), which was operational as a unified combatant command from
1985-2002. Rogers appealed to other commanders by acknowledging the dangers of an overly
specialized and detached combatant command. USSPACECOM had no meaningful command or
mission connection to the other combatant commands: combatant commanders rarely interacted
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with USSPACECOM, had little insight into what the command actually accomplished, and did
not see how its mission provided benefits to their own mission sets. In contrast, A unified Cyber
Command would be integrated into existing Department constructs to support other missions.200
Towards Proof of Concept: Joint Task Force-Ares and Operation Glowing Symphony
Unfortunately, other commanders thought that U.S. Cyber Command still lacked
maturity.201 Much of this belief was grounded in the fact that other commanders still did not
understand how USCYBERCOM supported their own missions. At one point, Admiral Rogers
had one of the service chiefs approach him and ask, “Mike, if you guys could do some cyber
stuff, I wouldn’t have to spend money on all these other capabilities, right?” Admiral Rogers
responded no, cyber capabilities were not a replacement for traditional capabilities—instead,
they provided commanders with a greater range of capabilities and decision options than they
would have otherwise had.202
Progress towards a unified command would again be stalled with a change at the top of
the Department, as Ash Carter was nominated by President Obama in December 2014 to replace
Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense. Carter took control of the Department in February of
2015, and the transition between Secretaries effectively delayed the discussion of a unified U.S.
Cyber Command.203 Rogers, however, continued to push for elevation. For example, Kaplan
(2016) suggests that testimony by Rogers before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
March 19, 2015 provides insight into his strategy. When asked by Senator John McCain whether
the current level of “cyber-deterrence” was inadequate, Rogers replied in the affirmative. Kaplan
asserts that Rogers’ logic was that a need for more cyber-deterrence meant more money and
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more power for U.S. Cyber Command.204 On the heels of the Department’s new cyber strategy
released in April,205 Rogers released his vision for the continued build-out of USCYBERCOM on
June 3, 2015. A major focus of this vision document was the integration of cyber tools to support
larger joint force operations.206
Although the July 2015 data breaches of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management207 and
Russian information operations during the 2016 presidential election cycle208 acted as lightning
rods for the attention of senior leadership, two campaigns during the 2014-2016 period validated
for military commanders the idea that U.S. Cyber Command should be elevated to a unified
combatant command. The first was the Russian invasion of Crimea in March of 2014. Russian
operations in Ukraine marked the first time that U.S. military officials saw significant tactical use
of offensive cyber operations and the integration of network attacks with tactical electronic
warfare (EW) and conventional operations.209 These operations differed significantly from the
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks in Estonia in 2007 and in Georgia in 2008210 in that
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the entailed attacks on the power grid and other physical systems and tracking the movement of
enemy forces in real-time by compromising soldiers’ mobile phones.211 The second—and
arguably more important—campaign was the Department of Defense’s decision to utilize
computer network operations in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
codenamed Operation Glowing Symphony.212
Dropping “Cyber Bombs” on ISIL. To combat the continued threat of ISIL in Iraq and
Syria, the Department of Defense formally established the Combined Joint Task Force –
Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), a multi-nation coalition, on October 17, 2014.213
Within six months, on March 29, 2015, an operations order had been signed directing U.S. Cyber
Command to support Operation Inherent Resolve via cooperation with U.S. Central Command.
USCYBERCOM’s main operational responsibilities would be to: provide information
operations to support U.S. Central Command; conduct force protection and counter-command
and control operations in support of Operation Inherent Resolve; provide mission support to
enable cyberspace effects; conduct operations against U.S. Central Command’s ISIL targets; and
support any other USCENTCOM requirements.214
News of USCYBERCOM’s role in Operation Inherent Resolve became public in
February of 2016 after Secretary of Defense Carter’s congressional testimony on progress. In a
subsequent interview with NPR, Secretary Carter elaborated that part of the goal was to disrupt
ISIL’s communications and command and control. “We are using cyber tools, which is a major,
new departure…These are attacks in the war zone, essentially using cyber as a weapon of war.
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Just as you drop bombs, we are dropping cyber bombs.”215 An USCYBERCOM internal mission
brief from April 12, 2016 provides more details; specifically, the command’s concerns center on
ISIL’s ability to enable global terrorist networking through cyberspace, incite attacks via social
media, distribute propaganda online, and dox select individuals.216 In a subsequent testimony
before the Senate Committee on Armed Service on April 28, Secretary Carter would confirm
that, as USCYBERCOM’s first major combat operation, this was the first real test of U.S. Cyber
Command’s capabilities ability to produce tangible effects on the battlefield.217
One week later, on May 5, Admiral Rogers ordered the creation of Joint Task Force –
ARES (JTF-ARES) within U.S. Cyber Command to develop and use malware and other
capabilities to degrade ISIL’s online capacity. This included damaging and destroying ISIL’s
networks, computers, mobile phones, and other communications equipment. The order also
provided JTF-ARES with instructions to coordinate with coalition partners. Two amending
orders (May 5 and June 13) gave additional detail on the development of cyber capabilities to
escalate the fight against ISIL but did not place any restrictions on the scope or reach of
subsequent operations.218 Command was delegated to General Paul Nakasone, a three-star
general from Army Cyber Command (and future Commander of USCYBERCOM).219
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JTF-ARES would be responsible for conducting Operation Glowing Symphony, a digital
campaign against ISIL. Operational planning had begun in earnest in September 2016. The Task
Force began to develop concepts of operation as early as September 12, as evidenced by an
internal document. In it, JTF-ARES established operational goals and measures of performance
and effectiveness. Moreover, the concepts of operation document portrays network attacks as a
form of fire support.220 An overview briefing of Operation Glowing Symphony was subsequently
delivered on September 16.221 Later, on October 7, USCYBERCOM briefed select individuals
from the unified combatant commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other
Department agencies on the means and ends of Operation Glowing Symphony.222 While JTFARES planned Operation Glowing Symphony, USCYBERCOM met an important public goal.
On October 21, 2016, all 133 Cyber Mission Force teams reached initial operating capability.223
This was an important milestone in implementing the Department’s Cyber Strategy, particularly
given the intensive costs (and setbacks) to develop and train teams.224
Planning for Operation Glowing Symphony continued through October. While originally
planned for execution in September, Operation Glowing Symphony was delayed due to objection
from the CIA, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the State Department.
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Resistance to the operation centered on notifying local governments of impending network
attacks, which would have affected networks across approximately 35 countries. The CIA was
particularly concerned with how unannounced network attacks would undermine cooperation
with law enforcement, intelligence, and counterterrorism elements in those countries. CIA
Director John Brennan, along with Secretary of State John Kerry, and Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper, argued that giving notice—particularly to allies—was necessary to
preserve these relationships. SECDEF Carter, Admiral Rogers, and General Joseph Dunford,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that there would be no harmful collateral effects,
and notice was not required under existing authority. Moreover, giving notice could result in a
public leak of the operation that would alert targets and allow others to discover U.S. Cyber
Command’s capabilities.225
The National Security Council addressed the dispute for weeks, delaying the Operation’s
original timeline.226 Finally, by early November, the JTF-ARES agreed to a notification
framework for activities related to the operation.227 On November 7, 2016, JTF-ARES issued a
command and control checklist that required providing USCYBERCOM with operational
updates every six hours with immediate updates required for issues of internal disagreement,
changes in the parameters of the mission, or on the call for ceasefire by other combatant
commands. At this point, technical/tactical and operational deconfliction had already been
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completed.228 The next day, Tuesday November 8, JTF-ARES was officially authorized to begin
conducting Operation Glowing Symphony.229 On Wednesday November 9, Admiral Rogers
released the Operations Order to JTF-ARES and its service components, thereby turning the
September 12 concepts of operation into actionable orders.230 A briefing was subsequently held
on Thursday November 10 to summarize Rogers’ Operations Order.231
That same November, Operation Glowing Symphony started to product its first effects.
The months prior had been focused on gaining access to ISIL networks and creating target lists.
ISIL routinely used encrypted mobile applications, social media, and online magazine and video
content; the group even had an entire information technology (IT) department. JTF-ARES
operators sent phishing emails to plant malware, malware, spyware, and back doors to gain
access and conduct reconnaissance. Using login credentials obtained through these methods,
operators used administrator privileges to build target lists; they noticed that ISIL used roughly
ten core accounts and a handful of servers around the world to manage online activities. The
execution of Operation Glowing Symphony ensued in late November. JTF-ARES operators
logged into ISIL accounts and deleted content and file, crashed servers, misconfigured networks,
and changed passwords. ISIL was locked out of online accounts, and the group’s online activities
were effectively frozen. Once ISIL’s main administrative accounts and distribution hubs had
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been compromised, JTF-ARES operators pivoted to target ISIL’s morale by slowing network
speeds, dropping connections, denying account access, and draining cellphone batteries. By May
2017, ISIL’s online operations had been significantly degraded, and many servers remained
down.232
Elevation to Unified Command: From Reactive to Persistent Force
Additional elements of the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community
would be notified of the existence of Operation Glowing Symphony on December 10, 2016, after
the initial execution by JTF-ARES.233 Prior to Operation Glowing Symphony many commanders
and civilians in the Department had a fundamental misunderstanding of both ISIL’s operations in
cyberspace and USCYBERCOMS offensive capabilities. Glowing Symphony provided the
“proof of concept” for cyber capabilities: the digital assault spurred a reconsideration of conflict
in cyberspace and how USCYBERCOM could interface with the combatant commands
operating in other domains.234
Operation Glowing Symphony subsequently served as a reference point for
USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness and maturity.235 For the Department of Defense and the
military, the operation was an overwhelming success: it proved that U.S. Cyber Command could
integrate computer network operations into traditional military battle plans of the other
combatant commands. The Intelligence Community reached a different conclusion about
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Operation Glowing Symphony. After roughly one month into the operation, the CIA assessed
that the operation’s effects were short-lived—ISIL would either restore online content or move
content to new servers. The conflicting views of the operation’s impact came from different
definitions of success: USCYBERCOM and DOD focused on temporarily disrupting and
distracting adversaries, while the Intelligence Community defined success in terms of enduring
outcomes.236
Despite these differing assessments, Operation Glowing Symphony provided the military
with the upper hand in the Title 10-Title 50 debate: cyber capabilities could not be held out of
military operations as a separate intelligence capability.237 Indeed, although the CIA would
continue to play an important role in the cyber domain,238 JTF-ARES offered a model for future
operations. Specifically, the success of JTF-ARES and Operation Glowing Symphony influenced
with creation of the Russia Small Group across U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA to counter
Russian influence and cyber operations.239 While the dual-hat structure with the NSA may have
initially stunted USCYBERCOM’s development—thereby benefitting the Intelligence

Nakashima, “U.S. Military Cyber Operation to Attack ISIS Last Year Sparked Heated Debate over Alerting
Allies.”
237
Bing, “Command and Control: A Fight for the Future of Government Hacking.”
238
Zach Dorfman et al., “Exclusive: Secret Trump Order Gives CIA More Powers to Launch Cyberattacks,” Yahoo!
News, July 15, 2020, https://news.yahoo.com/secret-trump-order-gives-cia-more-powers-to-launch-cyberattacks090015219.html.
239
Dina Temple-Raston, “Task Force Takes on Russian Election Interference,” National Public Radio, August 14,
2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/08/14/751048230/new-nsa-task-force-takes-on-russian-election-interference; Ellen
Nakashima, “U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018
Midterms,” The Washington Post, February 27, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/uscyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html; Shannon Vavra, “NSA’s Russian
Cyberthreat Task Force Is Now Permanent,” Cyberscoop, April 19, 2019, https://www.cyberscoop.com/nsa-russiasmall-group-cyber-command/.
236

183
Community—Operation Glowing Symphony marked a turning point in the military’s influence
in interagency efforts in the cyber domain.240
Planning and executing the operation had reignited the discussion of elevation to a
unified command as early as late-2015; this time, senior leadership in the Department and White
House concluded that USCYBERCOM should indeed be elevated. However, the 2016
presidential election and impending transition in administration delayed elevation 241 for another
year. Eventually, in late 2016, President Obama, Secretary Carter, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended to Congress that USCYBERCOM be elevated to a unified combatant command.
Congress subsequently authorized this elevation in December 2016 with the release of the
FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act.242
The transition to the Trump administration in January of 2017 brought with it an assertive
Secretary of Defense—retired Marine Corps general James Mattis—who was intimately familiar
with DOD politics. Secretary Mattis supported elevating USCYBERCOM and revising the 2011
Unified Command Plan to make room for a new unified combatant command.243 On August 18,
2017, the new Trump administration released an official statement directing the elevation of U.S.
Cyber Command from a sub-unified to a fully unified combatant command.244 This elevation
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represented a recognition of the growing importance of cyberspace to U.S. national security.245
The importance of a unified U.S. Cyber Command would be further supported by the
administration’s growing strategic emphasis on a return to great power competition shown in the
December 2017 National Security Strategy246 and the January 2018 National Defense Strategy.247
U.S. Cyber Command’s elevation to a unified command was also accompanied by a pivot
in the command’s strategic and operational thinking. Specifically, USCYBERCOM began
changing from a reactive force—i.e., operations were primarily conducted in response to an
adversary’s action—to a force that would maintain a persistent operational presence in
cyberspace. Much of this shift coincided with and was a result of planning and executing
Operation Glowing Symphony. For example, a USCYBERCOM briefing from November 30,
2016 shows the roots of strategic change: in contrasting the dynamics of cyberspace with the
nuclear strategic environment, the briefing concludes that deterrence in cyberspace is much more
complex than nuclear deterrence. Because cyberspace is characterized by constant contact in a
dynamically constructed terrain, initiative must be seized and retained through a strategy of
persistence.248 This strategic theme—persistence—would be echoed in a number of reports and
testimonies on cyber deterrence throughout 2017.249 USCYBERCOM’s command vision, a
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public document released on March 23, 2018, further codifies the thinking that the operating
environment is one of constant contact and temporary advantage. Superiority is achieved through
persistence, which broadly requires constantly maneuvering between defense and offense
globally across an interconnected digital space “as close as possible to adversaries and their
operations.”250
On May 4, 2018, U.S. Cyber Command became operational as a unified combatant
command. This occurred during the change of command: Admiral Rogers term as Commander
of USCYBERCOM and Director of the NSA had ended, and the duties were transferred to Army
General Paul Nakasone,251 the commander responsible for leading JTF-ARES. Later that fall, the
Department of Defense released its 2018 cyber strategy document, where the strategy of
persistent engagement would be carried out by “defend[ing] forward to disrupt or halt malicious
cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.”252
Analysis and Conclusion
To what extent can organizational size, adoption-capacity, or organizational culture explain the
evolution of the U.S. cyber force structure? The U.S. case offers support for my claim that
organizational size is an overlooked factor shaping the implementation of cyber forces. However,
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answering six questions provides insight into each theoretical framework’s ability to explain
implementation dynamics.
(1) Why did the U.S. introduce JTF-CND under DISA (a subordinated branch force structure)
and subsequently give control over the task force to combatant commands (modifying force
structure to subordinated joint)?
Accounts suggest that the ELIGIBLE RECEIVER exercise in 1997 was the driving factor
behind the creation of JTF-CND. Although SOLAR SUNRISE—which many feared was linked
to the growing tensions with Iraq—drove the formalization of JTF-CND,253 the need for an
institutional response was clearly identified in ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 1997. The exercise was
part of a semi-annual series of exercises that the Joint Chiefs of Staff utilized in part to mitigate
existing and future risks and threats.254 This suggests that the initial impetus for introducing the
task force came from the military’s ability to invest in internal experimentation and new
initiatives. Moreover, the lack of literal operating space and set up of trailers for the task force
suggests that capacity was not a strong consideration for creating JTF-CND. Culture also
struggles to explain why the task force was given to DISA. Although DISA may have been a
better cultural fit for the mission than the Air Force, the DISA arrangement appears to have been
a bargain to satisfy service interests concerned about mission-capture by the Air Force.
The shift of JTF-CND from DISA to USSPACECOM, which modified cyber force
structure from subordinated branch to subordinated joint, does not appear to be the result of
capacity or culture. The lack of interest in the mission on the part of other unified combatant
commands does not provide positive evidence for a greater absorption capacity for
USSPACECOM. Culture may have been an enabler: JTF-CND still fit within the broader

253
254

Healey, A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012, 122–35.
Healey, A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012, 55.

187
military culture of jointness, and, being heavily populated by the Air Force, USSPACECOM
may have been predisposed to take on a technologically centered mission. However, it is also
possible that the mission remained defined in a limited way so that it did not infringe on the
missions of the other commands; a broader mission scope for JTF-CND could have driven
internal competition.
Verdict: Preliminary support for both organizational size and cultural explanations. Little
support for adoption-capacity.
(2) Why did AFCYBER(P) fail?
A successful AFCYBER(P) would have further modified the U.S. cyber force structure,
taking the U.S. from a subordinated joint to a sub-unified service construct. My theory of
organizational size asserts that modification is the result of competing bureaucratic interests that
exercise veto power over the organizational design of cyber forces. As such, this explanation
suggests that AFCYBER(P) failed because implementers failed to placate competing interests by
narrowly defining the cyber mission, linking their mission definition to existing interests, or by
including others in the command structure. Adoption-capacity theory suggests that
AFCYBER(P) failed because the broader military did not possess the capacity for the Air Force
to absorb the entire cyber mission. According to this logic, AFCYBER(P) put increased demands
on the Air Force that hampered the military’s capacity to conduct the ongoing campaigns in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Finally, the cultural explanation suggests that, as a service-level initiative,
AFCYBER(P) did not fit within the larger joint warfighting culture and was not aligned with
how the rest of the military viewed computer network operations.
Evidence from the episode indicates that the broader military possessed the capacity for
AFCYBER(P), i.e. the creation of AFCYBER(P) did not significantly degrade the military’s
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overall ability and capacity to conduct the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. By and large, the Air
Force had been sidelined in the two ground wars and relegated to providing ISR and drone
capabilities.255 Although Gates singles out the Air Force for a reluctance to develop greater ISR
capabilities (citing AFCYBER(P) as a distraction), he does acknowledge that this was a militarywide problem. Gates would approve $2.6 billion worth of new ISR initiatives in August of
2008.256 As such, the creation of AFCYBER(P) appears to have had a limited impact on overall
military capacity to absorb the initiative. Interestingly, Gates pointed to the impact that
AFCYBER(P) had on the Air Force’s devaluation of nuclear mission, not the Air Force’s
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Gates, combining the nuclear and cyber missions
under the Eight Air Force greatly reduced the leadership’s daily focus on the nuclear mission.257
Consistent with the expectations from my theory of organizational size, the primary
reasons for the failure of AFCYBER(P) appear to be: (1) an overly broad definition of the
command’s mission, and (2) a failure to reduce veto players by appealing to common interests.
First, Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne and those in the Eighth Air Force responsible for
developing AFCYBER(P) never explicitly defined exactly what the new Air Force mission
would include or exclude.258 Moreover, Wynne’s strategic justification for the new command
rested on the eventual rise of peer-competitor states that would challenge the U.S. in cyberspace.
However, with no actual peer competitor at the time and no connection to the ISR efforts in Iraq

255

U.S. Air Force/U.S. Cyber Command Consultant interview with author.
Marshall Curtis Erwin, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaisance (ISR) Acquisition: Issues for Congress”
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Reseach Service, April 16, 2013), 10, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41284.pdf.
257
Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 240–41, 244.
258
The most refined version of the scope of the mission indicated that the goal was to establish “freedom to
maneuver” in cyberspace. Michael Wynne, “Cyberspace as a Domain in Which the Air Force Flies and Fights”
(C4ISR Integration Conference, Crystal City, VA, November 2, 2006),
http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/cybercommand/speech.htm.
256

189
and Afghanistan, AFCYBER(P) was hard to justify to the other services and combatant
commands.259
As a result, the other combat services assumed that, despite public reassurances,260 the Air
Force sought to become the sole provider of cyber tools within the joint construct, i.e. the Air
Force personnel would eventually replace other service personnel across combatant
commands.261 This fear was compounded by the fact that the Air Force gave responsibilities to
the Eighth Air Force; this service component had been the dominant force in Strategic Air
Command, which controlled two of the three nuclear strike capabilities prior to the creation of
USSTRATCOM. The services saw AFCYBER(P) as an attempt to capture and dominate the
cyber mission the same way the Air Force had dominated the nuclear mission before
reorganizations in 1992.262 The result was inter-service resistance to AFYCBER(P).263 While the
nuclear incident at Minot underlies the immediate collapse of AFCYBER(P), the lack of broader
organizational support for the initiative rested on a failure to define and connect the mission to
existing interests. Wynne remarked after the fact that a joint cyber command was the best
possible option; it needed to be joint.264
This episode does lend some support for the cultural explanation via counterfactual.
Although not within the joint warfighting construct, it is possible that AFCYBER(P) would have
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survived had it been aligned with ISR capabilities instead of the nuclear mission. The other
military services viewed the cyber mission as just another form of combat support, and each of
the services began incorporating cyber into their own ISR capability profiles.265 Had the Air
Force followed the broader cultural movement and placed AFCYBER(P) developments under
control of Air Force Space Command (where it was eventually placed as a downgraded
Numbered Air Force), it is possible that there would have been less resistance across the
military.266 While the evidence does not rule out this explanation, supporting evidence remains
weak.
Verdict: Strong support for the theory of organizational size with weak support for the
cultural explanation. No support for adoption-capacity logic.
(3) Why was a sub-unified joint force structure chosen for U.S. Cyber Command over
alternatives?
There are three possible reasons why U.S. Cyber Command was initially created as a subunified joint command and not a unified command. First, adoption-capacity suggests that the
military lacked the resources to convert the existing joint task force into a unified command.
Second, the cultural explanation suggests that the joint approach was consistent with joint
military culture—and the prior success of U.S. Special Operations Command—and the decision
to create a sub-unified command rested on cultural constraints. Third, according to my theory of
organizational size, the joint arrangement was the product of competing inter-organizational
interests; a sub-unified command was the result of a lack of a “proof of concept” and not
resource constraints.
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The evidence provides mixed support for organizational size, strong support for culture,
and little support for adoption-capacity. In terms of culture, the joint approach remained
consistent with military’s approach to conducting warfare, and USSOCOM’s success was
referenced as a reason for creating a joint command for cyber. Moreover, the recent creation of
USAFRICOM as the tenth unified combatant command created restraints that prevented the
creation of USCYBERCOM as a unified command. The “ten-command rule” was a widely
understood cultural reference point for decision-making. At the same time, the decision to
continue a joint organizational model was characterized by explicit considerations of the
competing interests within the military that would resist other organizational models like the
creation of a new service. However, neither proof of mission maturity nor resource constraints
were advanced for keeping USCYBERCOM as a sub-unified command. Indeed, the dual-hat
arrangement with the NSA provided USCYBERCOM with a crucial boost in technical and
human resources, without which the initiative may have stalled for years as USCYBERCOM
would have had to duplicate what already existed in the NSA.267 Instead, political constraints on
a unified command appear to have stemmed from the implicit ten-command rule. As such,
organizational size receives mixed support and adoption-capacity receives little support.
Verdict: Mixed support for organizational size. Strong support for cultural explanation
and little support for adoption-capacity.

(4) Why was USCYBERCOM established in 2010 and not 2009?
In addition to the question of force structure, the timing of USCYBERCOM’s creation
provides an examination point for each explanation. Although there was sufficient buy-in and
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resourcing to establish USCYBERCOM in 2009 the wake of SIPRNet—and Gates had de facto
created the command with the merger of JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW—the delay was primarily the
product of a change in presidential administrations. The political change did not significantly
alter the capacity to absorb USYBERCOM, create additional culture constraints, or change
existing views on the cyber mission. Thus, there is no evidence to support any of the
explanations.
Verdict: Evidence provides no support for organizational size, culture, or adoptioncapacity.
(5) Why wasn’t USCYBERCOM elevated between 2012 and 2013?
The non-elevation of USCYBERCOM between 2012 and 2013 show the limits of the
cultural and adoption-capacity explanations. The disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces
Command in 2011 cleared a major cultural obstacle: it reduced the number of unified combatant
commands from ten to nine, theoretically clearing the way for USCYBERCOM to be elevated.
At the same time, the disestablishment of USJFCOM also represented a reduction in bureaucracy
that theoretically increased the organizational capacity for the military to elevate
USCYBERCOM. Moreover, the Snowden leaks provided a potential stimulus for elevation: the
revelation of capabilities could have incentivized the elevation of USCYBERCOM to offset the
loss of strategic advantage.
However, no such elevation occurred; for two reasons, many in the military believed that
the command lacked maturity. On one hand, the command had not been established long enough
to merit elevation: the Cyber Mission Force, the main focus of implementation efforts, was only
in its initial developmental stages. On the other hand, many combatant commanders did not
understand how cyber capabilities affected their own missions. This evidence supports the
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argument from my theory of organizational size that the likelihood of moving towards full
implementation is increased by providing “proof of concept.”
Verdict: Evidence provides support for organizational size. No support for culture or
adoption-capacity explanations.
(6) Why was USCYBERCOM elevated to a unified combatant command?
The eventual elevation of USCYBERCOM to a unified command resulted from the
success of JTF-ARES. Operation Glowing Symphony provided a concrete demonstration of how
cyber capabilities could integrate with and support kinetic operations. This “proof of concept”
fostered buy-in from military commanders and civilian officials and built support for elevation to
a unified command. Moreover, because there were no major changes in military culture or
organizational capacity, the elevation of USCYBERCOM casts additional doubt on the
explanatory power of these competing frameworks.
Verdict: Strong support for organizational size. No support for culture or adoptioncapacity.
Table 5.1 summarizes this discussion.
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Table 5.1: Summary of Evidential Support for Alternative Explanations (United States)

Explanation
Episode

Organizational
Size

Culture

AdoptionCapacity

Supports

Supports

Weakly Supports

Strongly Supports

Weakly Supports

No Support

Mixed Support

Strongly Supports

No Support

No Support

No Support

No Support

Non-elevation of
USCYBERCOM, 2012-2013

Supports

No Support

No Support

Elevation of USCYBERCOM

Strongly Supports

No Support

No Support

Introduction/Modification of
JTF-CND

Failure of AFCYBER(P)

USCYBERCOM initial force
structure

Creation of USCYBERCOM in
2010
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CHAPTER 6
The Dynamics of Change in a Small Military:
Cyber Force Structure in Estonia
If we compare the United States or the U.K. or Canada to Estonia, Estonia is a village.1
- Dr. Jaak Aaviksoo
Fmr. Estonian Minister of Defense
Introduction
This chapter examines the cyber force implementation dynamics in a small military
organization—the Estonian Defense Forces (EDF). Total military personnel for the Estonian
Defense Forces peaked in 2003 with roughly 8,100 active duty personnel. From 2009 to 2017,
the EDF has had an average size of approximately 5,900 active personnel.2 This chapter details
the creation of and changes in Estonia’s cyber force structure. In doing so, it assesses the three
competing theoretical frameworks advanced in Chapter 3: organizational size, adoption-capacity,
and military culture. Using the operationalization from Chapter 4, Figure 6.1 summarizes the
evolution of Estonia’s cyber force structure according to implementation stage, the
corresponding force structure, and the respective military institution.
This chapter contains four major sections. The first section provides background on
Estonia’s security environment post-2004 after joining both the European Union and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The second section details the chain of events from 2007 to 2009
that led to the delegation of cyber operations to the Estonian Defense Forces’ (EDF) Staff and
Signals Battalion. The third section examines the creation of the EDF’s Cyber Command by
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looking at efforts to implement a new unified branch from 2010 to 2018. Much of this section is
dedicated to detailing the genesis of the new command and the hurdles that its advocates faced.
Due to the relative dearth of public information on the establishment of Estonia’s Cyber
Command compared to the creation of U.S. Cyber Command, the second and third sections rely
heavily on interview data. The chapter concludes by evaluating each theoretical explanation as
applied to the case of Estonia.

Figure 6.1. The Evolution of Estonia’s Cyber Force Structure: Implementation Stage, Force
Structure, and Institution.

Background: Estonia’s Changing Strategic Environment
Russia has been the most important factor in Estonia’s strategic environment, particularly since
the country’s independence from Soviet rule in 1991.3 In this regard, two decisions in 2004
represent an important analytical starting point for Estonia’s contemporary strategic
environment.4 First, on May 1, 2004, Estonia officially entered the European Union, an
important foundation for the future of Estonian foreign policy.5 Second, Estonia joined the North
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in March of 2004 as part of NATO’s second wave of postCold War expansion; membership was finalized in April of 2007.6
NATO membership was particularly impactful and had a dual effect on the strategic
environment. Deepening ties with the Western Europe and the United States placed additional
stress on official diplomatic relations between Estonia and Russia. Russian officials portrayed
Estonia’s membership as a hostile attempt to leave the Russian sphere of influence and part of
NATO’s increasing threat to Russian national security.7 Estonia’s strategic military posture also
began to shift from a single focus on territorial defense to a posture that incorporated and relied
more on the collective defense guarantees of NATO’s Article 5.8 This shift, which had begun
prior to 2004 in anticipation of NATO membership, was accompanied by a desire to both support
and contribute to allied security interests with military means. This manifested in decisions to
participate in U.S.-led military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq.9 At the same time, Estonia’s
participation in out-of-area missions and its integration in NATO’s collective defense system
provided an incentive for its small military force to contribute in a strategically meaningful
way.10
Many in Estonia saw cyber-security as such an area where they could contribute. Cyber
threats did not appear in prominent discussions within NATO: the alliance and its members were

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Member Countries” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 24, 2020),
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm#:~:text=Cold%20War%20enlargement,Bulgaria%2C%20Estonia%2C%20Latvia%2C%20Lithuania%2C%20Romania%2C%20Slovakia%20and,of%20enl
argement%20in%20NATO%20history.
7
Hiski Haukkala, “A Close Encounter of the Worst Kind? The Logic of Situated Actors and the Statue Crisis
between Estonia and Russia,” Journal of Baltic Studies 40, no. 2 (2009): 207–10; Valeriano and Maness, Cyber War
Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, 143.
8
Karabeshkin, “The Ongoing Transformation of the Estonian Defence Forces,” 133.
9
Wivel and Crandall, “Punching Above Their Weight, but Why? Explaining Denmark and Estonia in the
Transatlantic Relationship,” 408–9.
10
Karabeshkin, “The Ongoing Transformation of the Estonian Defence Forces,” 134; Wivel and Crandall,
“Punching Above Their Weight, but Why? Explaining Denmark and Estonia in the Transatlantic Relationship,”
408–9.
6

198
preeminently occupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.11 For Estonia, NATO membership
coincided with the culmination of a host of domestic digital initiatives. The Estonian government
invested heavily in the development of information technologies throughout the 1990s and early
2000s. In the drive to become an international leader in information technologies, Estonia’s state
and private infrastructure became heavily dependent on the Internet.12 More than any other
country in the world, Estonia’s critical infrastructure had become cyber-dependent; from routine
government forms and banking to military command posts, connectivity to the Internet was an
essential part of a functioning state.13 Much of this was directed towards a political goal:
Estonian officials wanted to rapidly break free from the Soviet legacy and to globalize through
technology.14 In an attempt to capitalize on the country’s reputation for technological progress
and tie it to its membership in NATO, Estonian officials proposed opening a cyber-focused
institution within NATO’s “Centers of Excellence” scheme.15 Planning and preparatory
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development for this center took place under the Estonian Ministry of Defense (MOD).
However, NATO allies were unmoved by the proposal for a cyber center—that is, until late in
2007.16
Adapting the Staff and Signals Battalion into a Cyber Force
Despite the push to establish a cyber-focused NATO center of excellence, no real thought had
been given to the role of the Estonian Defense Forces in cyberspace.17 More broadly, Estonia had
no government-level cyber-strategy prior to 2008.18 However, the catalyst for change occurred in
May of 2007 after the Estonian government’s decision to relocate the “Bronze Soldier,” a World
War-II memorial in the main square of Tallinn commemorating the Soviet Union’s defeat of the
Nazis. Although a night of protests occurred, the primary backlash took place online in the form
of a three-week onslaught of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. Although not
perceived as a distinctly military issue, the attacks facilitated the eventual adaption of the EDF’s
Staff and Signals Battalion into Estonia’s first military arm for cyberspace.
The 2007 Bronze Soldier Episode
The decision in 2007 to relocate the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn was the latest in a string of
government initiatives to de-Sovietize Estonia. For many Estonians, Russian and Soviet
monuments were symbols that glorified Soviet occupation and distorted history. For the sizeable
ethnic Russian minority in Estonia (approximately 26 percent of the population in 2007), visiting
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the Bronze Soldier memorial on May 9 was an important way to celebrate Russia’s WWII
Victory Day. For the Russian government, statues such as the Bronze Solder were symbols of
national pride that represented the glory and strength of Russia’s military might.19 In the lead-up
to the general parliamentary election held in March 2007, the removal of the statue had been part
of the Reform Party’s election platform. After the party’s surprising victory and the election of
Andrus Ansip as Prime Minister, the decision to relocate the statue received support from a
conservative government coalition—one that excluded the moderate Centre Party and instead
included the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, a conservative nationalist party.20
The Ministry of Defense had been tasked with handling the physical relocation of the
statue, and the date for relocation was set for April 27. That night, in response, protests and riots
erupted in the streets of Tallinn.21 The protests were accompanied by a string of cyber incidents
that night that targeted the government and critical infrastructure in the private sector. While the
protests only lasted one night, the cyber-attacks continued for almost a month, occurring in three
waves: ping-flooding attacks to overload web traffic in the first wave from April 27 to April 29;
a wave of targeted botnet distributed denial of services (DDOS) attacks from April 30 to May 11
in the second phase (including the heaviest attack on May 9, Russia’s WWII victory day); and a
third wave of botnet DDOS attacks occurring from May 11 to May 18.22 On the government
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side, the ping and DDOS attacks targeted the servers used by the Estonian parliament, websites
of the President and Prime Minister’s respective parties, and the institutions in control of
Estonian Internet infrastructure. In the private sector, attacks targeted two of the largest financial
firms, three news organizations, and several communications firms.23 Although some form of
digital retaliation for relocation had been anticipated, the scope of the cyber incidents had
surprised government officials.24
Ministry of Defense Takes the Lead. Officials in the Ministry of Defense first identified
issues with their computer networks in the early hours of April 28. As Lauri Almann (Estonia’s
permanent Undersecretary of Defense at the time) has recalled: “We were sitting in the
government situation room, and suddenly in walks our chief [public relations] person, who says,
'We are unable to put our press releases out' on government Web sites. We didn't understand the
seriousness of the problem until he said, ‘We are under cyberattack.’”25 Later that morning,
Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo could not access the Reform Party’s website; moreover, he
noticed that websites for the leading Estonia news outlets, including the Posttimees, were not
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functional.26 Across the Ministry of Defense and the wider government, officials realized that
computer network operations could constitute a nation security threat; these network attacks
were not the same as a computer virus or an account hack. Minister Aaviksoo was subsequently
briefed on the wider outages and concluded that these network attacks were serious, systematic,
and coordinated, and had signs of Russian government involvement27 despite any concrete links
to the Kremlin.28
Both internally and externally, Minister Aaviksoo declared the networks attacks a
national security threat, likening them to a naval blockade—preventing connectivity to the
Internet and functionality across networks was like shutting down ports to the sea.29 This analogy
spread throughout the administration and had become the dominant domestic public narrative by
April 30.30 However, by framing the network attacks as blockade and signaling Russian
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culpability,31 discussions soon emerged over whether Estonia could invoke NATO’s collective
defense provision. Many across the government, including speaker of parliament Ene Ergma,
had believed the network attacks were attempts by the Kremlin to probe NATO’s network
defenses and readiness.32 However, after extensive consultation with NATO allies, Defense
Minister Aaviksoo announced that there was no basis for triggering Article 5:
At present, NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This
means that the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other
words collective self-defence, will not automatically be extended to the attacked
country…Not a single NATO defence minister would define a cyber-attack as a
clear military action at present. However, this matter needs to be resolved in the
near future.33
Although Article 5 was off the table, the Ministry of Defense still coordinated
extensively with NATO, the European Union, and others such as the United States,
Israel, Finland, Germany, Slovenia, and Sweden. Each entity sent computer emergency
response teams (CERTs) to observe and assist the Estonian CERT (CERT-EE), which
was operating temporarily under the Ministry of Defense.34 With international assistance,
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CERT-EE was able to implement a three-pronged strategy: (1) increase Estonia’s server
capacity to handle the overload of internet traffic from botnets servers; (2) distinguish
authentic from the “zombie” traffic responsible for the DDOS to block illegitimate server
traffic; and (3) locate and neutralize the bots and zombies used for the attacks.35 Working
around the clock, CERT-EE and its international partners managed to increase bandwidth
by May 10 and continued to hunt down botnet servers until approximately May 23.36
Sidelining the Military. One of the main insights that emerged from the Ministry of
Defense—and subsequently, the rest of the government—was that there was no designated entity
responsible for cyber-security or cyber-defense. CERT-EE had become the de facto hub for
technical coordination, but there were no structures or rules in place for political coordination.
Instead, there was a loose network of experts across the government and private sector on which
the Ministry of Defense was forced to rely.37 The Staff and Signals Battalion, a support unit
within the EDF tasked with ensuring the availability and functionality of EDF strategic
communications and information technology,38 was the only military entity that possessed such
expertise. However, personnel from the Staff and Signals Battalion were largely sidelined during
the network attacks and were only brought in as consultants. Only civilian infrastructure had
been targeted; no damage had been done to military networks, and the attacks never reached
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defense processes. As a result, there was a clear understanding that the network attacks were not
primarily a military defense issue. First and foremost, the network attacks were a civilian
political issue.39
Moreover, aside from acting as a coordinating body for international assistance, the
Ministry of Defense actively looked to downplay its role to avoid the perception that the Defense
Forces would intervene in domestic affairs. The Ministry of Defense had been responsible for the
relocation of the Bronze Soldier and had taken the lead in coordinating the response to the cyber
incidents. As a result, a perception emerged that the Ministry of Defense was responsible for
dealing with network attacks more broadly and that the Ministry and the EDF had very strong
postures in cyberspace. Neither was true; as such, it fell to the Ministry to draw back and
severely limit EDF involvement. According to Minister Aaviksoo, this latter part was
particularly important in relation to both the night of protests and the online assault:
In the Soviet days, if there was something going wrong, the Kremlin would send
troops in the streets. We were so sensitive about something like that
happening…They never fight their own people. They never show themselves in
the streets. And for [the network attacks], you don’t centralize, you don’t mix
things up. There must be a clear distinction line between civil and military.40
Despite the lack of direct involvement, the EDF and the Ministry of Defense clearly
understood the military implications of the network attacks.41 Yet, the Ministry pushed to
prioritize civilian initiatives over the development of military capabilities. Prior to 2007, most
civilian agencies viewed cyber-security as an issue purely for “the IT people”—it simply was not
on the radar for most agencies. After the network attacks, however, there was a sense of urgency
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to incorporate cyber-security into governmental processes. As such, the Ministry of Defense
could not realistically justify diverting resources from much-needed civilian initiatives to expand
the Staff and Signals Battalion. Therefore, Minister Aaviksoo tried to prioritize three shorterterm goals. First, the Ministry would begin drafting a comprehensive national cyber-security
strategy in conjunction with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. Second, the
Ministry of Defense would work with NATO to establish a cyber center of excellence in Tallinn.
The debate over invoking Article 5 had brought cyber threats front and center for Estonia’s
allies; Minister Aaviksoo saw a window of opportunity for the previously proposed center to
materialize. Finally, the Ministry would begin discussions over how to supplement the military’s
cyber capacity through new reserve initiatives.42
Civilian Priority, Limited Military Resources
Within a year, both a national cyber-security strategy and the cyber center of excellence
were established. Both developments were direct consequences of the inadequacies exposed
during the Bronze Soldier episode.43 The Ministry of Defense released the first National Cyber
Security Strategy in May of 2008. The strategy stressed a whole-of-nation approach:
organization, technical, and regulatory information security measures were to be implemented
across the ministries of Defense, Education and Research, Justice, Economic Affairs and
Communications, International Affairs, and Foreign Affairs.44 Although stating that cybersecurity research and development were necessarily intertwined with national defense, military
affairs were not directly acknowledged in the strategy. The role of the EDF was only
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acknowledged as (1) a supporter of efforts by a new NATO cyber center of excellence and (2) as
a partner in a new Master’s course on cyber-security with Tallinn Technical University.45
Despite the lack of public attention, civilian and military leadership within the Ministry
of Defense began to expand the Staff and Signals Battalion’s responsibilities to explicitly include
cyber operations. The Battalion was the only viable option for developing a military capability.
The Ministry of Defense had to build on the small pool of existing expertise: the Staff and
Signals Battalion had the only functionally-related competence within the military.46 EDF
leadership at the joint staff level and the service level were in consensus over delegating the
emerging cyber role to the Staff and Signals Battalion. Given the limited human and financial
capital at the EDF’s disposal, creating a new and separate military arm for cyberspace was
simply not feasible.47
Some within the Defense Forces (and a few civilian politicians), however, favored a
much stronger posture and pushed for the development of independent cyber capabilities. The
Staff and Signals Battalion had taken a backseat during the 2007 network attacks, and several
military commanders felt compelled to show that the military had a plan and could deliver
solutions to cyber threats. Moreover, these commanders argued that developing cyber
capabilities would aid Estonia’s integration into NATO—the country could cement its place in
the alliance by providing cyber expertise to its partners.48
On two accounts, however, these ambitions were quashed. On one hand, the Joint Staff
and Chief of Defense (CHOD) General Ants Laaneots, the commander of the EDF, did not
support building independent cyber capabilities. Despite the government-wide impact of the
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2007 DDOS attacks, top military officials remained committed to building the EDF’s capacity
for territorial defense. The military lacked the resource base to carve out distinct cyber
capabilities; the leadership’s interests centered on basic capabilities for countering potential
Russian aggression. Dedicating resources to cyber capabilities, staffing, and training, would also
hamper the EDF’s ability to integrate into NATO structures.49 On the other hand, advocates
encountered resistance from the civilian leadership in the Ministry of Defense. As Minister of
Defense has reflected:
I was also skeptical about this development simply because, if you employ 4,000
people [in the military] and have a conscription system…you are so involved in
building that very basic capability that it's not wise to take the best military brains
and put them in a niche area that is not giving you back what you what you
expect.50
The mix of strategic imperatives and resource constraints effectively shut down discussions over
and independent entity for cyber capabilities in the military.
The launch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)
on May 14, 2008 further constrained the EDF’s ability to implement any new internal cyber
initiatives. The CCDCOE was the realization of Estonia’s 2004 proposal to NATO; it was set up
to organize academics and military practitioners for complex technical cyber-defense exercises
and to function as NATO’s own cyber think-tank.51 Civilian and military specialists from across
Estonia were needed to staff the CCDCOE. As a result, military personnel from the Staff and
Signals Battalion were needed for the Estonian contingent of the CCDCOE. In this way, the
CCDCOE absorbed part of the military’s human capital, stretching an already-thin resource base
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for cyber to its limits.52 This intensified the EDF’s reliance on public universities to develop a
pipeline of cyber-defense talent; more than ever, the EDF lacked the resources to build greater
cyber expertise in-house.53
By June 19, 2008, any possible window that may have existed for an independent cyber
force had closed as the Riigikogu (the Estonian Parliament) passed the Defense Forces
Organization Act. The Act, which helped finalize the country’s post-independence militaryrelated legal construction,54 officially delegated cyber-related duties to the Staff and Signals
Battalion and formalized its relationship to the NATO CCDCOE. The Act went into force on
January 1, 2009.55 More tellingly, in the 2009-2012 period after the Act was passed, no cyber
force initiative ever came close to appearing on the agenda of the Riigikogu’s National Defense
Committee, the legislative committee responsible for handling all military-related issues.56
Conceptualizing and Implementing a Unified Cyber Branch
From late 2009 through 2013, the Ministry of Defense continued to prioritize civilian dimensions
of cyber-security over the development of the military’s cyber capabilities. Cyber-security would
not even officially be recognized as a military issue until the release of the second National
Cyber Security Strategy in 2013. As a result, no serious proposals emerged to create an entity
outside of the Staff and Signals Battalion to handle cyber operations. The Ministry did, however,
work during this period to increase the military’s latent capacity—albeit, indirectly—by
establishing a pool of reserve talent to supplement both civilian and military efforts in
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cyberspace. The turning point came in 2014: structural changes within the Ministry of Defense
provided the opportunity to reassess both civilian and military approaches to the cyber domain.
Against this backdrop, the initial visions for Cyber Command emerged and were eventually
realized in 2018.
Human Capital Constraints, 2010-2013
Strategic documents released in early 2010 gave no attention to the Estonian Defense
Forces’ approach cyberspace. The Estonian Long Term Defence Development Plan 2009-2018,
released by the Ministry of Defense in late January of 2010, only acknowledged the CCDCOE as
the key mechanism for increasing Estonia’s commitment to NATO (and, conversely, the
alliances commitment to Estonian defense). More specifically, the document stated that it was
“vital to fully develop NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE)
into an organisation that will bring together competence on cyber security and that will help
NATO and Allies to develop military capabilities in this field.”57 Later, in May, the Riigikogu
released the Nation Security Concept of Estonia. While coordinated cyber-attacks were
referenced as a potentially significant national security threat, the discussion in the document
was limited to cyber-crime and online extremism58 with no explicit mention of a military
dimension.
Despite the lack of recognition in high-level documents, the Ministry of Defense focused
on addressing the military’s human capital problem in a way that supported the government’s
priority on civilian initiatives. Specifically, the Ministry emphasized the development of the
reservist Cyber Defense Unit (eventually renamed the Cyber Defense League). The idea for a
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cyber component of the Estonian Defense League (EDL)—the country’s military reserve
system—had arisen in September of 2007 as a result of the fallout from the Bronze Soldier
Incident.59 By 2008, an informal cooperation network emerged within the Estonian Defense
League, and the Ministry of Defense formed a working group to formalize this network. The first
de facto cyber units of the EDL were established in April 2009, and these units were legally
codified by the Riigikogu in late January 2011.60 The 2011 defense strategy’s discussion of the
role of the Estonian Defense League underscored the importance of the Cyber Defense Unit to
military cyber-defense. The EDL was explicitly tasked with developing cyber-defense
capabilities to help the Ministry coordinate broader national cyber-security efforts.61
The Estonian Defense League’s increased cyber capacity provided a crucial pool of
civilian talent from which the military could draw, particularly as the Ministry of Defense
stepped out of the role as leading coordinator for cyber issues.62 In early 2011, the responsibility
for cyber-security policy coordination was transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication.63 This shift was meant to emphasize
domestic cyber issues over national security and thereby increase government-wide awareness.
Initially, the Ministry of Defense was the only ministry that possessed the resources to
coordinate cyber issues across the government; other ministries had limited and fragmented
approaches to cyber threats. Long-term, this move was intended to reduce the strain on the
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Ministry of Defense’s resources and allow it to focus more on national security and military
defense issues.64 In the short-term, however, it meant that military approaches to cyberspace
would continue to pay deference to civilian priorities. As such, establishing the Cyber Defense
League was the only viable way to build military capacity for the cyber mission by linking it
with the broader civilian emphasis.65
While the Staff and Signals Battalion had officially been tasked with the cyber mission in
January of 2009, references to military cyber-defense only occurred at the strategic policy levels
after 2013. Although the parliamentary elections of March 2011 brought in new leadership to the
Ministry of Defense with Mart Laar, the Ministry was largely marked by continuity. After
suffering a stroke in February of 2012, Laar resigned; before Urmas Reinsalu was eventually
tapped to replace him, Laar’s duties were carried out by Jaak Aaviksoo, who had been appointed
Minster of Education and Research after the 2011 elections.66 Within the Ministry of Defense,
discussions centered on framing the EDF’s approach to cyber operations—whether the Ministry
would state the EDF’s intention to develop a strategy of active defense and offensive cyber
capabilities or state EDF intentions in a broader manner. An internal paper even emerged during
this period advocating for the Estonian proposal of a NATO-level cyber command; this would
have required an expansion of the effort currently under the Staff and Signals Battalion.67
Although there were people across the Ministry and military willing to discuss more
robust strategic and institutional approaches for the EDF—particularly those involved with
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creating the Cyber Defense League—they were not linked in any formal, structural way. As a
result, many of these internal discussions went nowhere.68 Eventually, the Ministry decided that
issues related to active defense and offensive capabilities were still too sensitive to state in public
documents, particularly given the implications such a statement might have across NATO.69 The
2013 defense development plan did not comment on the EDF’s role in cyberspace. Instead, it
linked the creation of the Estonian Defense League’s cyber units to Estonia’s contribution to the
growth of the CCDCOE.70
Structural Changes, Strategic Development, and the Idea of Cyber Command, 2014-2015
Shortly after the release of the 2013 defense development plan, the Ministry of Defense
took an important step to consolidate civilian and military cyber expertise. On January 31, 2014,
Minister of Defense Urmas Reinsalu approved the creation of the Cyber Policy Department
within the Ministry. The new department was tasked with coordinating the Ministry’s cyberrelated initiatives, developing policy proposals, and acting as a point of contact for the rest of the
government.71 Within a month, the Cyber Policy Department was active and the Ministry began
looking for an official to head the department.72 By June, the Ministry had selected Mihkel Tikk
to lead the Cyber Policy Department. Tikk, who took over the Department in July and had been
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one of the founders of the Cyber Defense League within the Estonian Defense League,73 would
be indispensable in the eventual creation of Cyber Command.74
The reorganization of previous Ministry efforts into the Cyber Policy Department
resulted in two important realizations. The first was that, despite having the common goal of
streamlining and enhancing the Ministry’s efforts in cyberspace, there were major differences in
civilian and military mindsets about how to reach that goal. Shortly after Tikk took the reins, the
Cyber Policy Department consolidated information and communication technology (ICT)
services—not cyber capabilities, but purely service-layer consolidation. Those from the EDF
asserted that the Ministry’s ICT services should be streamlined to support warfighting.
Conversely, civilians in the Ministry argued that ICT consolidation should prioritize peacetime
functions to better integrate and coordinate with other ministries. Prior to the creation of the
Cyber Policy Department, these discussions were confined to their respective camps with little
crossover. Civilian MOD personnel rarely went out into the field, on missions, or even to
military exercises to understand how ICT could support warfighting. Similarly, EDF personnel
rarely went to the Ministry to partake in the broader strategic discussions on the role of ICT for
cross-governmental and international strategic relations. The Cyber Policy Department brought
these two blocs together to identify common goals and overlapping responsibilities.75
The second realization was that existing arrangements—both civilian and military—were
decentralized and wildly inefficient considering resource limitations. At the civilian level, almost
every suborganization and department within the Ministry of Defense had its own chief
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information officer, chief information security officer, or chief technology officer. Tikk and
MOD leadership recognized that centralizing these efforts would not only streamline defense
processes related to the cyber domain but would also save money.76 Within the EDF, although
the Staff and Signals Battalion was responsible for military network defense, each of the
services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—and Special Operations Command had their own
technical teams and subcommands to support their respective operations. Over time, this
institutional setup had become operationally inefficient and ineffective. As a result, the creation
of the Cyber Policy Department spurred an examination of how the Estonian Defense Forces
could better organize its efforts in the cyber domain.77
The Initial Vision for Cyber Command. Discussions within the Cyber Policy
Department over consolidating the cyber elements of the EDF grew in earnest as the department
collaborated in the development of the second National Cyber Strategy. The strategy—heavily
influenced by the CCDCOE78—was released in September of 2014 and was the first strategic
document to publicly acknowledge the EDF’s role in cyberspace. Although a limited
acknowledgement, it did specify the military’s intent to develop cyber capabilities for the
purposes of collective defense under NATO.79
This new public-facing outward stance reflected the Ministry of Defense’s internal
debates over developing a more robust EDF posture in cyberspace. The Ministry of Defense’s
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Permanent Secretary, Mikk Marran, had reached out to Tikk during this period about gaining
support from Riho Terras, the Chief of the Defense Forces (CHOD) since December 2011, for
restructuring the EDF.80 Terras needed no convincing, however. He favored the development of
cyber capabilities and was one of the drivers behind the proposal to establish a NATO-level
cyber range training facility in Estonia; he had even offered the alliance use of the Staff and
Signals Battalion’s cyber range in June of 2014.81 Instead, Tikk responded that the CHOD did
not have time to discuss the dynamics of a reorganization. Rather, the key to gaining support for
reorganization was to convince everyone around him—the Joint Staff and the service chiefs—
that a new command was necessary. That way, when Terras consulted the Joint Staff and the
services towards a final decision, everyone would be on the same page and would recommend
reorganization.82
A potential reorganization of the EDF’s cyber capabilities coalesced around three main
arguments. First, growing needs for high-level coordination for countering network attacks
demanded a more comprehensive institution within the military. Consolidating the EDF’s
existing efforts into a new system or organization would facilitate coordination both internally
within the Estonian ecosystem and externally with NATO allies. In this regard, the current
arrangement under the Staff and Signals Battalion proved inadequate.83 Second, and relatedly,
the Staff and Signals Battalion lacked the resources to be effective on a larger scale. In particular,
the Battalion lacked a sufficient workforce, and the residual talent in the military was dispersed
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across the combat services. A new organization that was higher in the chain of command could
consolidate existing talent and would be more likely to attract governmental resources to recruit
and train new cyber operators.84
Finally, reorganizing the military’s cyber efforts offered an opportunity to reduce the
bureaucratic hurdles related to command and control. The increasing operational speed in
cyberspace required a shorter chain of command than was currently in place. For a directive from
the Cyber Policy Department to reach military elements, it had to go through multiple levels of
bureaucracy: the Cyber Policy Department was under the Minister of Defense, the Command,
Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate (the J-6 Directorate, responsible for cyber
planning) was located under the Chief of Staff of the Military, and the Staff and Signals
Battalion was directly under the command of the Chief of Defense. Moving across lines of
command risked losing coordination at either the strategic, strategic supporting, or operational
levels. Centralizing these efforts would both increase operational speed and create the possibly
for some issues to reach higher political levels to respond more swiftly to attacks.85 The general
conclusion was that a new cyber-focused command should be created within the Estonian
Defense Forces. Instead of building capabilities and then creating an independent command,
many in the Cyber Policy Department believed that by defining a clear organizational endstate—a new military command—it would be easier to build support around an initiative.86
Designing a Cyber Command. Heading into 2015, the Cyber Policy Department began
working on an internal cyber policy plan for the Ministry of Defense. As part of this effort, the
Department created a roadmap for consolidating the EDF’s cyber efforts into a new cyber
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command. Much of this stage of planning was dedicated to gathering like-minded civilians and
military commanders. In particular, the Cyber Policy Department engaged with the head of the
Joint Staff’s J-6 Directorate, the commander of the Staff and Signals Battalion, and their
incoming replacements, all of whom supported the creation of a cyber-specific command of
some kind. The key was to create a command plan that everyone would understand and support,
and this became the team that would define that plan.87
The main challenge was to convince military leadership—primarily the Chief of Defense,
the Joint Staff, and to a lesser degree, the service commanders—that creating a new command
was not an overwhelming risk, i.e. that it would not detract from the military’s primary goal of
developing the Army’s capabilities for Baltic defense.88 Although CHOD Terras had continually
supported the growth of cyber initiatives in the EDF, much of the top military leadership still
maintained a mindset of “computers versus bullets.”89 Many feared that their resources—
budgetary, personnel, and technological—would be reassigned to cyber operations and military
support functions. As a result, the working group, operating out of the Cyber Policy Department,
identified areas where the EDF could invest in cyber capabilities moving forward without
compromising other military priorities. Moreover, the working group pitched the new command
as a cost-saving measure.90
In terms of organizing the command, the creation of a new unified branch emerged from
the working group as the only feasible force structure. The new cyber command would be
modeled in part after the Estonian Special Operations Force, an independent branch of the
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military that stood apart from the combat service ecosystem. The Special Operations Force
offered a useful heuristic: it had a non-traditional mission set that did not fit into how the
services defined their own missions and it operated directly under the Chief of Defense.91 A
joint-service construct had little appeal—the Staff and Signals Battalion was already providing
communications and signals support for the services, particularly for the Air Force and Navy.
These services had only a marginal stake in developing the cyber domain;92 for example, without
its own fighter jets, the Air Force was more concerned with renting fighter jets from NATO
allies for training personnel.93 As such, it made no sense to utilize a joint-force model: “We are
not as big as the U.S., where every service and every subcommand can have their own huge IT
department. It just didn’t make sense.”94
Moreover, the Army, by far the largest and most influential service, had no opposition to
the branch model as long as the new cyber commander’s power remained checked.95 A servicelevel construct was also not feasible: the EDF simply lacked enough people to form a fourth
service,96 and the Army had no real base of expertise or desire around which to build a subunified service command.97 As a result, the working group settled on the creation of a new
unified branch: it represented the best way to support the services equally while maintaining the
freedom to develop future capabilities and talent through the reserve system.98
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Finalizing the Plan for Cyber Command and Initial Operating Capability, 2016-2018
Surprisingly, resistance within the EDF to the command proposal turned out to be quite
low. Instead, most of the opposition came from the middle-management level within the
Ministry of Defense. A major element of the Cyber Command proposal was to relocate the
Ministry’s IT service provision under the new command. Civilian operators faced a culture
shock: they would be moved from a purely civilian-IT work environment to one where they
operated alongside and in conjunction with military elements. Middle management feared that
this consolidation would reduce the Ministry’s service levels.99
A key factor in getting these three constituencies—EDF leadership, civilian IT operators,
and Ministry middle management—on the same page was Mihkel Tikk’s professional
background. Tikk had been selected as head of the Cyber Policy Department because of his
extensive experience in the IT sectors of the government, as an officer in the Estonian Defense
League, and in the private sector. With this background, Tikk was able to recognize the
differences in each camp’s argument; they were all talking about the same issues and goals but
with different semantics that prevented finding common ground. Moreover, much of the
planning and organizational designing to date had been focused at the operational level. As a
result, EDF leadership, military cyber operators, and civilian IT providers focused on the
implications of a new command on their respective operational environments. Tikk’s approach,
then, was to frame the cyber command proposal in terms of common strategic ends. By defining
the new command’s purpose in broader strategic terms, Tikk explained how a cyber command
would support existing defense and military policy and other end goals as laid out by the MOD.
Crucially, Tikk had cultivated trust as a translator across these groups—because of his
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background and his personal connections, each group saw him as “one of their own.”100 As a
result of Tikk’s efforts, Chief of Defense Terras became convinced of the need to establish a new
branch, and that a cyber command could be his legacy in the EDF.101
International Dimensions. Several international dynamics helped build additional
support for a new cyber command. On the one hand, leadership at the CCDCOE—particularly
the director, Sven Sakkov, who had previously worked in the Ministry of Defense—had been
advocating for an Estonian cyber command. The development of a cyber command would keep
Estonia relevant as the primary engine of the CCDCOE, particularly as NATO was moving
closer to acknowledging cyberspace as an official military domain.102 On the other hand, the
alliance’s move towards recognizing cyberspace as an operational domain raised geopolitical
concerns that incentivized a new command. Interoperability with allied forces was certainly a
concern,103 and the Staff and Signals Battalion was not seen as a particularly strong point of
contact for international coordination.104 However, the main concern vis-à-vis NATO was
Estonia’s security dividend from the alliance. Specifically, the Ministry of Defense and the EDF
did not want NATO to provide military assistance for the “wrong problems,” i.e. sending allied
support to combat hybrid threats (including cyber operations) instead of providing hard
capabilities (air policing capabilities and troop rotations) to bolster territorial defense efforts.
Therefore, part of the appeal of a cyber command was as a signal to NATO: the new
command represented a robust response to threats from cyberspace, so the alliance should
continue to aid the EDF’s deficiencies in traditional military capabilities.105 In the lead-up to
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NATO’s recognition of cyberspace, the working group within the Cyber Policy Department
consulted extensively with NATO allies about developing a command. Consultations with allies,
particularly with the United States and the United Kingdom, over cyber issues had been
occurring since the 2007 network attacks.106 In the 2015-2016 period, the Cyber Policy
Department explicitly narrowed conversations with allies to assess the different organizational
models for cyber forces emerging across NATO members. Some of these consultations extended
to non-NATO nations.107
NATO formally recognized cyberspace as a military warfighting domain in June of
2016.108 Defense ministers across the alliance reaffirmed the applicability of collective defense
to the domain at the NATO Warsaw Summit that July. This was the culmination of efforts that
had begun in 2014 during the Wales Summit, when the alliance stated the applicability of
international law to cyberspace.109 Although not the primary driver behind Estonia’s plans to
create a new cyber command, NATO’s recognition of cyberspace acted as an accelerant to
finalize the proposal.110
An Open Window and Initial Operating Capability. NATO’s 2016 declaration coincided
with the opening of a policy planning window within the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry had
begun crafting its new defense development plan, with the previous 2008 plan set to expire in
2018.111 Throughout the formulation of the new development plan, it became clear that the cyber
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command proposal would materialize. CHOD Terras was a particularly strong proponent of
creating a cyber command at this point: his incoming replacement, Major General Martin Herem,
was a seen as a “tank guy.” Major General Herem looked to dedicate even more attention to the
development of the Army’s capabilities; as such, this represented the best opportunity for Terras
to move forward with creating a cyber command.112 Moreover, Hannes Hanso, Minister of
Defense from September 2015 to November 2016, had left the Ministry to become Chairman of
the National Defense Committee of the Riigikogu; this presented a prime opportunity to cement
legislative support around the new command.113 As a result, the development plan, released by
the Ministry of Defense in early 2017, announced that the EDF would officially establish a new
cyber command. The decision was framed as a direct consequence of NATO’s decision to
recognize cyberspace as a military domain at the 2016 Warsaw summit.114
Three other events gave greater weight to this decision. First, in February 2017, the
CCDCOE released the second, updated version of its Tallinn Manual, the most comprehensive
analysis on the application of existing international law to cyberspace.115 Second, Estonia rotated
into a six-month occupancy of the presidency of the Council of the European Union; a major
pillar of the country’s agenda was technological innovation.116 In September 2017, the Estonian
Ministry of Defense hosted an EU conference for defense ministers and featured the first high-
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level cyber tabletop exercise.117 Finally, in January of 2018, the CCDCOE was tapped by NATO
to lead the alliance’s cyber-defense training and education efforts.118 This provided the final push
for the creation of an Estonian cyber command across the rest of the government.119
On June 21, 2018, parliament passed a statute revising the organization of the military,
and in doing so formally established Cyber Command as a unified branch of the EDF. The units
under the new command included: the Staff and Signals Battalion; an information
communication technology center; the Strategic Communications Centers; the Headquarters and
Support Company; and the Cyber and Information Operations Center.120 The command remained
geographically dispersed with units located in both Tallinn and Tartu;121 defining new reporting
structures in the command became the initial priority. With Terras leaving the CHOD position in
December, Cyber Command (under command of Colonel Andres Hairk, former commander of
the Staff and Signals Battalion) pushed to achieve initial operating capability by August 2018
and established the goal of reaching 300 personnel (compared U.S. Cyber Command’s
approximately 6,200 personnel in late 2018122) and full operating capacity by 2023.123
Analysis and Conclusion
To what extent can organizational size, adoption-capacity, or organizational culture explain the
development of Estonia’s cyber force structure? The Estonian case offers support for my claim
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that organizational size is the primary factor shaping the implementation of cyber forces.
Answering three questions provides more detailed insight into the comparative explanatory
power of each theoretical framework.
(1) Why was Estonia’s initial cyber force structure limited to the Staff and Signals Battalion?
Evidence from the 2007-2009 period indicates that the Bronze Soldier network attacks
spurred discussions for institutional reform across the government, including within the Estonian
Defense Forces. The decision to limit initial cyber force structure to a subordinated branch—in
the form of the Staff and Signals Battalion—can be attributed to three potential causes. First, the
cultural explanation would suggest that force structure decisions were constrained by a military
culture of restraint in domestic affairs that developed in the years after independence from the
Soviet Union. Defense Minister Aaviksoo’s recollections lend credibility to this explanation:
there was an explicit decision not to involve the military in civilian efforts to combat the 2007
DDOS attacks, and a similar logic was advanced for delaying new military initiatives for
cyberspace: civilian efforts to protect domestic networks were prioritized over broad changes to
the military’s posture. This explanation, however, is undermined by the desire of many in the
Staff and Signals Battalion to implement a more robust military posture.
This episode provides support for both my theory of organizational size and adoptioncapacity theory. Consistent with my expectations for organizational size, risk aversion played a
major role in determining the initial subordinated branch cyber force structure. Minister
Aaviksoo explicitly acknowledged that, creating new military structures were seen as too risky.
Unlike investments in the CCDCOE and the Cyber Defense League, investing a new command
for the military had a low return. It was akin to putting all the military eggs in one basket: the
limited size and resource base of the military meant that the military did not possess the risk
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tolerance to create a new military command while simultaneously building territorial defense
capacity and integrating into NATO. Because the experience of 2007 had acted as a stimulus for
government-wide action, the lack of risk tolerance meant that the existing Staff and Signals
Battalion was the only option for creating a cyber force structure.
However, this evidence is also consistent with the expectations of adoption-capacity. The
2007 network attacks provided systemic-level motivation to address a novel security area and
possessed an existing—albeit limited—capacity to absorb cyber operations into the Staff and
Signals Battalion. Evidence from 2008 to 2010 suggests that capacity limited a more large-scale
institutional response by (1) the need for the Staff and Signals Battalion to simultaneously staff
the CCDCOE and (2) the inability of the Ministry of Defense to dedicate resources to both
civilian and military initiatives.
Verdict: Support for both organizational size and adoption-capacity. Little support for
the cultural explanation.
(2) Why was a unified branch force structure chosen for Cyber Command?
The Estonian military is dominated by the Army: it is the largest branch, represents the
largest faction of the Joint Staff, and the Chief of Defense has traditionally come from the Army.
As such, it has traditionally exhibited lower levels of jointness compared to other militaries in
NATO.124 Therefore, cultural logics would suggest that as initiatives for the cyber domain gain
support, the cyber mission would naturally be incorporated into Army structures as a form of
territorial defense. Yet, Army leadership and those in the Joint Staff expressed no interest in
taking over the cyber mission. A lack of substantial jointness could have enabled the creation an
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independent service, this option was ultimately discarded. This indicates a lack of support for
cultural explanations.
Consistent with the expectations of my theory, the size of the Estonian Defense Forces
prevented a deviation from the branch model. The limited personnel pool for the military as a
whole —evidenced by Estonia’s continued reliance on conscription—forced each service to
focus on their primary missions in the land, sea, and air domains. As a result, there was no
interservice competition over the cyber mission: the services had no interest in expanding their
mission sets when they were still struggling to fulfill their primary purposes. Internal power
games were over resources that were not related to the cyber domain.125 Because the services had
no real footprint in the cyber domain, they had no preference over organizational design. In fact,
the services actually supported the development of offensive cyber capabilities under a branch
model.126 Organizational size also impacted the decision against pursuing a new cyber service:
the EDF lacked enough cyber-specific personnel to build a new service. As such, reorganizing
talent from across the EDF within the existing branch construct remained the only viable option.
This evidence also supports the main claim from adoption-capacity theory. The EDF lacked the
capacity—particularly in terms of human capital—to undertake a joint or service construct.
Verdict: Strong support for both organizational size and adoption-capacity; no support
for the cultural explanation.
(3) Why wasn’t Cyber Command established in prior to 2018?
Interviews consistently point to the 2007 network attacks as the “proof of concept”
behind the push to establish Cyber Command.127 Why, then, did this proof of concept not
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translate into the creation of Cyber Command prior to 2018? There is no evidence that military
culture played a role. Adoption-capacity logic suggests that two external demonstration events
identified by interviewees should have spurred the creation of Cyber Command in the years
before 2018. The first was the creation of U.S. Cyber Command in 2010; the second was the
2012 revelations surrounding Operation Olympic Games that targeted an Iranian nuclear facility.
Although civilian and military officials in the Ministry of Defense discussed the impacts
of both events, neither event incentivized decisionmakers to create Cyber Command within the
EDF. While the operation against Iran spurred the CCDCOE to think more seriously about legal
implications of cyber incidents, leadership within the Estonian MOD continued to emphasize
NATO’s defense planning for the Baltics.128 Instead, the creation of Cyber Command hinged on
three things: the establishment of the Cyber Policy Department, gaining support from MOD
leadership, and getting buy-in from the leadership in the EDF. Although the creation of the
Cyber Policy Department reduced bureaucratic complexity and increased organizational capital
in the Ministry of Defense, it did not directly change the organizational capacity of the military.
Therefore, evidence only weakly supports adoption-capacity.
Moreover, the security environment was dominated by Russia: Estonia had been one of
the states in the eastern flank of NATO trying to push Russian aggression onto the alliance’s
agenda since the early 2000s (success would only occur after the 2014 Russian invasion into
Crimea).129 A concern with provoking Russia, coupled with the limited number of cyber
operators in the Staff and Signals Battalion, provided few opportunities for linking operational
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effects of cyber capabilities to broader military interests. As a result, military-wide knowledge of
operational effects was derived from the 2007 network attacks. With over ten years between the
2007 attack and the 2018 creation of Cyber Command, interpersonal connections and trust
were the main factors linking the operational and strategic payoffs of Cyber Command to
existing military interests. In this way, organizational size facilitated the link between the future
effects of Cyber Command and the interests of MOD and EDF leadership. Mihkel Tikk was
instrumental in this regard—his personal connections across the EDF, Ministry of Defense
leadership, and civilian IT operators were crucial in building a broad coalition of support for
Cyber Command. In such a small organization, building trust among personal ties for the
creation of a new military command proved indispensable.130 This provides support for the
theory of organizational size.
Verdict: Support for organizational size, weak support for adoption-capacity, and no
support for military culture.
Table 6.1 summarizes the evidential support for each explanation.
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Table 6.1: Summary of Evidential Support for Alternative Explanations (Estonia)
Explanation
Episode

Delegation to Staff and Signals
Battalion

Decision to Utilize Branch
Model

Creation of Cyber Command in
2018

Organizational
Size

Culture

AdoptionCapacity

Supports

Weakly Supports

Supports

Strongly Supports

No Support

Strongly Supports

Supports

No Support

Weakly Supports
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion

Overview
This dissertation provides a conceptual and theoretical framework for understanding and
explaining the variation in cyber force implementation dynamics across militaries. In doing so,
this project provides two much needed contributions to the international security literature on
cyber conflict. First, this project advances a novel typology for categorizing cyber force structure
and identifies nine distinct arrangements: Subordinated Branch, Subordinated Service,
Subordinated Joint, Sub-Unified Branch, Sub-Unified Service, Sub-Unified Joint, Unified
Branch, Unified Service, and Unified Joint. Second, I create the first comprehensive database on
cyber forces worldwide that catalogues changes in cyber forces structures over time.
This dissertation has argued that the implementation of cyber forces—as well as choices
and changes in cyber force structure—is shaped by organizational size. The size of a military
helps mitigate the implementation tension between building an operationally effective cyber
force and integrating it into the broader defense bureaucracy. Implementers in large militaries are
more likely to initially prioritize bureaucratic integration, while those in smaller militaries are
more likely to prioritize operational concerns. Despite a greater risk tolerance and the availability
(relative to smaller organizations) of human and financial capital to build an operationally
effective cyber force, larger militaries entail a greater number of competing interests that can lay
claim to the cyber mission. As such, implementers in larger militaries are more predisposed to
ensure the bureaucratic integration and organizational survival of cyber forces before prioritizing
mission-building. Conversely, implementers in smaller militaries are more likely to focus
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directly on mission-building. Implementers face a smaller pool of bureaucratic competitors;
however, smaller militaries possess a smaller resource base and lack the risk tolerance of larger
militaries. Accordingly, implementers are more likely to vigorously make a case for operational
effectiveness to justify the additional strain on financial and human capital caused by building a
more bureaucratic cyber force. In this way, organizational size shapes implementation priorities
and influences implementation pathways and the changes in cyber force structure.
Summarizing and Evaluating the Findings
Chapter 2 established the variation in cyber force structures both across militaries and within
militaries over time to show that principle diffusion has occurred. The quantitative analysis in
Chapter 4 and the case studies of the United States (Chapter 5) and Estonia (Chapter 6) provide
empirical support for my theoretical claims. Table 7.1 recaps each of my five hypotheses and
summarizes the support from both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Hypothesis 1 stated that the relationship between military size and the risk of completing
the implementation is curvilinear. The quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 provided support for
this hypothesis: smaller militaries are at a greater risk of fully implementing cyber forces over
time than larger organizations. In effect, smaller organizations have a reduced median process
duration time compared to larger military organizations. This finding is bolstered by the case
studies: once started, the implementation process for the U.S. spanned 19 years (1998-2017) and
entailed moving between four stages (Introduction, Modification, Expansion, and Full
Implementation); conversely, Estonia’s implementation length was only nine years (2009-2018)
and only involved two stages (Introduction and Full Implementation).
Hypothesis 2 postulated that, due to a greater tolerance for risk, large militaries were
more likely to transition into Introduction than smaller militaries. This hypothesized relationship
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between size and the probability of transitioning into Introduction over time found support in the
quantitative analysis. Evidence from the case studies provide additional support for this
hypothesis by linking size to the introduction of a cyber force through risk tolerance. In the case
of the United States, internal experimentation via wargaming (in the form of the 1997
ELIGIBLE RECEIVER exercise) identified the need for a cyber-specific force to address
computer network operations. As a large organization, the U.S. military was able to use internal
wargaming to identify an area of risk that had not yet emerged as strategically salient and
subsequently establish Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense as a response. Conversely,
Estonia’s military relied on external stimuli (the 2007 network attacks) to justify the delegation
of cyber responsibilities to the Staff and Signals Battalion. Estonia provided no evidence of
internal experimentation efforts related to the cyber domain: the military simply lacked resources
and maintained its focus on building traditional military capabilities. The inability to absorb a
cyber force also delayed the creation of a formal role for the Staff and Signals Battalion as
civilian initiatives were prioritized.
Both quantitative and qualitative analysis support Hypothesis 3—that large militaries are
more likely to transition into Modification than smaller militaries. With regards to the case
studies, size shaped the dynamics of Modification of the U.S. cyber force structure while it
deterred Modification in the Estonian case. As a large military, the United States exhibited
redundancy across the services: each military service had developed their own footprint in the
cyber domain. As such, each service had an interest in retaining its share of the cyber mission.
This simultaneously incentivized the transition from a branch model to a joint model (with the
relocation of JTF-CND from DISA to USSPACECOM) and counterbalanced the attempted
standup of AFCYBER(P) as the Air Force sought to secure a greater share of the cyber mission.

234
Table 7.1. Summary of Support for Hypotheses Derived from Theory of Organizational Size
Hypotheses

Quantitative
Analysis

Qualitative
Analysis

H1: The relationship between military size
and the risk of completing the implementation
process is curvilinear.

Supports

Supports

H2: Larger militaries are more likely to
transition into Introduction than smaller
militaries.

Supports

Supports

H3: Cyber forces in larger militaries are
more likely to transition into Modification
than those in smaller militaries.

Supports

Supports

H4: Cyber forces in larger militaries are
more likely to transition into Expansion than
those in smaller militaries.

Supports

Supports

H5: Cyber forces in larger militaries are
more likely to transition into Full
Implementation than those in smaller
militaries.

Does Not Support

Supports (Qualified)

Conversely, Estonia’s military exhibited practically no redundancy: size restricted the services’
ability to expand operations outside their core missions. As a result, the services had no
substantial stake or interest in the cyber mission. With fewer interests vying for the cyber
mission, there was no need to alter the existing branch model under the Staff and Signals
Battalion.
Hypothesis 4 also receives support from both quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Simulations from Chapter 4 show that after roughly 15 years of occupying the Introduction
stage, large militaries are much more likely to transition into Expansion than smaller militaries.
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The case studies also provide evidence that size influenced expansion. As a larger organization,
the U.S. was able to marshal the resources needed to expand the joint-force approach; an
important dimension was dual-hatting the commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the Director
of the National Security Agency. By formally merging authority, the military was able to access
the NSA’s human and technological capital to create USCYBERCOM. The Estonian Defense
Forces had no such existing resource pool to access, and efforts to develop human capital were
focused on building latent military capacity in the reserves. As such, transitioning to Expansion
made no sense for the EDF given resource constraints, and debates focused on potential unified
force structures.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that larger militaries are more likely to transition into Full
Implementation than smaller militaries. This hypothesis receives no support from quantitative
analysis. The multistate model in Chapter 4 shows that larger militaries are no more likely than
smaller militaries to transition from Introduction to Full Implementation, and smaller militaries
are actually more likely to transition from Pre-Adoption to Full Implementation than large
militaries over time. Qualitative analysis provides qualified support for this hypothesis. Both the
U.S. and Estonia reached Full Implementation by creating a unified cyber force structure, and the
justification for both transitions rested on “proof of concept” that linked the operational effects of
computer network operations to common strategic interests across the military. However, the
proof of concept for U.S. Cyber Command—Operation Glowing Symphony—came in the form
of an offensive operation. For Estonia, proof of concept came from defensive operations during
the 2007 network attacks, prior to the formation of any cyber force. Although proof of concept
drove Full Implementation in both militaries, size limited the circumstances under which proof
of concept could occur. As a more loosely coupled organization, effective proof of concept in the
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U.S. needed to be proximate and direct: the impacts of Operation Glowing Symphony bore
directly on the operations conducted in conjunction with other military commands. In the case of
Estonia, proof of concept was temporally distanced from the creation of EDF Cyber Command.
However, the tighter coupling of the Estonian Defense Forces meant that the temporally distant
proof of concept could be linked to existing strategic interests through trust and personal
connections. As such, the cases studies provide qualified support for Hypothesis 5.
From the quantitative and qualitative analyses carried out in this dissertation, two distinct
implementation pathways emerge. For the U.S., a large military, implementing cyber forces
required prioritizing bureaucratic fit over developing the cyber mission: organizational
redundancy meant that multiple competing interests had to be satisfied before dedicating greater
resources to the cyber mission. Moreover, changes to cyber force structure occurred
incrementally, and reaching a unified joint command rested on providing direct proof of concept
to other military commands. In the case of Estonia, a small military, implementers were able to
prioritize building organizational capacity to carry out the cyber mission. With no competition
over the cyber mission, implementers could focus more on creating an effective organization that
justified the strain on existing resources. Consolidation emerged as a solution to resource
constraints, and the creation of the EDF Cyber Command relied on trust and personal
relationships to link proof of concept to existing strategic interests. As such, several conceptual
steps of the implementation process were bypassed.
Alternative Explanations
In each case study, assessments of both the adoption-capacity and organizational culture
explanations highlight the importance of theorizing organizational size. The ultimately
incomplete account provided by each alternative explanation shows that while organizational
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size is not the only (or even the most important) variable, the implementation of cyber forces
cannot be explained without considering the effects of organizational size.
Adoption-capacity provides a consistent and compelling explanation for the case of
Estonia. The evidence surrounding the delegation of cyber responsibilities to the Staff and
Signals Battalion, the selection of a unified branch force structure, and the timing of Cyber
Command’s establishment provides support for adoption capacity. However, on its own, the
adoption-capacity explanation struggles to account for several events covered in the case study
of the United States. Adoption-capacity does provide some insight into the introduction and
modification of Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense, but it receives no support from
the evidence in the rest of the case. Adoption-capacity cannot adequately explain the failure of
Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional), the initial selection of a sub-unified joint force
structure for U.S. Cyber Command, the non-elevation of USCYBERCOM between 2012 and
2013, or the subsequent elevation in 2018. As such, the combined insights from both the U.S.
and Estonian cases show the complementary and contingent nature of adoption-capacity and the
theory of organizational size. Both cases suggest that size is an important enabling and
constraining factor and that adoption-capacity dynamics may take on greater causal priority in
smaller organizations than in larger organizations. Even so, organizational culture still exhibits
independent effects on the implementation process.
Evaluating military organizational culture as an explanation across each case also
evidences the need to consider organizational size. Cultural logics receive strong support in the
U.S. case from the evidence relating to the introduction and modification of JTF-CND and the
initial force structure selection for USCYBERCOM. However, an account based solely on
organization culture only weakly explains the failure of AFCYBER(P) and struggles to explain
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much of the rest of the U.S. case. In the case of Estonia, the cultural explanation receives weak
support from evidence surrounding the delegation of the cyber mission to the Staff and Signals
Battalion. The evidence does not support a cultural explanation of the selection of organizational
model and the timing of Cyber Command’s creation. As with adoption-capacity, explanations
resting on organizational culture show that size is an important variable that has the potential to
shape when and how organizational cultural factors matter.
Implications for the Study of the Diffusion of Military Innovations
In addition to the contributions to the literature on cyber conflict, this argument and its
supporting evidence make three contributions to studies of the diffusion of military innovations.
First, it shows how organizational characteristics mitigate diffusion pressures by constraining or
enabling innovation and implementation. In this study, military size played an important role in
shaping not only the initial decisions to adopt a cyber force but also the intermediate decisions
over modification and expansion and the decision to implement a unified command. As a result,
size influenced the range of choices faced by implementers. The analysis in this dissertation
suggests that the structural characteristics of military organizations—such as size—can influence
the types of changes and innovation likely to occur.
Second, this dissertation advances a stage-based framework for theorizing the adoption of
an international innovation by incorporating implementation dynamics. The framework
characterizes adoption and implementation as a dynamic process comprised of five stages: preadoption, introduction, modification, expansion, and full implementation. As such, this
framework can account for the ways in which innovations change throughout diffusion
processes. When innovations diffuse as concrete models, variations occur as militaries introduce
the innovation into their particular ecosystems: select components or instruments of the
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innovation can be introduced or the innovation can be reinvented altogether. Conversely, when
innovations diffuse as broader principles—as is the case with cyber forces—implementers enjoy
a greater range of agency. This framework is able to capture the ways in which innovations can
and do change in distinct ways after adoption during implementation. Stage-based theorizing can
also provide unique insight into the emergence of competing innovation models over time in the
international system. The same factor that influences adoption may exert a different effect on
implementation decisions. As leading states change an innovation model during implementation,
another model can emerge for laggards to adopt.
Third, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of matching the appropriate methods
to stage-based theorizing. Specifically, I introduce multistate survival modeling to assess the
stage-specific effects of organizational size. Multistate models provide a flexible option for
statistically modeling the likelihood of transitioning between stages over time. It also allows for
covariate effects to vary according to transition; this is particularly important for testing
hypotheses related to both adoption and implementation.
Extensions of the Study
There are two major extensions to this dissertation that merit discussion. The first is the inclusion
of additional case studies to assess the implementation of cyber forces in other militaries. The
second extension of this study entails examining the adoption and implementation of other
innovations. This section provides a brief discussion of both extensions.
Extending Qualitative Analysis: A Preliminary Assessment of Germany’s Cyber Force Structure
The German military—the Bundeswehr—provides an exemplar of a non-extreme case of
a medium-sized military. The Bundeswehr has averaged roughly 182,000 active duty personnel
from 2011 to 2017: much larger than the Estonian Defense Forces (approximately 6,000) yet
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much smaller than the United States military (approximately 1.5 million) during this period.1 In
fact, the Bundeswehr represents the statistical mean of military size in terms of personnel in the
Dataset on Cyber Force Structures. As such, it presents an important extension of my theory of
organizational size to assess the operational-bureaucratic tradeoff during implementation.
Figure 7.1 shows the development of Germany’s cyber force structure according to
implementation stage, force structure, and the specific military institution. Germany created its
first cyber force in December of 2006 as a subordinated branch. The Department of Computer
Network Operations (CNO), established under the Strategic Reconnaissance Command of the
Joint Support Service, was tasked with conducting cyber operations for military intelligence
purposes. In April 2017, the Bundeswehr completed a major consolidation of its existing cyber
efforts with the creation of the Cyber and Information Domain Service (CIDS).2

Figure 7.1. The Development of Germany’s Cyber Force Structure: Implementation Stage, Force
Structure, and Institution.
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This brief overview of Germany examines the factors behind the creation of the Cyber and
Information Domain Service as a new unified service in the Bundeswehr.
The Impetus for Change and Proof of Concept. Preliminary evidence indicates that the
2013 Snowden leaks prompted an initial reconsideration of the Bundeswehr’s cyber capabilities.
For leadership of the Strategic Reconnaissance Command, the Snowden leaks revealed a major
gap between German and U.S. capabilities related to signals intelligence and cyberspace. For
leadership in the Ministry of Defense, the strategic importance of cyber capabilities was
solidified by the 2014 Russian invasion in Crimea.3 However, no serious consideration was
given to changing the Bundeswehr’s cyber force structure until 2015.
Two events would align civilian leadership in parliament (the Bundestag) and the
Ministry of Defense with military leadership in the Bundeswehr to pursue reorganization. The
first was the May 2015 compromise of Bundestag networks. Russian-based hackers had
infiltrated Bundestag networks and attempted to install software on the computers of staff and
members of parliament; this software would have provided hackers with permanent access to
these computers for intelligence collection. Subsequent forensics would link the hacking group
to the Russian government.4 Similar to the case of Estonia, this spurred a reconsideration of
government-wide initiatives related to cyberspace. However, the Bundestag compromise did not
act as the proof of concept for military purposes. The Department of Computer Network
Operations would provide proof of concept in 2015. Similar to the U.S. case, the CNO
Department conducted an offensive operation, attacking Afghan mobile networks as part of the
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effort to release a German citizen kidnapped in Afghanistan.5 Following these events, on
September 17, 2015, Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen ordered the establishment of a new
cyber department within the Ministry and stated the intention to create a new organization within
the Bundeswehr for the cyber domain.6
Resources, Interests, and New Force Structure. The stand-up of both the new cyber
agency and a new military organization occurred concurrently: Minister von der Leyen delivered
the order to officially set up the Ministry’s new cyber agency on November 1, 2015, and a
separate committee for the military initiative held its first round table on November 2. More
formalized instructions were given to the committee on November 11; and on November 23,
2015, the steering committee officially began to work towards the creation of a new command by
surveying the existing strategic landscape, cataloguing existing units, personnel, and deficiencies
across the Bundeswehr, and developing justifications and responsibilities for a new
organization.7 The steering committee’s final stage of analysis lasted through the end of 2015
and into early 2016. This stage included defining the factors and criteria for measuring the
successful stand-up of a new command. Notably, the steering committee consulted extensively
with experts in Silicon Valley and military personnel from both the U.S. and Israel.8
Debates over force structures emphasized both the need to elevate cyber operations to a
higher level and the need to consolidate the Bundeswehr’s existing piecemeal approach to the
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cyber domain. Strategic Reconnaissance Command was headed by a two-star general; elevating
the issue and attracting more resources required a four-star general. At the same time, the CNO
Department was the main organization for conducting computer network operations, the German
Army, Navy, and Air Force each had their own cyber and information technology-focused units.
Like the U.S., the Bundeswehr exhibited a certain degree of redundancy: each service had a stake
in the cyber mission. However, the size of the Bundeswehr also limited competition over the
cyber mission. Unlike special forces in the Bundeswehr, only a marginal number of service
personnel staffed cyber/IT units; each service’s stake in the cyber mission was low. 9 Most
personnel resided in the Joint Support Service, and in total, the Bundeswehr had roughly 14,500
active personnel available for reorganization.10. As such, a joint-service arrangement was not
necessary to coordinate combat service initiatives. Instead, an independent service construct
emerged as the primary organizational model for cyber force structure. In this sense, the Joint
Support Service acted as an important precedent for consolidating talent that supported combat
operations.11
The committee released its final report on organizing a new service on April 25, 2016,
roughly one week after Minister von der Leyen approved strategic guidance for the Ministry’s
cyber agency.12 On the heels of the report, Minister von der Leyen publicly announced the plan
to create a new service in the Bundeswehr.13 Part of the motivation to announce the
Bundeswehr’s reorganization in late April related to NATO’s pending recognition of the cyber
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domain. On one hand, Chancellor Merkel and Minister von der Leyen wanted Germany to be a
leading state within NATO regarding cyber issues. On the other hand, German leadership wanted
to be seen as a military innovator within the EU; announcing the intent to create a cyber service
prior to NATO’s domain recognition would lend credibility to the Bundeswehr.14 After NATO’s
June 2016 recognition, Germany released its own formalized strategic views on cyberspace with
its July 2016 White Paper and the subsequent 2016 National Cyber Security Strategy. The White
Paper devoted significant attention to the cyber domain in the context of the military.15 By April
of 2017, the Cyber and Information Domain Service reached initial operating capability.16
Analysis in Brief. This brief discussion provides support for extending the theory of
organizational size to additional cases. The Bundeswehr has had more resources available at its
disposal than the Estonian Defense Forces and exhibited more redundancy in the cyber mission
across the services than the EDF. However, the Bundeswehr lacks a resource base comparable to
that of the United States: the Bundeswehr has been frequently cited as a military facing constant
political and resource constraints.17 As such, the theory of organizational size predicts a less
severe tradeoff between bureaucratic integration and building operational effectiveness.
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Although each service had a presence in the cyber domain, resources in the Bundeswehr appear
to be more tightly coupled across the military than in the U.S. military. The services thus
remained focused on their primary missions and retained relatively low interest in the cyber
mission. The service presence in the cyber domain also provided more personnel for
consolidation than the case of Estonia. As a result, service footprints in the cyber domain led to a
reconsideration of the organizational model, but a lack of considerable competition among the
services enabled a transition into a unified cyber force structure. Moreover, the recent experience
of creating the Joint Support Service served as a useful model for bureaucratic integration. These
dynamics, coupled with a pool of cyber personnel across the Bundeswehr, enabled implementers
to pursue and independent service structure.
Application to Other Military Innovations
The conceptual typology and framework advanced in this dissertation can also be
extended to assess the diffusion and implementation of military innovations other than cyber
forces. Two examples serve to illustrate the utility of the framework. The spread of air forces
provides a natural extension. Although most states have eventually developed an independent
service, many air forces initially emerged subordinated to another combat service.18 The French
case illustrates this dynamic. France introduced its first major air branch—the Aeronautics
Service (Service Aéronautique)—in 1909 as a unit under the French Army. In 1922, the
Aeronautics Service was expanded to a Major Command within the Army; by 1934, France had
elevated this command to an independent air force as a unified service.19
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The development of special operations forces across militaries provides another example.
In Norway, special operations forces were consolidated in 2014 into the Norwegian Special
Operations Forces Command (NORSOF), a standalone branch apart from other service
structures. Prior to 2014, both the Army and Navy had their own respective special forces
commands: the Armed Forces Special Command (FSK) under the Army, active since at least
1982; and the Navy Special Operations Command (MJK), active first as the Frogmen unit under
the Navy in 1953 and later as the major command post-1968.20 Norway’s special forces force
structure has thus progressed as follows: no force pre-1953; a subordinated service force
structure from 1953 to 1982; a subordinated joint service arrangement of ad hoc interservice
coordination from 1982 to 2014; and a unified branch from 2014 to the present. Similar force
structure developments have occurred in other countries such as Poland21 and Estonia.22 Figure
7.2 visually summarizes the extension of my framework to the French air force structure and
Norway’s special operations force structure.
It remains to be seen whether my theory of organizational size is also generalizable to
other innovative military restructurings. However, anecdotal evidence provides initial support for
the theory’s generalizability. For example, the formation of U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) in 1991 to control strategic nuclear forces was partially a product of clashes
between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy over service-level preferences. Starting in 1946,
U.S. air forces (initially the Army Air Force and then the subsequent U.S. Air Force) had
advocated for a single, unified command to control all nuclear forces. Navy leadership refused to
Tommy Olsen and Marius Thormodsen, “Forging Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (Monterey, California,
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allow their forces to be absorbed by another service, arguing that nuclear-equipped submarines
must coordinate with other naval forces and should therefore remain under the control of the
Navy. Despite compromises made in 1960 to create the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the
Air Force and Navy retained independent control over their respective nuclear forces.

Figure 7.2. Extensions of the Framework and Typology to Additional Military Innovations

Development of the French Air Force

Development of Norwegian Special Operations Forces
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A joint, unified command only became possible with the emergence of arms control
agreements and the end of the Cold War: service parochialism declined as the strategic nuclear
arsenal became less important.23 Even after its creation, USSTRATCOM struggled with
adequate staffing and the coordination and interoperability of service components due to
interservice tensions.24 The example of USSTRATCOM lends initial support to the theorized
dynamics of large militaries. Returning the example of Norwegian Special Forces provides
additional support for the theory’s application to other innovations. Existing accounts suggest
that, while mergers of the Armed Forces Special Command (FSK) and the Navy Special
Operations Command (MJK) had been discussed since the late 1990s, reorganizations failed due
to differing mission definitions. The main conflicts occurred between these respective
commands, not between the larger services. The separate operations of the two commands
represented an inefficient use of resources, particularly during deployments in Afghanistan. The
consolidation of these two commands under a new branch was seen as a way to increase both
readiness and combat power, thereby reducing the strain on military resources.25 These dynamics
mirror the developments of Estonia’s cyber force structure and offer anecdotal support for
extending the theory of organizational size to other military innovations.
Limitations of this Dissertation
Although this dissertation makes substantial contributions to both the cyber conflict literature
and the literature on military diffusion, the present study has several limitations. First, although
the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 spans both democratic and non-democratic regimes, the
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case studies focus only on democratic, NATO-member states. As a result, qualitative analysis
only explores causal mechanisms in the context of democratic states. Recent analysis on Russian
cyber force structure appears to support the generalizability of the theory of organizational size.
The size of the Russian military has enabled both the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and
the Federal Security Service (FSB) to develop relatively independent and redundant capabilities.
Moreover, competition between these two camps has prevented changes to cyber force structure.
This appears to provide support for this dissertation’s claim that large organizations must
prioritize bureaucratic integration—i.e. reconciling any new force structure initiatives with GRU
and FSB interests—before creating new or elevating existing cyber forces.26 At the same time,
the case of China presents a challenge for my theoretical claims. As one of the largest militaries
in the world, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) underwent sweeping reforms in 2016;
as part of these reforms, cyber and information-related efforts from across the military were
consolidated under the new Strategic Support Force. This unified service replaced the previous
cyber force structure under the General Staff Fourth Department (4/PLA), the military
intelligence department of the PLA. As such, the theoretical framework advanced in this
dissertation must be extended to assess implementation in non-democratic contexts.
Second, the case studies in this dissertation limit analysis to NATO member countries. As
such, my theory of organizational size may be of limited applicability to militaries in democratic
states outside of NATO. The development of Brazil’s cyber force structure does provide some
credibility to the framework outside of NATO: cyber force structure has been limited to
subordinated and sub-unified service structures under the Army. The initial cyber force was
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introduced in late 2008 in response to internal assessments instead of external imperatives,
lending support to claims of risk tolerance in large militaries. Moreover, the most recent
arrangement, Defense Cyber Command, integrates capabilities across the services but remains
under the Army chain of command.27 Any expansion would require a modification in
organizational model to a formal joint-service structure. However, the case of Israel raises
concern about how well the theory travels. Despite being a small military, the failure of a
proposed merger between Unit 8200 (the military intelligence unit traditionally responsible for
cyber operations) and the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
(C4I) Directorate of the Israeli Defense Forces exhibited implementation dynamics predicted for
larger militaries. The merger failed because both stakeholders had entrenched interests and were
unwilling to compromise over the new force structure. As such, preliminary case details suggest
that successful initiatives for cyber force structure must account for bureaucratic integration prior
to developing greater operational capacity.28 This too merits an exploration of the framework’s
generalizability.
Two final caveats are in order. This project does not explicitly address why militaries
pursue cyber forces. An assessment of motivation lies outside the scope of this study. Instead,
this dissertation assumes that, when given the opportunity, states will attempt to implement cyber
forces. This may account for the potential complementary nature between my theory and
adoption-capacity: adoption-capacity can provide a foundation for pursuit based on competition,
while my theory of organizational size explicates and refines implementation hurdles. Finally,
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the Dataset on Cyber Force Structures used for quantitative analysis in this dissertation only
covers a 19-year time frame. As more data become available in the coming years, this dataset
should be expanded and used for continued assessment of variation in institutional structures.
While current trends indicate that institutional isomorphism and the emergence of a dominant
force structure model appear unlikely, more data must be collected to test these conjectures.
Directions for Future Research
This dissertation provides a conceptual and theoretical springboard for future investigations into
cyber forces and cyber force structures. Three directions appear fruitful for future research. First
and foremost, the theoretical explanation advanced in this dissertation must be evaluated with
evidence from other cases. Although my theoretical framework provides important insight into
two democratic NATO-member states, further research is needed to evaluate whether this theory
travels to (1) non-NATO states and (2) non-democratic states.
Second, future work should examine the effect of force structure on the behavior of cyber
forces. Existing studies on cyber conflict have not yet explored the structural dimensions of
behavior. As one recent review of the literature has highlighted: “[f]ew articles—if any—focus
on how organizational structure…causes certain outcomes in cyber conflict.”29 On one hand,
cyber force structure can shed light on how states approach the cyber domain and conceptualize
the co-deployment of computer network operations with kinetic force in battlefield settings.30 On
the other hand, the new military structures hold strong implications for conflict escalation
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between states.31 The study of cyber force structures is a crucial missing link in arguments about
cyber-arms racing32 and strategy and self-restraint among states in cyberspace.33
Finally, future research should look to theorize how cyber forces coordinate with their
civilian intelligence counterparts. Structural arrangements—such as force structure—are bound
to play an important role in determining operational and strategic responsibilities; the dual-hat
arrangement between U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency provides a clear
example of a relationship bound by force structure. Yet, while this dissertation serves to identify
the key stakeholders for cyber force implementation, it remains silent as to the types of
cooperation likely to emerge between the military and civilian intelligence agencies. Subsequent
work must therefore investigate this issue.
Broader Academic Implications
This dissertation holds three broader implications for international security scholars. First, this
project provides a much-overlooked institutional dimension for scholars focused on military
revolutions—specifically, the Information Technology Revolution in Military Affairs (IT-RMA).
While cyber forces in and of themselves do not constitute a military revolution, the spread of
cyber forces certainly reflects the integration of information technologies into military operations
and structures with which IT-RMA scholars are concerned.34 Most analyses and commentary on
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military revolutions have tended to focus on the technological dimensions at the expense of
organizational dynamics and personnel issues.35 The typology and framework advanced in this
dissertation provide one approach for deriving indicators to assess the evolution of IT-RMA
elements as states implement innovations into their own military organizations.
Second, this dissertation carries implications for studying how states respond to emerging
technological threats and opportunities. Examining how states to create military institutions for
cyber-security is vital for understanding how states react to rapidly evolving technologies and
ultimately transform the international environment. On one hand, this dissertation pushes back
against claims of institutional isomorphism:36 although militaries may emulate the practices of
others, emulation does not require the creation of identical institutional arrangements. In the case
of cyber forces, evidence from both quantitative and qualitative analysis in this dissertation
shows that militaries can utilize the same innovation principle but implement qualitatively
different force structures. On the other hand, the lack of institutional homogeneity sheds light on
the ways in which states and their militaries shape technology through institutionalization and, in
doing so, reshape the nature of interactions between states over time.37
Finally, by studying how military organizations change, this study can contribute to
ongoing discussions about the nature of institutional reproduction and change over time.
Evidence from both case studies show an interplay between functionalist and power-distribution
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mechanisms of institutional reproduction and change.38 The dissertation has argued that the
creation and persistence of cyber forces are driven by the tension between emerging functional
needs for militaries (the operational imperative) and the distribution of power and preferences
among military stakeholders (the bureaucratic imperative). Therefore, decisions over initial cyber
force structures made at critical junctures—those short periods of time where actors choices can
affect and subsequently restrict the range of future decisions through path dependence39—are not
completely self-reinforcing and may “lock in” the range of potential force structures in the future
in only a limited way.40 Instead, military size provides the broader context against which military
sub-organizations, such as cyber forces, are reproduced through the interactions of changing
strategic environments and prevailing internal interests.
At the same time, the analysis advanced in this dissertation suggests that, because of the
interplay between functional needs and power-distributional concerns in militaries, neither
functionalist nor power distributional explanations provide a compelling logic of institutional
change. The evidence from the cases studies thus appear to support accounts of institutional
change that rest on “layering” and “conversion.” In short, this dissertation’s findings suggest that
innovation and implementation in large militaries are more likely to reflect a process of
institutional layering, while innovation and implementation in smaller militaries are likely to
resemble institutional conversion. Institutional layering involves the creation and negotiation of
new institutional arrangements on top of preexisting structures.41 This is seen clearly in the U.S.
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case: functional imperatives incentivized the development of cyber forces, but existing service
claims over the cyber mission acted as constraints. The subsequent deliberations over and
changes in force structure reflected layering: over time, the scale of command for U.S. Cyber
Command was renegotiated to a unified command, but this occurred within a joint-service
framework to preserve existing service-interest structure. Conversely, institutional conversion
entails the redirection of existing institutions to take on new roles or functions.42 This process
appears to have occurred in the case of Estonia. Unlike the U.S. the combat services of the
Estonian Defense Forces had no real interest in retaining the cyber mission; however, a limited
resource base restricted implementation prospects. Thus, the EDF repurposed existing efforts via
consolidation instead of layering: cyber units and personnel were removed from the services and
merged with the Staff and Signals Battalion to create a new cyber force structure.
Policy Implications
Several policy implications flow from this dissertation’s analysis of cyber force implementation.
First, the typology of cyber force structures advanced in this dissertation is an important step
towards identifying jurisdictional and operational overlaps and fault lines among cyber force
stakeholders.43 When left unaddressed, bureaucratic overlaps—between military elements, but
also between the military and civilian intelligence agencies—can lead to two problems. On one
hand, the elevation of cyber forces can alter distributional relationships; this can spur
competition over defense budgets both within the military and in relation to civilian intelligence.
Competition between cyber forces and intelligence agencies carries several implications for
strategic efforts in the cyber domain. In-fighting risks conflict escalation through subpar strategic
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assessment and coordination result from: inefficient resource usages; duplicated efforts; the lack
of a common definition of security; and the withholding of information to control over decision
processes.44 On the other hand, the strategic elevation of cyber forces brings to the forefront
tensions between network exploitation and network attack. In the case of the U.S., the civilian
National Security Agency emphasizes exploitation for intelligence collection, while
USCYBERCOM is geared more towards achieving effects through network attack. The U.S.
dual-hat arrangement has been an attempt to alleviate this tension. Where commanders are not
given discretion to determine the tradeoff, military commanders may be more willing to accept
escalatory risks to show competency. In a domain of relatively ambiguous signaling dynamics,45
this spells trouble for conflict escalation.
A second set of policy consequences arises for NATO. The creation of cyber forces
among member states may be an attempt to close the ongoing gap in military transformation.46
Evidence from the Estonian case study—and the preliminary extension to Germany in this
chapter—suggests that the alliance can function to reduce the political costs of creating and
implementing cyber forces. In both instances, consultation with NATO allies provided additional
information regarding the relative payoff of organizational models and the strategic dimensions
of the cyber domain. The creation of cyber forces across the alliance will certainly help to
formalize and facilitate interoperability and intelligence-sharing (to a certain degree) in the cyber
domain. Consultation also provides the opportunity for leading alliance members, such as the
U.S., to help shape allied doctrine.47
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However, the worldwide development of cyber forces leads to a third, more discouraging
implication. While institutional isomorphism may not occur in relation to cyber forces, that does
not preclude the emulation of practices in the cyber domain.48 In this regard, U.S. Cyber
Command’s “defend forward” strategy and its operational construct of “persistent engagement”
have set a troublesome precedent. As a fairly overt statement of USCYBERCOM’s intent to
operate in the “grey zone” of cyberspace to protect “blue zones” (i.e., your own networks), the
strategy reveals a contradiction: there is no grey zone. As soon as you leave your own networks,
you are entering into someone else’s network.49 The issue then becomes: as other cyber forces
develop greater capabilities, who will be the next to “defend forward”? Should behavioral
practices follow the institutional patterns identified in this dissertation, both allies and
adversaries of the U.S. should be expected to develop their own versions of forward defense and
persistent engagement, thus creating greater threats to U.S. network security.
A final policy implication emerges from this study related to broader military innovation.
Although not the driving factor behind changes in cyber force structure, continuity in civilian
defense leadership appears to have been an enabling factor in both the U.S. and Estonian cases.
The creation of U.S. Cyber Command would likely have been delayed by at least six months to
one year had Secretary Gates not been asked to remain in his position as Defense Secretary as
the Obama administration replaced the Bush administration. Similarly, in the case of Estonia,
Minister Aaviksoo’s de facto retention of defense responsibilities as Education Minister in the
wake of Mart Laar’s stroke in 2012 created a continuity in leadership that sustained initial
debates over the EDF’s strategic role in cyberspace. This suggests that continuity in civilian
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defense leadership can facilitate the emergence of innovations—leadership appears more likely
to undertake new initiatives when they have some degree of job security.
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Appendix 1
Details on the Dataset on Cyber Force Structures (DCFS)

Description of the Dataset
The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures catalogues the evolution of cyber forces and force
structures for all United Nations (UN) members with an active military force from 2000 to 2018.
For those states with a cyber force, the DCFS captures both the organizational model utilized and
the scale of command. Three states enter the dataset after 2000: Timor Leste in September 2002
after its independence and subsequent membership to the UN; Montenegro in June 2006 after
independence and formal UN membership; and South Sudan in July 2011 after independence
and admission to the UN.
An active military force is a necessary precondition for inclusion into the dataset: there
can be no cyber force without an active military. As such, the DCFS surveys 172 UN-member
states and excludes the 21 member states that do not maintain an active military force. UNmembers without an active military include: Andorra, Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Iceland,
Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco,
Nauru, Palau, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, the Solomon
Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
Several cyber force initiatives from UN-member states are excluded from the dataset due
to lack of adequate information for full coding according to the procedures described below. A
list of these exclusions are as follows: the Bolivian Army’s Cyber Center; Cuba’s Cyber
Command; Ethiopia’s Cyber Security and Space Force; the Mongolian Armed Forces Cyber
Center; New Zealand’s Cyber Support Center; Pakistan’s capabilities writ large; Russia’s new
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Information Warfare Branch; the United Arab Emirates’ Military Cyber Command; and the
modernization initiatives announced by Armenia, Georgia, and Morocco.
Finally, the DCFS does not include information on non-UN members that meet the
criteria for cyber forces. For example, although Taiwan established an Information,
Communications, and Electronic Warfare Command in 2017,50 this initiative is excluded from
the dataset. Subsequent expansions of the dataset will look to include both additional years and
non-UN members.
Dataset Sources
The Dataset on Cyber Force Structures uses five types of resources to code country cyber forces
over time. The sources are:
Official government publications. Official government publications utilized for coding
include: national cyber-security strategies; national defense strategies; national cyber-defense
strategies; implementation plans related to national strategies; defense white papers; government
web pages; executive and legislative decrees; and government press releases and announcements.
Many of these primary documents are available in English. Where official English language
versions are not available, native-language versions were translated to English using Google
Translate.
Reports produced by think tanks or international organizations. Reports produced by
think thanks and international bodies are drawn from six main sources: initiatives of the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR); the International Telecommunication
Union(ITU); the Potomac Institute’s Cyber Readiness Index series; analyses from the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE); the European Union Agency for
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Cybersecurity (ENISA); and think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Estonia’s International Centre for Defense and Security, the Center for Security Studies
at ETH Zurich, and the International Institute from Strategic Studies which produces The
Military Balance. While most sources provide primary government documents and case-study
analyses, it is worth noting that several UNIDIR sources catalogue broader national cyberdefense initiatives and are not limited to just the military. Accordingly these UNIDIR
resources—Cybersecurity and Cyberwarfare 2011: Preliminary Assessment of National
Doctrine and Organization, The Cyber Index published in 2013, and the UNIDIR Cyber Policy
Portal (https://cyberpolicyportal.org/en/) provided crucial starting points for research and coding.
Peer-reviewed academic works. In addition to the academic works cited in this
dissertation, research and coding have relied on journal articles and books containing countryspecific case studies on military reforms, national intelligence communities, and cyber-specific
initiatives where available.
News articles from international and regional media outlets. Information from news
and magazine outlets have been collected through LexisNexis from sources such as the
Associated Press, Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, Wired Magazine, and region-specific
publications such as the Diplomat (East and South-East Asia) and Dialogo Americas (Central
and South America).
Interviews conducted with former policymakers, military officials, industry members,
and subject matter experts. Extensive interviews have been conducted with elites in the United
States (including several former military officials and one former cyber commander) and Estonia
(including former Ministry of Defense policymakers, NATO CCDCOE officials, and current
officials in Cyber Command). Initial interviews have also been conducted with contacts in
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Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Singapore. These interviews have been used not
only to obtain or confirm country-specific initiatives, but also to refine the criteria and
conceptual categories for the typology presented in this dissertation.
Cyber Force Coding Procedures
Several major coding rules have been applied to these resources to ascertain both the existence of
cyber forces and their force structures according to the conceptual categories of my typology.
Each observation must meet the following criteria to be included in the dataset:

1) Each observation must contain the following descriptive information:
•

Name of the UN-member state to which the organization corresponds;

•

An organizational name that appears in the military hierarchy/order of battle (and,
where applicable, and organizational acronym);

•

An operational start date (month and year) that indicates when cyber forces achieve
initial operating capability;

•

An operational end date (month and year) indicating when an organization is
dissolved or disbanded based expansion of the initial organization into a new entity,
reorganization and consolidation with other organizations to create a new entity, or
replacement with new initiatives that create greater changes to the military hierarchy;

•

The entity to which the organization directly reports in the military hierarchy;

•

Organizational location in either the combat or combat support chain of command;

•

The number of combat services included in the organization; and

•

Confirmation of CNO authority.

•

Where possible, the primary functional role of the organization (logistics,
intelligence, combat) is noted.
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2) An official government source must identify the organization and its CNO responsibilities.
These government sources must be confirmed through at least two other non-government
resources, regardless of resource type.

3) Where official government sources are unavailable or do not provide enough information for
rule #1, information on cyber forces must be derived from at least three different types of
resources listed above.

4) Cyber force subsystem location is coded based on the function of its immediate parent
organization. For example, Germany’s Department of Information and Computer Network
Operations (2006-2017) was subordinated to the Strategic Reconnaissance Command in the
Joint Support Service and is thus coded as a combat support organization (and thus a branch
model). Where there is no parent organization (i.e. a unified command), subsystem location
is determined by whether the organization is incorporated into combat service chains of
command or stands as an independent non-service force.

5) When multiple organizations within a country are given CNO responsibilities, cyber forces
are coded based on placement in the military hierarchy—those organizations higher in the
chain of command that retain operational responsibilities are designated as the primary cyber
force. For example, Denmark’s primary cyber force from 2009-2012 was the Army 3rd
Electronic Warfare Company; however, because the Offensive Cyber Warfare Unit
(established 2012) under the Defense Intelligence Service had fewer links in the chain of
command to the Danish Defense Command (the joint command) and the Minister of
Defense, the Cyber Warfare Unit replace the 3rd Electronic Warfare Company as the primary
cyber force despite the continued operation of the 3rd EW Company.

6) Organizational Model is based on (1) subsystem location and (2) the number of combat
services that maintain cyber forces. Cyber forces located in the combat support subsystem
maintain a Branch Model. Cyber forces in the combat subsystem have either a Service model
(1 combat service) or a Joint model (2+ combat services with cyber forces). Joint
organizational models occur when either (1) combat services are formally linked by a single
supra-command, or (2) multiple combat services maintain their own independent cyber
forces. When multiple combat services maintain cyber forces, but each of these forces report
to only one of the combat services, countries are coded as having a single-service model
instead of a joint structure.

7) Scale of Command is determined by immediate parent organizations and reporting structures.
A Unified Command has no parent organization and reports directly to
Chiefs/Ministers/Secretaries of Defense. Unified Commands are joint unified combatant
commands, independent combat services, or independent branch commands. Sub-Unified
Commands report to Unified Commands: they include joint combatant commands that are
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not unified; Major Commands under individual combat services; and Major Commands
reporting to an independent branch command. Finally, Subordinated Commands report to
Sub-Unified commands (and, in rare cases, directly to Unified Commands as task forces).
Subordinated command structures appear as task forces, joint component units to a unified or
sub-unified combatant command, individual units reporting to a Major Command within a
combat service, or functional support units reporting to branch commands.
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Appendix 2
Robustness Checks for Statistical Models in Chapter 4

Robustness Checks: Unimputed Data
Table A1: Stratified Cox Model of the Entire Implementation Process, Robustness Check Using
Unimputed Data
Variables

B/(SE)

Log Total Military Personnel

2.318*
(1.02)

Log Total Military Personnel Squared

-0.074†
(0.045)
0.178
(0.167)

Log Military Spending (USD mil)
per 1000 Soldiers
Government Expertise
Government Expertise Squared
Latent Cyber Capacity
Latent Cyber Capacity Squared
Regime
Total Active Conflicts
Intensity of Strategic Environment
Diffusion
Diffusion x Time

2.221†
(1.200)
-0.212†
(0.109)
4.687***
(1.178)
-0.401**
(0.135)
2.418***
(0.727)
0.296
(0.402)
-0.158
(0.240)
13.770**
(5.242)
-0.088**
(0.032)

Note: *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. †p ≤ .10. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
N = 61,052. Failures= 80. Log likelihood = -617.2566.
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Table A2. Multistate Model of the Implementation Process, Robustness Check Using Unimputed Data

Covariates

P→F

P→I

I→M

I→E

I→F

M→E

M→F

E→F

Log Total Military Personnel

0.940
(0.718)

0.851***
(0.136)

0. 927†
(0.492)

0.362
(0.290)

0. 170
(0.301)

0.362
(0.290)

0.678
(1.133)

0.678
(1.133)

Log Military Spending per
1000 Soldiers (USD mil)

0.846
(0.727)

0. 431*
(0.187)

3.362*
(1.383)

1.607*
(0.741)

0.260
(0.580)

1.607*
(0.741)

-0.805
(2.116)

-0.805
(2.116)

Government Expertise

0.467
(1.055)

-0.244
(0. 210)

-0.602
(0.647)

-0.491
(0.402)

-0.150
(0.425)

-0.491
(0.402)

-0.328
(1.834)

-0.328
(1.834)

Latent Cyber Capacity

-0.126
(1.851)

1.189***
(0.256)

-2.111
(1.915)

-0.145
(0.778)

1.492***
(0.399)

-0.145
(0.778)

0.535
(1.856)

0.535
(1.856)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

3.393***
(0.779)

Total Active Conflicts

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

0.126
(0.421)

Intensity of Strategic
Environment

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

-0.052
(0.253)

Diffusion

-14.572
(16.199)

51.136***
(13.862)

8.286*
(4.021)

3.448
(2.831)

4.807
(3.876)

3.448
(2.831)

-3.573
(6.107)

-3.573
(6.107)

-

-0.432***
(0.099)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Regime

Diffusion x Time

Note: *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. †p ≤ .10. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
N = 61,052. Failures= 80. Log likelihood = -587.43719.
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Robustness Checks: Stratified Cox Models with Imputed Data
In addition to using an alternative measure for military spending, the robustness checks in Table
4.13 utilize two additional measures not discussed in the primary text of the chapter. Additional
control variables are as follows:
Military Professionalism. Professionalization of the armed forces may impact the
military’s capacity to adopt and implement innovations. To capture the potential effects of
professionalism on the implementation process, I utilize two measures: an ordinal measure
assessing the extent to which appointment decisions in the armed forces are made based on
personal/political connections or on skills and merit; and an ordinal measure assessing the extent
to which members of the armed forces are salaried employees (conscripts are excluded). Both
measures are drawn from the Varieties of Democracy Project.
Economic Development. In addition to the latent cyber capacity index, it is also possible
that latent cyber capabilities rest on the development of a country’s broader economic base. To
account for this potential confounder, I operationalize economic development as gross domestic
product (GDP) in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. This measure is logged to facilitate comparability
Across all models M1-M3, the relationship between organizational size and the
implementation process holds, supporting the conclusions in the main text. Statistically
significant relationships persist regardless of whether size is conceptualized in terms of military
personnel (M1) or in terms of spending (M2 and M3) when controlling for other factors. In fact,
these robustness checks enhance the findings in the main text: the significance levels of spending
as a measure of size suggest that the personnel measure utilized in the main text is the more
conservative measure for organizational size.
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Table A3: Stratified Cox Models of the Implementation Process, Robustness Checks Using
Imputed Data.
Covariates
Log Total Military Personnel
Log Total Military Personnel
Squared
Log Total Military Spending
(USD mil)

M1

M2

M3

2.516*
(1.124)
-0.101*
(0.049)
0.290†
(0.160)

0.332*
(0.140)

0.328†
(0.169)

2.059***
(0.594)

2.442***
(0.674)

-0.108***
(0.034)

-0.130***
(0.037)

Log Total Military Spending
Squared (USD mil)
Military Professionalism
(Appointments)

-0.052
(0.171)

-0.261
(0.165)

Military Professionalism II
(Salaried)

0.148
(0.169)

0.233
(0.169)

-0.984
(1.539)
2.266*
(1.051)
-0.207*
(0.090)
3.462***
(0.943)
-0.255**
(0.099)
-0.125
(0.232)

-1.728
(1.582)
1.458
(1.045)
-0.138
(0.090)
3.781***
(0.909)
-0.272**
(0.093)
-0.106
(0.228)

Military Influence
Government Expertise
Government Expertise Squared
Latent Cyber Capacity
Latent Cyber Capacity Squared
Log GDP per capita
Regime
Regime II

1.627
(1.034)
-0.159†
(0.089)
3.691***
(0.844)
-0.267**
(0.089)

2.732***
(0. 661)

0.233***
0.281***
(0.070)
(0.073)
Total Active Conflicts
0.567
0.433
0.535
(0.345)
(0.313)
(0.334)
Intensity of Strategic
-0.304
-0.197
-0.248
Environment
(0.207)
(0.193)
(0.202)
Diffusion
13.437**
11.333*
12.711**
(5.090)
(4.746)
(4.789)
Diffusion x Time
-.078**
-0.066*
-0.071*
(0.030)
(4.746)
(0.028)
Note: *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. †p ≤ .10. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
N = 72,006. Failures=89. Imputations = 5.
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